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1 INTRODUCTION TO THIS REPORT 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Resilience to failure represents a cornerstone of effective risk management. It relates to the capacity to deflect, 
absorb and return from disruptive challenges to extant processes and systems.  It is not a state with a defined 
end-point, rather it is about dynamic and continuous improvement. The challenge for employers and safety 
professionals rests with the capacity to identify vulnerabilities and to use the derived learning to inform strategy 
for maintaining current and enhancing future resilience.   
The complexity of large-scale organisations is increasing.  This is often manifest in terms of organisations’ 
structures, systems and processes and exacerbated when combined with trends towards increasing 
specialisation, the resultant bureaucracy of knowledge and the ever-present scope for partisan agendas.  This 
renders the recognition of vulnerabilities particularly challenging.   
The capacity to recognise vulnerabilities, which invariably arise from interactions between variables, is 
challenging in itself.  But even where recognised, the associated complexity can exceed the mental capacity 
of individuals or controlling minds, such that their recognition relies upon the quality of engineered and social 
systems put in place to gather and synthesise intelligence.  However, bitter experience from major events has 
taught us that the presence of effective structures and systems alone may not prove to be sufficient where 
there are cultural barriers to effective learning, e.g. where critical voices are unwelcome, suppressed, or simply 
ignored, or where economic considerations dominate micro-political agendas and priorities.  
Linked with the concept of safety culture maturity, the term ‘learning organisation’ has entered the safety and 
risk management lexicon.  ‘Learning organisations’ are institutions defined as having reached a state of 
maturity in their approach to risk management such that they pro-actively seek out data and other evidence 
to test for vulnerabilities in their structural, engineered and social systems.  Learning can take a variety of 
forms, and can be derived from an array of sources, key amongst which, are learning from incidents (within 
and beyond the organisation); learning from effective monitoring of the safety status of systems and 
processes, including behavioural components; intelligence gathering through meaningful engagement and, 
involvement of employees.  
 
High profile, high consequence industrial accidents represent a key source of learning that other organisations 
can draw upon to enhance their resilience. Similarly, there is considerable scope to apply learning from 
incidents within one’s own organisation in the same way.  A unifying prerequisite, however, rests with the 
need for a strong, critical focus on identifying root causes and commonalities, underpinned by the need to be 
mindful of the illusion of retrospective determinism (Bergson, 1911) giving rise to an unduly narrow 
perspective.  A key insight of deeper analysis is that causality is routinely non-linear, in the sense of a simple 
intuitive chain of events (see parts 1 and 3).  This analysis suggests less transparent influences, that lie 
beyond engineered systems and arising from the interplay with structural, socio-technical and cultural 
elements.    
Recent decades have witnessed a growing recognition of the need to understand and take account of these 
‘softer’ components in incident causation.  Doing so requires engagement with social science insights, notably 
from management theory, cognitive psychology, social psychology and sociology, as well as traditional human 
factors and ergonomics principles.  Reflecting the engineering roots of the industrial safety tradition, the central 
focus has been on systems, rather than individuals per se, i.e. how the context (structural, engineered and 
social) of the workplace interact to impact on individual and group behaviour.  This has given rise to a 
significant interest in both recognising and understanding such influences and finding ways of measuring their 
prevalence.   
Of particular note is the work on safety climate/culture, as well as an array of auditing techniques, notably 
those focused on behavioural elements.  The merits of the more commonly encountered approaches are 
discussed in Part 2.  The focus on softer non-engineered elements has been widely justified by duty holders 
and some safety professionals on the basis of a claimed plateauing of safety performance attributable to 
engineered solutions.  However, this premise remains contentious, and conceptually risks oversimplification 
and propagation of artificial separation between social, technical and structural elements, that are prone to 
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interact in complex ways that may not be immediately apparent.  The capacity to recognise the subtlety of the 
relationships between these variables can be important, as exemplified in the discussion of major events in 
Part 1 and the modelling techniques discussed in Part 3.   
Our perspective on the use of evidence to enhance resilience, however, extends beyond the identification of 
vulnerabilities, whether derived from lag or lead indicator sources, to the challenging arena of effective 
intervention design to produce improvement, specifically with respect to cultural and behavioural elements 
(Parts 2 and 3).  A central premise is that learning through effective data capture is key to the design and 
delivery of successful change agendas, again, underpinned by a strong commitment to critical introspection.  
This report commences (Part 1) with an account of findings and implications from an analysis of 12 major 
incidents within the petrochemical, nuclear, civil engineering, transport and space exploration sectors.  
Echoing findings from related foundation work within the University of Bristol Safety Systems Research 
Centre, the key finding is that these incidents share a number of common organisational and cultural 
weaknesses.  The implications of this leads to the question of how organisations might go about detecting the 
presence of these and other vulnerabilities, and most pertinently, what steps they might take to address 
identified vulnerabilities, this being the focus for Parts 2 and 3.  Part 2 provides a critical perspective on the 
use of incident and other safety performance data/evidence to detect organisational and cultural weaknesses 
of the type identified in Part 1, before moving to the challenging issue of intervention design and delivery.  The 
scope for applying cutting-edge modelling techniques as a potential tool for organisations to desktop prototype 
the logic of their ideas for intervention is discussed in Part 3. 
1.2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1.2.1 Part 1: Cultural precursors to major events: good practice expectations 
Part 1 reports on findings from a deeper analysis of the causative, organisational and cultural precursors for 
a sample of 12 major events drawn from a range of industry sectors.  Ten 'themes' are identified that provide 
a means of classifying these important precursors to the events. These are: 
1.  Leadership  
2.  Safety Culture  
3.  The Business Environment - Commercial Pressures 
4.  Effective Communication 
5.  The Safety Management Systems 
6.  Risk Assessment and Management  
7.  Developing and Maintaining a Learning Organisation  
8.  Maintaining Competence 
9.  Management of Contractors - the Supply Chain 
10.  Oversight and Scrutiny 
Within each of these themes, findings from the event reports, and some further points prompted by them, 
have been drawn together to form 'organisational expectations'. These should, in theory, allow organisations 
to integrate these, or benchmark against, their own operational and organisational requirements, e.g. policies, 
requirements or good practice guidelines. 
The expectations (150 in total) are presented as a series of statements.  The objective was that these should 
act as a source of reference that would enable organisations to assess ('benchmark') their own approach and 
expectations, either against the collective results or within specific areas where they have a particular interest 
or concern.  
The expectations are complemented by a discussion and commentary designed to put them into context and 
to explain their importance.  
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The findings should also be of interest to regulatory bodies in considering their requirements on duty holders, 
and also to industry bodies and international organisations that have a role in promoting good practice. 
A major recommendation of this review is that the set of expectations should be further developed into a set 
of 'penetrating' questions to assess operational 'reality'.  This would provide employers and safety 
professionals with an important new tool that could be applied at a range of organisational levels to assess 
vulnerability to major industrial events, i.e. as a supplement to functionally similar 'tools' currently used to 
assess engineered vulnerabilities. Further development would be required. 
If it is assumed that 'benchmarking' against the expectations identifies areas where potential improvements 
might be made, the key question then arises as to how the derived insights and learning might be used to 
inform corporate decision making over the design of interventions that address identified vulnerabilities. This 
is discussed in Part 3, drawing on examples from the learning identified in Part 1. 
1.2.2 Part 2: Organisational learning and the design of evidence-based interventions 
Part 2 provides a critical commentary on contemporary theory and practice in addressing behavioural and 
cultural elements.  A core theme relates to the role of evidence within the related domains of: 
• identifying structural, organisational and socio-technical weakness; 
• setting priorities for intervention to enhance resilience; 
• intervention options appraisal – theories of change and what works, and 
• intervention design and delivery – intervention logic – how will ‘it’ work and impact evaluation. 
 
Options are also discussed for data gathering, and the relative strengths and limitations of lag and lead 
indicators and their potential contribution to identifying priorities for informing managerial/safety function 
thinking over intervention and improvement. 
Options for intervention are discussed, with reference to influential mainstream theories of behaviour change, 
supplemented by critical reflection upon the more widely encountered approaches to intervention within the 
safety domain.  The commentaries on contemporary safety culture and behavioural safety practice are 
informed through the author's involvement in some of the foundation UK research on these topics.  
The perspective on intervention extends to engagement with the under-articulated area of options appraisal, 
i.e. by what mechanism is change theorised to occur; what proportion of individuals might be predicted to 
make sustainable changes to their behaviour; what will be the roles of respective stakeholders, how much 
progress is required by when? etc.  The scope for applying system dynamics modelling techniques to 
intervention options appraisal and design (see Part 3) is discussed.  
Part 2 is supported by five themed annexes that offer a more detailed articulation of the history, assumptions 
and strength of evidence for the concepts, tools, techniques discussed within the body text: 
• Annex A: The characteristics of high-reliability organisations - many of which maintain and sustain 
their resilience to failure in ways that align with the expectations developed from the learning from 
events presented in Part 1. 
• Annex B: Safety culture maturity and how it can be assessed. 
• Annex C: Strengths and weaknesses of behaviours. 
• Annex D: Limits of training and communication interventions. 
• Annex E: Considerations in the use of incentives and reward. 
 
1.2.3 Part 3: System dynamics modelling 
Part 3 presents the argument that the ability of an organisation to learn from past events and proactively 
improve resilience is often constrained by simplifications made in the way we conceive and model event 
causality.  Part 3 explores the scope for using system dynamics modelling as a means of identifying, 
articulating and making transparent, vulnerabilities within complex socio-technical systems that balance some 
of the shortfalls of other existing approaches.  Causal loop diagrams (CLDs) provide an intuitive graphical 
representation of how variables interrelate and align.  Modelling is relevant to a range of complementary risk 
management domains, including:  
• representation of incident causality;  
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• testing the resilience of established safety systems and control measures and,  
• proof-testing the logic of change/improvement intervention ideas.  
 
The scope for further development is discussed.  
Following an introduction to CLD using simple examples, three case studies are presented to highlight the 
application of causal loop modelling (CLM) in relation to examples considered in Part 1.  The first of these 
relates to the theme of 'oversight and scrutiny'.  The second addresses 'incentives and indicators', while the 
third considers the causal factors relating to ‘contractor and supply chain management’.   
Through these examples, archetypal structures of organisational and cultural precursors to failure aligned with 
the themes discussed in Part 1 are presented.  These reconceptualise elements of the precursors as being 
emergent from the interactions between multiple variables.  This assists in ensuring not just that unhelpful or 
dangerous behaviours are prevented, but that the underlying systems that cause those behaviours are 
identified and treated.  Efforts to control these variables as discrete from one another, or as simply part of a 
chain of causality, can result in ineffective interventions.  It is thus through this re-conceptualization that better 
reflects the complexity of the organisations and systems in question, that potential interventions can be tested 
at a systemic level.  
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PART 1 
 
CULTURAL PRECURSORS TO MAJOR EVENTS: GOOD PRACTICE EXPECTATIONS 
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2 INTRODUCTION TO PART 1 
 
 
Part 1 sets out a series of 'expectations' for good practice. The expectations were developed based on 
reviewing the findings of published investigations into twelve important events that have occurred over the 
last twenty-five years across a range of industries that are engaged in 'process safety' (those engaging in 
activities that involve complex interactions between people, processes and engineered plant). 
The expectations are presented under 10 broad headings that should enable organisations to assess 
('benchmark') their own approach and expectations, either against the collective results or within specific areas 
where they have a particular interest or concern. The learning can be incorporated into major organisations ’ 
operational and organisational requirements – e.g. 'policies', 'requirements', 'standards' or 'good practice 
guidelines'.  
The findings should also be of interest to regulatory bodies in considering their requirements on duty holders, 
and also to industry bodies and international organisations that have a role in promoting good practice. 
Many of the findings should apply to 'occupational safety' (sometimes referred to as 'personal safety' or 
'industrial safety') that refers to personal injuries or fatalities arising from day-to-day activities in the course of 
work such as slips, trips and falls, but the context of this report concentrates on the organisational and cultural 
precursors to major events that led (or could have led) to major loss of life, significant plant damage, 
environmental consequences, major costs, and a potential loss of corporate (and wider industry) reputation.  
The development of the material presented in Part 1 relies for its content on the presented recommendations, 
conclusions and discussion in the event investigation reports used as source material and referenced in 
Section 3. In a few areas, prompted by the event findings, the expectations have been strengthened and 
further developed where it is judged that by doing so provides additional valuable insights or greater clarity 
regarding particular identified issues.  
The events studied were deliberately chosen to encompass a wide variety of industries including chemical 
plant, nuclear installations, transport, and major civil engineering undertakings. This wide range reflects earlier 
studies of events (Taylor, R. H. and Rycraft, H. S., Learning from disasters; Taylor, R. H et al, A study of the 
precursors leading to ‘organisational’ accidents in complex industrial settings; Taylor, R. H. et al, 
Understanding organisational and cultural precursors to events) that had shown significant commonality in 
organisational and cultural precursors across a wide range of industry settings and contexts, including events 
occurring during ‘normal’ operation, during higher-risk operations such as start-ups and shutdowns, and in 
major projects to improve plant or construct new facilities.  
 
2.1 POTENTIAL USES OF THE EXPECTATIONS 
 
The expectations that have been developed may be useful in a number of ways: 
a) They can be used as general 'reminders' of the organisational and cultural precursors to major events and 
thus to raise awareness of these important and sometimes neglected issues. They may be of particular 
value to leaders and senior managers who may not be fully familiar with some of the issues involved, and 
the information presented may enable them to ask informed questions about the areas discussed. It may 
also help them to recognise more clearly how their decision making can influence the issues identified and 
that could lead to poor or deteriorating standards of process safety performance if not adequately 
addressed. It may also be valuable in this context for introducing new managers and leaders to the key 
issues that underpin process safety as part of their initial training. 
b) Another potential use may be as a checklist for those investigating events. Some investigations still ‘stop’ 
their analysis by concluding that, for example, 'levels of competence were not high enough', or that 
'procedures were not followed' and do not go deeper into the causes to investigate why these issues arose. 
The expectations might, therefore, be valuable as an 'aide memoir' to investigators in order to prompt a 
deeper examination of organisational and cultural issues. A potential area of further work would be to 
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develop an investigation 'tool' aimed at promoting full and consistent investigation of relevant 
organisational and cultural issues following an event. 
c) The primary consideration in carrying out this work, however, was to enable organisations to develop or 
review their expectations (or the equivalent) and enable them to benchmark them against what has been 
learned from the wide range of actual events studied here. This might be done either in specific areas 
considered as requiring review (e.g. contractor management or leadership) or more systematically to 
compare existing expectations or their equivalent, across the whole range of pertinent issues that have 
been identified here. Some regulators and other bodies have also developed guidance for their inspection 
teams that attempts to address organisational and cultural issues. For example, the Office for Nuclear 
Regulation (ONR) in the UK have published safety assessment principles (SAPs) that address many of 
the themes identified in this document (ONR, Safety assessment principles for nuclear facilities). The 
expectations developed here may provide an opportunity for these to be benchmarked in a similar way to 
that for industry. 
d) Finally, it has been noted that there are already 'tools' (such as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), human 
reliability analysis (HRA) etc.) that allow organisations to assess performance in engineering and human 
factors requirements and practice on a periodic basis, as part of their process of risk assessment for 
planned or existing operations. The expectations presented here should provide a basis for organisational 
and cultural issues to be assessed in the same way as part of that process. Some foundation work has 
been carried out to develop the expectations into sets of 'penetrating questions' that might allow analysis 
of these matters to be similarly explored. Preliminary work in the area of leadership (McBride, M., Taylor, 
R. H, and Sibbick, G., Organisational and cultural causes of accidents - a pilot study), for example, 
suggested that this could be a useful development that would enable industry and regulatory bodies to 
explore current practices. This may lead to interventions, and it is then important that the learning 
presented in the rest of this document on CLM and psychological and behavioural factors in developing 
effective interventions, should be fully taken into account. 
The potential uses are illustrated schematically in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Potential uses of the expectations generated from analysis of the twelve events 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 3.1 METHODOLOGY 
 
This study builds on earlier work conducted since 2004 (Taylor, R. H. and Rycraft, H. S., Learning from 
disasters; Taylor, R. H. et al, A study of the precursors leading to ‘organisational’ accidents in complex 
industrial settings; Taylor, R. H. et al, Understanding organisational and cultural precursors to events; 
McBride, M., Taylor, R. H., and Sibbick, G., Organisational and cultural causes of accidents - a pilot study).  
The methodology used for this study was based on the approach used in the foundation work (Taylor, R. H. 
and Rycraft, H. S., Learning from disasters, and Taylor, R. H. et al, A study of the precursors leading to 
‘organisational’ accidents in complex industrial settings). This earlier work only considered the results in broad 
terms, whereas the current study provides a significantly more detailed and comprehensive analysis.  
The review was carried out in several stages: 
a) The various reports into the twelve events (16 in total, ~2000 pages) were studied, and relevant paragraphs 
and sections identified where these contained findings relevant to organisational and cultural matters. From 
this initial work, the headings or 'themes' under which the results were to be presented were formulated. 
b) The relevant, identified material was then assigned to one or more of the ten identified 'themes'. Points 
arising from each report frequently covered the same ground, so areas of commonality were then brought 
together for the issues identified; 
c) These points were then reviewed and summarised before assigning them to relevant sub-section headings 
(e.g. 4.2.1, 4.2.2 etc.), that were chosen to cover the full range of material identified under each of the 
identified 'themes'.  These are spread over Sections 4-13. 
d) Work then proceeded sequentially on each theme, turning the summary material into a coherent narrative 
account. This was designed to identify the expectations, but also provide a commentary that considered 
their context and significance.  
e) The narrative account was then summarised and presented within each theme in the form of a set of 
expectations without the contextual material provided by the commentary. This was designed to allow 
those interested in obtaining an overview of the expectations and in a form allowing organisations to carry 
out a direct comparison of the expectations with their own existing equivalent material. 
f) In carrying out such an extensive review, there is always the danger that relevant material may be missed 
and that the reviewer introduces subjective biases into the selection and filtering of the material identified. 
To minimise this, a second 'run through' of the material summarised from the reports studied was then 
carried out. This allowed points to be further clarified where required in the commentary, and a few further 
points were added that had not been previously identified. Other team members were then invited to 
comment and to use the expectations in draft form to identify material that might form a basis, and provide 
examples, for subsequent parts on modelling of proposed interventions, and behavioural and psychological 
issues. 
g) Finally, an independent review was carried out by another member of the research team to provide an 
independent partial quality check. Here, a sample of the twelve event reports were read and an analysis 
parallel to that above carried out to check that no significant issues had been omitted and to review the 
commentary and summaries. This indicated that no major issues had been omitted based on the reports 
reviewed, but allowed the discussion of a small number of the expectations to be improved or strengthened. 
Before finalising, the final draft was then reviewed by independent specialists from two external 
organisations to assess suitability and provide comments. 
The methodology used is shown schematically in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Representation of the method used to generate expectations 
The events chosen were (in order of occurrence): 
1. Port of Ramsgate walkway collapse – UK, September 1994 (Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Walkway 
collapse at Port Ramsgate: A report on the investigation). 
2. Heathrow Express new Austrian tunnelling method (NATM) tunnel collapse during construction – UK, 
October 1994 (HSE, Collapse of NATM tunnels at Heathrow Airport.  A Report on the investigation by the 
HSE into the collapse of New Austrian Tunneling Method (NATM) tunnels at the central terminal area of 
Heathrow Airport on 20/21 October 1994). 
3. Longford gas plant explosion – Australia, September 1998 (Hopkins, A., Lessons from Longford: The 
Esso gas plant explosion; Royal Commission, The Esso Longford gas plant accident: Report of the 
Longford Royal Commission; State Coroner Victoria, Inquest into the deaths of Peter Brubeck Wilson 
and John Francis Lowery and the fire at Longford gas plant number 1).  
4. Tokaimura criticality accident – Japan, September 1999 (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
1999, IAEA report on the preliminary fact finding mission following the accident at the nuclear fuel 
processing facility in Tokaimura, Japan, 26 November 1999; US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Safeguards, D of F.C.S, NRC review of the Tokai-mura criticality accident). 
5. Hatfield railway accident – UK, October 2000 (Office of Rail Regulation, Train derailment at Hatfield: A 
final report by the Independent Investigation Board). 
6. Davis Besse pressure vessel corrosion event – USA, February 2002 (US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Davis-Besse reactor vessel head degradation lessons-learned task force report). 
7. Loss of the Columbia Shuttle – USA, February 2003 (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board report). 
8. Paks nuclear plant fuel cleaning event – Hungary, April 2003 (IAEA, 2003, Report of the expert mission 
conducted under the IAEA Technical Co-operation Project). 
9. Texas City oil refinery explosion – USA, March 2005 (Baker, J. A. et al, The report of the BP U.S. 
Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel; Chemical Safety Hazards Investigation Board, Investigation 
report: Refinery explosion and fire; Mogford, J., Fatal accident investigation report - Isomerization unit 
explosion final report). 
10. Loss of containment at the thermal oxide reprocessing plant (THORP) Sellafield reprocessing plant – 
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UK, April 2005 (Health and Safety Executive, Report of the investigation into the leak of dissolver 
product liquor at the thermal oxide reprocessing plant (THORP), Sellafield). 
11. Buncefield Fuel Storage Explosion – UK, December 2005 (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 
The Buncefield incident, 11 December 2005 - The final report of the Major Incident Investigation Board). 
12. Loss of the Nimrod XV230 Aircraft – Afghanistan, September 2006 (Haddon-Cave, Q. C., The Nimrod 
review - An independent review into the broader issues surrounding the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 
aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006). 
 
A brief description of each of these events is presented in Annex F. This choice of events was determined by 
a range of factors: 
a) The availability of formal reports that looked in some depth at the organisational and cultural precursors 
to the events. Some candidate events were the subject of reports that took a more superficial view of 
such factors and these were therefore not used as input to the current study. 
b) Events that had occurred relatively recently, so that the applicability of learning would still be relevant to 
current operations. More recent events may still be subject to continued investigation, analysis and (in 
some cases) legal action, so these were precluded from the study. Some earlier events had been 
considered as part of foundation work (Taylor, R. H. and Rycraft, H. S., Learning from disasters), where 
they suggested precursors that were strikingly similar but were not included in later studies because 
they occurred some considerable time ago. 
c) Events that industry partners, professional bodies, and academic sources had suggested were of 
considerable interest and from which they had derived learning. 
Where specific events are cited, this is because of the learning opportunities that they present, rather than 
criticism of the organisations involved. 
3.1 THEMES 
The expectations were aggregated and considered under ten 'themes' that were chosen to cover the main 
findings and that were considered likely to reflect the key areas of interest to industry and regulatory bodies: 
1. Leadership  
2. Safety Culture  
3. The Business Environment - Commercial Pressures 
4. Effective Communication 
5. The Safety Management System 
6. Risk Assessment and Management  
7. Developing and Maintaining a Learning Organisation  
8. Maintaining Competence 
9. Management of Contractors - the Supply Chain   
10. Oversight and Scrutiny 
It should be emphasised that in the analysis of events involving significant complexity and behavioural 
influences, learning may often need to be categorised under several of the themes. This is illustrated in Part 
3, where CLM has been applied. For example, one of the case studies presented draws out in a very clear 
way potential interactions between various themes such as safety culture, oversight and scrutiny, business 
environment, communications and the safety management system (SMS) in terms of the wider 'knock-on' 
effects, as change taking place in one area impacts much more widely. The introduction to each of the 
Sections in Part 1 identifies where there is 'overlap' in the expectations and the associated commentaries.  
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In exploring the findings from the events studied and then developing the expectations under each theme, it 
was recognised that behavioural and psychological influences often played a key role in the causation of the 
events. Part 2 of this report discusses a range of such influences and where these appear to be particularly 
relevant to the issue under consideration, they are signposted in the commentary and discussion related to 
each theme in Part 1.  
The order with which expectations relevant to these themes are presented reflects, in very broad terms, a 
hierarchy of organisational influence. Thus, leadership is presented first since this has the ability to 'shape' 
the other themes. Safety culture and the effectiveness of communication within the organisation are areas 
where corporate leadership commitment and example have a considerable influence over the way that these 
issues are treated across the organisation. The business environment (e.g. commercial or 'political' pressures) 
can strongly influence this leadership approach. The SMS contains requirements relating to risk assessment, 
reporting and learning, maintaining competence, and managing contractors and although these should again 
be influenced by the attitudes and behaviours of corporate leaders, the way that they are set and promoted in 
practice is primarily determined by 'business' or project leadership and management. Finally, oversight and 
scrutiny, which includes monitoring and audit, as well as broader organisational oversight (often carried out 
through the relevant safety function), ensures that expectations at all levels are both being communicated and 
effectively-being put into practice.  
This approach to the ordering of the themes is illustrated in Figure 3. It should be noted, however, that in this 
illustrative representation, the interactive nature of some important issues are not fully drawn out (but are 
reflected in the text in Part 1). For example, leadership should strongly influence the safety culture of the 
organisation but there should also be feedback from the culture on the effectiveness of leadership. A very 
important matter such as learning from near misses requires effective and encouraging leadership, a strong 
safety culture, and effective management systems that are mutually supportive and reinforcing. The reference 
to 'encouragement of learning/improvement' and 'reporting and learning from events' within individual boxes 
within Figure 3, for example, does not mean to imply that interdependencies between elements of the diagram 
are not of very considerable importance.  
Earlier studies used a slightly different set of 'themes'.  In the present report, 'safety management systems' 
(previously considered along with safety culture) has been brought out as a separate theme and 'management 
of contractors', that had been previously been subsumed within several of the themes, was likewise separated, 
reflecting its importance as a major contributory factor in over half of the events studied. These changes were 
made in the light of re-analysing the various reports, and reflect the fact that both weaknesses in the SMS 
(and non-compliance with it), and issues with the drawing up and management of contracts, were both such 
major issues in many of the events that they should be recognised and addressed as separate themes. 
Each theme is divided into sub-sections. These attempt to draw together the main areas of interest or 'topics' 
within the expectations. These are summarised in an introductory section to each theme.  As discussed in 
3.1, the sub-sections were identified as a result of aggregating the collective findings of all of the sources 
studied within a particular theme and then identifying suitable sub-sections based on the material available. 
The material under each theme is developed in three main sections: an overview, the expectations in summary 
form (presented in tables), and a discussion and commentary on the expectations that puts them into context 
and explains their importance. There are between 10 to 21 expectation in each theme, and amount to more 
than 1501 in total across the ten themes. It should be noted that there is strong correspondence between 
some of the identified expectations and the attributes ascribed to high-reliability organisations (HROs). These 
are discussed in Annex A. 
Expectations under each theme have deliberately been grouped in order to ensure that each theme is 'self-
standing'. Thus, if there is particular interest in certain themes where there may be the need to review current 
organisational expectations (or their equivalent), all relevant material should be contained within that theme. 
This does, however, mean that taking the expectations presented as a whole, there should be some 
duplication and overlap between material presented. Other approaches were considered in presenting the 
material, but the need to ensure that each theme remained 'self-standing' was considered to be of primary 
 
1 The fact that 150 expectations are considered necessary is, in itself, indicative of the complexity of the topic. 
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importance. Some cross-referencing at the end of the introduction to each theme has been provided, however, 
so that other relevant material can more easily be identified and considered.  
The expectations presented in Part 1, provide a basis not only for benchmarking current organisational 
requirements against findings developed from events as mentioned above but provide a basis for the potential 
development of 'probing' questions within each of the key areas that would enable organisations to review or 
audit the degree to which operational practice meets organisational aspirations. Just as audit and oversight 
are important practices in ensuring acceptable standards in engineered systems and operational processes, 
it is anticipated that the current material could be able to provide a basis for a similar approach in reviewing 
organisational and cultural factors (see 'potential uses' in 1.1) - the importance of which are amply 
demonstrated by the events studied. Some successful earlier work has been carried out for one of the themes 
(leadership) (McBride, M., Taylor, R. H, and Sibbick, G., 2012, Organisational and cultural causes of accidents 
- a pilot study).  
When improvements need to be made as a result of such a review, it is important that great care is taken in 
assessing the potential for unintended consequences in closely coupled and complex systems involving 
people, plant and processes. A systems view should be taken. Indeed, this is a finding from the reports on 
several of the events studied. As noted above, Part 3 of this report considers and provides examples of the 
application of CLM and shows how this has the potential to enable the identification of actions and 
performance indicators that take into account and address potential 'knock-on' effects.  
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Figure 3: Schematic of the interaction between themes reflecting their order of presentation 
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4 EXPECTATIONS: LEADERSHIP 
4.1 OVERVIEW 
 
Effective leadership is arguably the most important factor influencing process safety performance in an 
organisation. Leaders set the tone of the organisation, and what they demonstrably and visibly regard as 
important gives a clear message to the workforce about organisational priorities. 
It is recognised that in some sources, leadership is sub-divided into:  
a) executive leaders, whose primary role is to determine business strategy and ensure independent 
oversight of performance;  
b) line managers whose primary role is to ensure effective delivery of leadership objectives by 
ensuring, inter alia, that the workforce is able to meet the objectives being sought together with the 
planning, monitoring and auditing of work and,  
c) supervisors, whose primary role is to provide direction and support to teams in the context of day-
to-day activities.  
In this document, the term leadership has been interpreted broadly to cover all of these roles, except where it 
is explicitly stated that reference is being made to a particular role.  
In order for leadership at all organisational levels to be effective, many of the organisational systems discussed 
elsewhere in Part 1 (e.g. communications, maintenance of competence, etc.) have to be fully effective. The 
overall process is thus interactive and interdependent since leaders should not only have an important role in 
determining and maintaining these systems, but the success of their leadership roles should also depend 
upon the effectiveness of them. 
Leaders should communicate their strong commitment to improving process safety and ensuring that risks 
are adequately addressed. This is particularly important when there are business pressures on the 
organisation and changes taking place that may impact on the process safety priorities of the workforce 
(including any contractors). Nearly all of the events studied occurred during periods when there were 
substantial business pressures. It is essential that senior leaders review the impact of the business 
environment on process safety and act to ensure that safety is not being adversely affected. Where pressures 
are being externally imposed, the potential impact on safety should be made clear to those imposing 
requirements on the business.  
Leaders should also ensure that all required management systems are in place with adequate support and 
resource, together with a strong underpinning safety culture. It is very important that in their communications, 
their approach to safety culture and establishing organisational systems, a precautionary approach to process 
safety is taken that starts from the assumption that 'things can go wrong'.   
Other sections in Part 1 where leadership related issues are discussed include sections 5, 6, and 13, with 
some references in sections 7, 8 and 11. 
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Table 1 - Summary of leadership expectations 
L1 Business leaders should make it clear that safety is a core value and takes precedence over 
all other matters. This should not only be reflected in communications (including 'policy' 
documents and expectations) but also convincingly demonstrated by the attention given to 
process safety by all leaders. Boards should ensure adequate time at their meetings to review 
process safety and performance against expectations. 
L2 Leaders should ensure that they are sufficiently knowledgeable about process safety to inform 
decision making, facilitate understanding of risks, and to ensure that all plant and projects 
conform to organisational requirements. They should engage in effective two-way 
communication with the workforce making clear their safety priorities, but also listening and 
responding to concerns raised, and ensuring effective follow-up action. They should lead by 
example and maintain high visibility in supporting a strong safety culture, effective 
implementation of the SMS, good working conditions and plant integrity and, 'defensive' 
systems such as audit and oversight in their various forms. 
L3 Communications and subsequent actions should make it clear that ensuring excellence in 
process safety takes precedence over cost and resource considerations if and when there is 
any conflict between requirements. This should be demonstrated by ensuring sufficient 
resources for all operations and support roles, and in maintaining competence. 
L4 Encouragement should be given for safety matters to be reviewed at plant and project level 
with a demonstrable openness and responsiveness to improvement suggestions and 
concerns, even when the latter may provide 'unwelcome' news that may affect production or 
costs. Any concerns (including inadequacies in the SMS) should be raised within a 'just' 
reporting system that is not unnecessarily constrained in its reporting criteria, and concerns 
raised should be prioritised and followed up, with feedback on developments given to staff. It 
should be made clear that compliance with the SMS is mandatory. 
L5 In ensuring competence, attention should also be given to promoting expected behaviours and 
people skills. This is particularly important in ensuring investment in supervisory roles. 
Supervisors should be encouraged and supported to promote excellence in process safety by 
ensuring compliance, encouraging reporting of ideas and concerns, and maintaining a 
questioning attitude. 
L6 Well understood roles, responsibilities and accountabilities should be assigned with clear lines 
of reporting. These should be kept as straightforward as possible to minimise overlap and 
unofficial hierarchies. Acting roles (including 'step-ups'), outsourcing of key roles, and 
processes for delegation and approvals should all be suitably controlled and subject to 
authorisation and other safeguards where relevant. Leadership and team stability should be 
maintained, wherever possible, to ensure that actions are seen through. The potential impact 
of incremental changes should be regularly reviewed. 
L7 Leaders have a central role in maintaining and improving safety culture through their actions 
and personal commitment - particularly during periods of organisational change when safety 
culture commitment may be more vulnerable. Support should be given for the promotion of 
learning, open communication, a questioning attitude and a willingness to stand back and 
assess biases (including any conditioned responses and behaviours). They should be attuned 
to any developing deficiencies in these areas and others, such as organisational structures, 
work pressures leading to non-compliance, and loss of staff in key safety areas. Leadership 
issues and their implications for safety culture should be regularly re-assessed and action 
taken to address weaknesses. 
L8 Before embarking on major organisational changes (including acquisitions and mergers), 
leaders should consider the potential impact on process safety. This should be reinforced by 
a rigorous and effective management of organisational change process with independent 
scrutiny that considers the potential impact of specific changes and potential unintended 
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consequences. In addition, oversight and scrutiny during the process of change should provide 
checks of the change process and identify any unintended 'knock on' and incremental effects. 
L9 Particular attention should be paid to controlling the change process such that 'initiative 
overload' and other working pressures do not lead to a loss of focus on process safety risks. 
Managers should be provided with assistance and advice, where required, to achieve effective 
prioritisation. 
L10 Leaders should not only understand process safety risks, but have an appreciation of the 
requirement to reduce risks as far as is reasonably practicable. They should ensure that risks 
are reviewed regularly, with issues of importance brought to their attention, and that there are 
clear priorities for action. They should be assisted in this by a well-resourced and competent 
independent safety function. This capability is particularly important where a 'de-centralised' 
business structure is in place, in order to ensure that corporate expectations and policy 
priorities are being met. 
L11 Where incentives are provided to staff for meeting performance objectives, process safety 
performance should be recognised. However, this should be done in such a way that reporting 
of concerns, 'events', and emerging issues is not adversely affected. 
L12 Process safety-related risk assessments should be carried out using appropriate up-to-date 
techniques. this should enable the maintenance of an effective safety case in the form of a 
'living' useable set of documents that informs operations, reviews and risk assessments. 
Follow up should not be deferred because of budgetary or resource constraints. Particular 
attention should be given to new or unfamiliar technology and to minimising complacency in 
dealing with more familiar risks - in particular, avoiding their 'normalisation'. They should also 
cover emergency provisions within all credible scenarios. 
L13 Leaders have a further responsibility to ensure that an up-to-date and suitable SMS is in place 
that is in line with any safety case, that there is a 'process owner' for each part, that the 
workforce understand its requirements and conform with it, and that any changes or waivers 
are adequately controlled. The SMS should be as comprehensive as is necessary, but over-
complexity and bureaucracy minimised to ensure understanding and effective use. 
L14 The SMS should be regularly reviewed particularly in relation to higher risk activities.   Changes 
should not be merely 'bolted on' but reviewed in order to ensure that they are appropriately 
integrated. Staff should be trained to understand the importance of key steps relating to 
process safety and encouraged to act cautiously, seeking advice and halting work safely if 
deficiencies arise - particularly during higher risk operations or when alarms are initiated. 
L15 In employing contractors, leaders from participating organisations should ensure 
understanding at an early stage in establishing the contract of all process safety-related 
obligations that they may be expected to meet and these should be 'scoped' to ensure that 
adequate resources and systems are in place. Contracts should not include potential 
disincentives that may deter the communication of safety concerns and associated necessary 
action to reduce risks as work proceeds. 
L16 When acting as a client organisation, an ability to act as 'intelligent customer' should be 
retained with a client project leader providing oversight of all process safety-related issues. 
The resources and skills to ensure that this is effective should be retained, including those that 
may be required in the longer term. As work progresses, effective communication between all 
involved parties should be maintained, and emerging risks and any potential conflicts of 
interest identified. Formal 'hold points' should provide the opportunity to stand back and review 
project status and any process safety concerns or potential conflicts of interest, allowing 
remedial actions to be agreed and their effectiveness monitored. 
L17 Leaders should ensure that arrangements, underpinned by necessary resource and 
competence requirements, are in place to ensure that learning from internal and external 
events can be used to enable necessary improvements. This learning should include 
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organisational and cultural issues. It should be shared in a directed way such that recipients 
obtain relevant information that can be understood and used, and that they are not 
'overwhelmed' with material that is not relevant to their needs. Steps should be in place to 
ensure that learning is incorporated in training, that it is maintained in the 'corporate memory' 
and the development of any organisational 'silos' where there is a reluctance to embrace wider 
learning is minimised. 
L18 Resources should be available for the investigation of events and their follow-up (including 
checks on effectiveness), with consideration of the need for wider communication and training 
needs. Any recurring issues should be given particular attention. Root causes and wider 
'system' impacts should be fully considered. 
L19 Overall process safety performance and trends in key indicators should be regularly monitored 
by leaders at all levels as part of a well-defined oversight and scrutiny process with input and 
advice from an independent safety function. The review should include suitable process safety 
indicators, learning from any 'events', and the output from both independent and 'line 
management' oversight findings. Over-reliance should not be placed on occupational safety 
performance data. The process should not only allow emerging risks to be understood and 
assessed by leaders at corporate, business and plant or project level but should also include 
a review of the effectiveness of follow-up. It should also provide evidence to executive leaders 
and board members as to whether organisational expectations for process safety are being 
met. 
L20 Where an operating organisation (duty holder) is part of a 'parent' organisation, it is important 
that leaders in both organisations ensure that there is an effective relationship between the 
two parties. Requirements, expertise and oversight from the 'parent' organisation should be in 
place where agreed and required, but the operating organisation as duty holder should be able 
to meet the obligations of its licence etc. without undue interference. Clarity about 
responsibilities and roles between the organisations should be maintained. 
L21 Leaders should maintain appropriate and effective contact with their counterparts in regulatory 
bodies in order to ensure that they are kept fully appraised of the organisational strategy with 
respect to safety and any changes to it, and should ensure that interaction and regulatory 
contact at plant or project level meet the requirements of all parties. 
 
4.2 DISCUSSION AND COMMENTARY 
4.2.1 Commitment 
Leaders should make it clear that safety is a core value and that it should take precedence over all other 
matters. Whilst committing to maintain and improve occupational safety, it is very important that process safety 
is also given prominence. This should be reflected in strategic documents such as corporate policy, 'vision' 
statements and in performance expectations. The latter should be translated into measurable criteria where 
possible. These should all be 'living' documents that are well known and understood by the workforce. 
The importance of process safety should also be demonstrated by the attention that the matter receives from 
leaders. It should be regularly reviewed and discussed at corporate and business level in the same way as 
other important issues such as finance and business development. At board level, process safety should be 
regularly scrutinised with effective support from an independent safety function. In some organisations, a 
board member takes a lead role in safety. This should not reduce the input and commitment of other members.  
Leaders should develop a strong knowledge and understanding of company and business process safety 
performance, including appreciation of the higher and emerging risk areas and how these are being 
minimised. They should actively endorse a strategic evidence-based approach to setting priorities rather than 
just reacting to events. They should demonstrate that they act on concerns that are brought to their attention 
through an 'open' process in which important issues are not 'lost' or minimised during upward transmission. 
Their views and conclusions, wherever possible, should be communicated effectively to all levels of the 
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organisation and checks carried out to confirm that leadership requirements are being followed. Effectiveness 
should be reviewed with feedback encouraged on any concerns that may arise. 
Leaders should maintain high visibility to the workforce at sites and demonstrate their interest in process 
safety performance by addressing the issues with staff and gaining an understanding of working 'reality'. They 
should lead by example and, wherever possible, reinforce the importance of safe working, the need to maintain 
a questioning and cautious, measured and reflective approach in all safety matters, and the need to follow the 
requirements of the SMS. They should make it clear that tolerance to degraded assets and infrastructure, 
poor working conditions, and recurring problems is not acceptable.  
It is also important that messages are not given that the workforce might perceive as indicating that cost 
efficiency and organisational effectiveness are being valued more highly than safety. For example, 
unexplained changes to well established and recognised safety-related posts can give unintended messages 
about the importance attached to process safety. 
Resources to support safety commitments should be sufficient, with competent staff in all process safety 
matters backed up with adequate support. This should transmit the message to employees that leaders are 
taking a longer-term view rather than dealing only with short term objectives. Staff should not feel 'abandoned' 
and left struggling to meet objectives with inadequate resources. Assistance should be provided to plant and 
project managers to ensure that they are not left to make decisions on process safety related priorities against 
competing organisational demands. 
Attention should also be paid to all plant which is no longer central to operations (so-called 'orphan' plant) and 
to plant which is not regarded as likely to present significant risk (e.g. newly constructed plant which is not 
expected to fail). 
Leaders should encourage and allow time to be taken for process safety to be reviewed at working level. This 
should include feedback on concerns and suggestions for improvements. They should show openness to 
'unwelcome' news - for example where deficiencies are identified and require action that may affect 
production. Leaders should also ensure that ideas and concerns are followed up as part of a coherent and 
prioritised plan with staff involvement and feedback.  
Workforce reporting of deficiencies and 'near-hits' should not be narrowly constrained by management and 
supervisors and should take place within a 'just' reporting system agreed with staff and their representatives. 
Leaders should encourage and show demonstrable support for this approach and take care not to undermine 
it by apportioning blame. This applies not only to operations but to support functions such as engineering, 
maintenance etc. Failure to work to procedures or failure to report 'events' which fall into clearly defined 
categories should be clearly understood by the workforce to be unacceptable.  
Competent team leadership and supervision should be in place, with attention given to the promotion and 
demonstration of expected behaviours and people skills. Leaders should maintain an awareness of the overall 
competency requirements and whether these are being met across the organisation. This should include inter-
personal skills and the resolution of sources of conflict that may impact on safety. These may emerge from 
historical conflicts or from differences in approach - for example as a result of individuals coming from very 
different business backgrounds.  
The role of supervisors is particularly important in ensuring a timely and effective response to emerging 
concerns. Their teams and managers should understand and support this.  
Leaders should respond to (and where necessary strengthen) defensive systems such as audit, oversight and 
scrutiny, and their response to findings should again enable their commitment to be demonstrated throughout 
the organisation. 
4.2.2 Roles, responsibilities and accountabilities 
Unambiguous management roles, responsibilities and accountabilities should be assigned with clear reporting 
lines. This should be done in a way that minimises overlaps and conflicting interests. Dual or multiple 'hatting' 
should be avoided. The impact of outsourcing should be carefully considered in terms of potential loss of 
expertise. Accountabilities should not be delegated to more junior staff without formal agreement and 
authorisation. 
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Where possible, teams should be kept stable with the retention of core skills and key posts. Excessively rapid 
turnover of management should be minimised. This is particularly important at project or plant management 
level so that continual disruption through changes in priorities and approach can be minimised. 'Acting' roles, 
particularly where post holders may lack sufficient experience and competence, should be kept to a minimum. 
The effect of incremental changes should also be reviewed.  
Leaders have a responsibility to ensure that the overall organisational structure is kept as simple as possible 
and to minimise the development of organisational 'silos' that inhibit effective communication and can lead to 
the development of 'unofficial hierarchies'.  
The organisational system should also ensure that those accountable, personally 'sign off' work as complete 
and satisfactory. They should be suitably qualified and experienced (SQEP) to do so and should have satisfied 
themselves that the work carried out meets requirements and that due process has been followed. 
4.2.3 Developing and maintaining a strong safety culture 
Maintaining and improving safety culture is central to ensuring good safety performance and leaders have a 
key role in achieving this. They should be willing to commit sufficient time and resources, and ensure that their 
personal commitment to improving safety culture is seen to be strong by the workforce (including, where 
relevant, contractors). They should avoid giving conflicting messages that might undermine this.  
The commitment to seek improvement in safety culture should be reinforced by initiating and objectively 
responding to safety culture assessments and ensuing improvement measures including those that arise from 
leadership inadequacies. Leadership attention to safety culture should be particularly important during periods 
of organisational change when other issues may be perceived by the workforce as being given higher priority. 
Emphasis on reinforcing and encouraging a questioning attitude and a cautious and compliant approach in all 
matters affecting safety should be reinforced by support for openness to learning and the encouragement of 
full and honest feedback. The need to 'step back' and gauge potential biases in making safety-critical decisions 
should also be encouraged.  
In maintaining awareness of safety, leaders should avoid being conditioned by past success or a lack of 
appreciation of operational reality. They need to remain vigilant to any slow and insidious decline in safety 
culture and should be prepared to explore the reasons for this should it begin to occur - with regular 
independent reviews. 
4.2.4 Impact of Organisational Change 
Organisational change can arise from external business or 'political' pressures and from the need to improve 
efficiency and output. It is very important that before embarking on any programme of organisational change, 
leaders consider with an open mind and without bias, the potential impacts on process safety. 
Whilst organisational change can have a positive impact on safety, it can also have serious adverse effects. 
These may arise, for example, through reduced resource, inappropriate changes to key posts, loss of 
important information and data, reductions in training, and in oversight provision. Leaders should, therefore, 
ensure that they are attuned to these issues and act as required to ensure that process safety standards are 
fully maintained. 
Pressures arising from increased workloads or over-demanding targets can lead to an increase in short cuts 
and non-compliance with the requirements of the SMS. It is thus important that prior objective assessments 
are carried out on the potential impact of proposed changes on safety through an effective and rigorous 
management of change (MoC) process supported by leaders, carried out with sufficient independence to 
ensure that impacts are fully evaluated and addressed, and with independent scrutiny in cases that could 
have a significant potential impact on safety. As far as possible, changes should not lead to over-complexity 
in the SMS or in lines of reporting and responsibility.  
Mergers and acquisitions can present particular challenges because of the need to align processes, ensure 
effective communication, assign clear accountabilities and interfaces, and recognise and address differences 
in culture. It is thus important that there is clarity about the system to be used and this should be reinforced 
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by training. Potential impacts on attitudes and behaviours consequent to the proposed change should be 
considered. 
Following and during change, where potential impacts on process safety have been identified and action is 
taken to minimise any consequent increase in risks, it is important that this should be the subject of 
independent oversight and scrutiny with a remit that includes ensuring that unintended consequences are 
identified and addressed. This issue is specifically examined in Part 3 of the report. 
Changes to staffing levels (including incremental changes) should be controlled. This should give confidence 
that workforce numbers do not drop below a level that is unsafe.  
Changes and improvement initiatives should also be carefully controlled and prioritised to avoid 'initiative 
overload'. This can lead to a loss of focus on important potential process safety risks, and difficulty for line 
management at plant or project level to assess priorities. Advice and assistance to achieve this prioritisation 
should be made available where required. 
4.2.5 Management of risks 
All leaders should fully understand the contribution that they make to managing process safety risks and have 
sufficient overall competence and understanding to see their contribution in the context of overall process 
safety risks within the organisation. Leaders should also understand the obligation on them and others to do 
all that is reasonably practicable to reduce these risks and what this principle means both legally (where 
relevant) and in practice.  
Risks should be periodically reviewed using the results of objective analysis, where appropriate, and based 
on specialist advice. Priorities for action should be assigned and any wider learning communicated within the 
organisation. In remaining alert to warning signals and event precursors, the role of human factors and people 
management, as well as 'hard' engineering risks, should be recognised and addressed. Risks should not be 
downgraded ('normalised') without full justification. 
To provide the board and other senior leaders with an independent view of safety risks and authoritative 
advice, organisations should have in place a safety function that is independent of business line management. 
In order to ensure adequate coverage and understanding of the risks to be considered, it is important that this 
is led by an experienced senior person with a wide knowledge of safety risks, supported by a well-resourced, 
experienced and skilled team. The function should be able to assess on behalf of senior leaders, the extent 
to which businesses and major projects are meeting organisational expectations on process safety and 
provide feedback. It should also be able to provide, through its independent assessment and reporting, 
confidence that upward reporting of safety concerns is not being 'rolled up' or 'bad news' suppressed, and 
provide leaders with a good picture of the spectrum of process safety risks in the organisation. 
In some organisations, a strongly de-centralised approach is taken in which businesses and projects largely 
determine their own approach to safety. Whilst this has advantages in potentially achieving greater 'ownership' 
and understanding, it is important that sufficient oversight is maintained on behalf of organisational leadership 
to provide assurance that businesses meet the expectations and policies set out by them. 
Safety-related incentives and 'rewards' to staff (such as bonuses or performance-related pay) should not be 
based solely on objective measures of occupational safety performance but should include process safety 
performance. Such 'rewards' should be carefully formulated so that they do not lead to unintended 
consequence such as discouraging the reporting of 'near-hits' and non-conformances that would otherwise 
provide learning opportunities. This issue is considered further in Part 2 (in particular in Annex E) in terms of 
behavioural issues and in Part 3 as an example of the use of CLM in order to elicit potential unintended 
consequences. 
Risk assessment processes such as design reviews, management of change assessments, and periodic 
safety reviews (including supporting processes for these such as hazard and operability studies (HAZOPs), 
qualitative risk analysis (QRA) and HRA), should be carried out in a way that aims to achieve transparency 
and avoid over-complication. Developing and maintaining a safety case as a 'living' document based on risk 
assessment is an important pre-requisite for ensuring that process safety is fully addressed by the 
organisation. Leaders should ensure that reviews are carried out in a timely way and are not deferred, for 
example, as a result of budgetary constraints. Where concerns emerge regarding the safety of a particular 
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process or approach, effective risk assessment by competent staff should be carried out that seeks out root 
causes. Timely precautionary action should then be taken. Particular emphasis should be given to repeat 
findings and the reasons for these occurring need to be fully assessed. 
Actions arising should again be prioritised and supported by appropriate investment and allocation of 
resources. Particular attention should be given to new and/or unfamiliar technology, and steps taken to avoid 
complacency in dealing with more familiar risks. In developing prioritised action plans, the possibility of 
introducing adverse effects on the wider organisation (unforeseen knock-on or 'system' effects) should again 
be fully considered as addressed in Part 3, and leaders should be made fully aware of any that are identified. 
Leaders should ensure that well-rehearsed emergency plans are in place that are understood by the workforce 
(including contractors), together with external agencies. These should cover all credible scenarios. 
Effective contact with regulatory bodies should be maintained at both senior level and at plant or project 
operations level so that regulators are kept fully appraised of emerging process safety risks and how these 
are being managed and, where relevant, their advice sought. 
4.2.6 Implementing and supporting the safety management system (SMS) 
Leaders are responsible for ensuring that an up-to-date and suitable SMS is in place across the organisation 
and/or business, that there is a process 'owner' for all parts of the SMS, that the workforce understand its 
content and importance, are trained in its use, and understand the potential consequences of failing to comply 
with it. It should be made clear that conformance with the SMS is mandatory (rather than being merely for 
guidance), but that suggestions for improvement are welcomed. Changes to the SMS and any waivers to its 
application should be carefully reviewed and, if agreed, signed off as acceptable by an appropriate senior 
authorised person.  
Whilst ensuring that the system is as comprehensive as possible in order to address all process safety-related 
matters, it is also important that over-complexity and bureaucracy are minimised and that the context and 
importance of key steps is explained (including effects on other work groups). This should add to the 
awareness of the workforce and their supervisors of the dangers of adopting 'work-arounds' or other non-
conformances. Complexity can be introduced by 'bolting on' new requirements to reflect change and care 
should be taken in handling such new requirements and integrating them effectively in the SMS.  
In addition to facilitating and encouraging the reporting of potential deficiencies and their timely follow up, 
leaders should emphasise the need for a cautious (safety first) approach in using the SMS and that when in 
doubt, specialist advice should be sought. 
 If there is uncertainty about continued safety, leaders should make it clear that they should support safely 
halting the work being carried out until uncertainties or concerns can be resolved ('stop and escalate'). For 
certain key process steps - e.g. start-ups, shut-downs, response to alarms etc. - the system and its application 
should be very regularly reviewed in order to ensure adequacy, understanding and continued compliance. 
4.2.7 Contractor (supply chain) management 
In inviting tenders and selecting contractors, it is important that the leadership of all involved parties 
understand the obligations that they should be required to meet in safety critical areas such as safety culture, 
resources and skills, reporting requirements, quality standards, oversight, communication and, conformance 
with agreed safe working practices. This should require all those involved to 'scope' the requirements of the 
project and, wherever possible, align client and contractor goals. 
When establishing contracts, such requirements should be clear, and any potential difficulties or conflict of 
interests identified so that all parties are aware of these and suitable understandings are in place. All 
necessary documentation should be made available at an early stage to ensure there are no subsequent 
'surprises'. Contracts should be established in such a way that there are not disincentives to meeting 
obligations - such as financial penalties that might deter the early communication of emerging safety concerns. 
Leaders should ensure that the organisation is an 'intelligent customer' for work carried out by contractors and 
that it retains its competence both to fulfil this role and to understand the contractor input sufficiently to use it 
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safely. The use of contractors should be carefully considered by leadership in relation to the possible long-
term loss of essential skills in the client organisation.  
A client project leader should retain oversight in a way that enables project management capability and any 
emerging risks or concerns to be questioned and addressed - for example, any repairs or 'improvements' 
during construction should be assessed and agreed before proceeding. 
As contractual work proceeds, attention should be given to ensuring that informed communication and 
discussion about safety risks takes place at all appropriate levels through identified and agreed channels - 
including between client and contractor leadership on strategic matters. This should include identifying any 
emerging risks and potential conflicts of interest that might not have been considered in establishing the 
contractual arrangements and which could be prejudicial to safety. Good practice usually involves the 
establishment of formal review 'hold points' or 'stage gates' in the contract, so that progress can be fully 
reviewed and any potential difficulties identified and resolved. 
4.2.8 Developing a learning organisation 
In nearly all of the cases studied, there have been earlier events or 'near-hits' either within the organisation or 
more widely, from which if relevant learning had been identified and actively used to produce enhanced 
resilience, the subsequent event might have been avoided. Thus, it is important that leaders become aware 
of- and act upon- the lessons learnt from these, and that they ensure that they are being widely communicated 
in a form that is intelligible and relevant to requirements. The flow of information and any subsequent need for 
follow-up should be managed so that recipients are not overwhelmed by a 'cascade' of learning material and 
actions that may then be very difficult to manage. These requirements will require adequate resources in each 
operational area to assess the relevance of the learning (including good practice) to their activities, to 
communicate it effectively, and to keep it 'alive'.  
It is also important that learning from previous events, and how this has influenced the approach to process 
safety within the organisation, should be maintained within the corporate memory and reinforced by training 
to keep all relevant staff alert to the continued possibility of major events. 
Individuals and teams that report deficiencies or make suggestions for improvements should be appropriately 
'recognised' and feedback should be given to them on follow-up. Resource for investigation and subsequent 
actions, including the analysis of potential system effects and any required training, should be assessed. 
Implementation and effectiveness of actions following reporting should also be checked. Leaders should 
require particular attention to be paid to any recurring issues, as this may indicate deeper-lying organisational 
and/or cultural shortcomings. 
Leaders should be aware of any areas of the organisation where there is an inward-looking or silo-based 
culture and take appropriate action. This is sometimes manifested by a 'not invented here' attitude that leads 
to a lack of response to wider organisational improvement and learning activities. 
In addition to promoting the sharing of important learning internally, sharing between organisations on a 
reciprocal basis can be an important source of learning. This can sometimes be inhibited by legal constraints 
following an event, but, where likely to reduce the risks of similar events elsewhere, it is important that where 
ever possible effective communication is maintained. 
4.2.9 Ensuring oversight and scrutiny (O&S) 
An adequate range of process safety indicators (including leading indicators) should be reviewed and trends 
monitored at various levels including at boards and executive teams, as part of the O&S process. Good 
performance in occupational safety should not be assumed to be an indicator of good performance in process 
safety.  
Oversight of process safety risks should be facilitated by a variety of approaches within a hierarchical, 
coordinated O&S process. This may range from local oversight by audit and operational random checks where 
required, to business or project O&S, and through to corporate oversight. This range of approaches should 
enable local management, business leaders and corporate leaders to obtain a clearer picture of risks and their 
management relevant to their responsibilities and requirements. The results should be used in conjunction 
with process safety indicators and regular reports from businesses and the corporate safety function to senior 
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leaders (including boards), to form a basis for assessing risks and their follow-up. Corporate O&S should also 
allow corporate leaders to assess whether 'expectations' are being met and whether the necessary resources 
are available to support their effective implementation.  
Business/project and more local O&S should be able to provide continuing and detailed insights into cultural 
matters, and also into more specific issues such as the effectiveness of interfaces and associated 
communications; understanding of roles and training; work quality; compliance with the SMS; response to 
safety warnings (e.g. alarms); recording of safety-significant issues; working conditions; plant integrity and, 
the effectiveness of maintenance and engineering support. Consequent improvements should be part of a 
coordinated and prioritised plan with clearly assigned responsibilities and leadership, and with the checking 
of implementation and effectiveness. 
4.2.10 Effective relationship between parent body and operating organisation 
In some of the events studied, the operating organisation (duty holder) was part of a larger 'parent' body. In 
situations where this is the case, it is essential that a clear and effective arrangement exists between the two 
organisations. Whilst the 'parent' organisation may have a role in maintaining oversight and may be able to 
provide advice and expertise, it is important that this does not interfere with the duty holder's obligation to 
meet regulatory requirements and other obligations. 
Leaders of all parties involved (including regulatory bodies) should understand and be completely clear about 
the relationship in place and should ensure that it is effective and meets requirements.  
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5 EXPECTATIONS: SAFETY CULTURE 
5.1 OVERVIEW 
The requirements that underpin a strong safety culture in an organisation have been widely discussed in 
various publications, but this section of the report draws out the key features of such a culture by reference to 
the conclusions of the reports of the events studied. Because safety culture is wide-ranging and is a vital 
component in ensuring safety, this section contains much material that overlaps with the discussion of other 
topics in the document. This is deliberate in order to ensure that safety culture is treated, as far as possible, 
holistically and in the context of its great importance in all safety-related matters. 
Demonstrable leadership commitment; a questioning attitude among the workforce (including contractors); an 
approach where everybody works together to improve safety by, for example, reporting deficiencies and 
promoting improvements within an atmosphere of trust, and a common sense of purpose throughout the 
organisation, are essential features of a strong safety culture. 
One point regarding terminology should be clarified: the reports into the events generally use the single term 
safety culture rather than safety climate and the same practice has been followed here. The use of the terms 
and their meanings is further discussed in Annex B that also discusses in depth the concept of 'safety culture 
maturity' and models to assess this. 
In several of the events reviewed, organisations sincerely believed that they had an effective safety culture 
but this, on investigation, was found to be illusory and based on little evidence. In some cases, organisational 
pressures and influences within the specific business, plant or project had allowed this to degrade, with norms, 
values, attitudes and behaviours failing to conform to the standards required. This highlights the need to 
maintain vigilance and to examine and, where necessary, act to improve safety culture both within the 
organisation as a whole and within its constituent parts. 
Safety culture related issues are also explicitly discussed in sections 7, 8, 10 and 12 with some references in 
sections 4, 11, and 13. 
Table 2 - Summary of safety culture expectations 
SC1 Leaders and managers should be committed to achieving a strong safety culture in all the areas 
for which they have responsibility. They should make clear the attitudes and behaviours 
required, communicate these effectively, listen to workforce views and feedback, and ensure 
that they retain an overview and remain aware of operational reality. Their own actions should 
act as a role model for others. 
SC2 The primacy of safety should at all times be emphasised in a way that is not compromised by 
the pressure of commercial objectives. Sufficient support and resource should be available to 
ensure that safety culture objectives and activities can be fully met. 
SC3 All staff and contractors should be trained to take a questioning attitude and precautionary 
approach to all matters affecting process safety, to adhere to procedures, and to seek advice 
where uncertainties arise. Clear interfaces, supported by effective communication, should be in 
place to enable this. 
SC4 Leaders and managers should be aware of both specific and overall levels of process safety risk 
within their areas of control and the degree to which the organisational safety culture is enabling 
these risks to be effectively managed. In assessing emerging risks, it is important that an open-
minded view is taken of their importance, which does not rely on previous success or good 
performance. 
SC5 Where possible, measurable criteria including proactive (leading) indicators should be in place 
to assess safety culture performance. These should be carefully formulated to reduce any 
unintended 'knock on' effects and to minimise misuse to meet targets. Where initiatives are 
taken to improve safety culture, these should be prioritised and coordinated to avoid initiative 
overload. 
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SC6 Leaders and managers should work to ensure that a fragmented approach to safety culture 
does not develop, with some areas of operations taking a more closed 'not invented here' 
approach to required improvement. The role of supervisory staff is particularly important, and 
they should be capable and well trained in the skills required to support a strong safety culture 
within their work areas. 
SC7 During periods of organisational change, commitment to a strong safety culture should be 
reinforced and its continued importance made clear, avoiding 'mixed messages'. A rigorous 
approach to the impact of change, including effective and visible management of change 
assessments and the presence of a strong and independent safety 'voice', should be used to 
reinforce the message that addressing safety concerns is strongly supported even in a changing 
working environment, and that staff views and feedback are welcome and should continue to be 
supported and taken seriously. 
SC8 An important attribute of a strong safety culture is the reporting of all events and significant 
deviations, with agreed procedures for competent investigation and follow-up that reflects their 
safety significance. The response to recommendations should be timely and adequately 
resourced. Root causes should be sought and the effectiveness of recommendations verified. 
Reasons that may be inhibiting reporting and follow-up should be identified and addressed to 
assure staff of the importance that is attached to it. Against this supportive approach, it should 
be made clear that failure to report deficiencies and concerns is unacceptable. 
SC9 Reporting should take place within a 'just' system that has been agreed with the workforce and 
their representatives and those reporting should be given feedback on their concerns and how 
they are being addressed. They should be appropriately 'recognised' for their action. Where 
required, a confidential reporting system should be available to staff. 
SC10 The process of raising concerns should be clear and made as simple as possible with a 
minimum of bureaucracy. Issues raised should not be 'blocked' by supervisors or line managers, 
who should encourage minority views and act as role models in maintaining a questioning 
attitude and promoting effective communication. 
SC11 Investigations should be carried out with engineering rigour, including the review of safety 
margins where appropriate. They should be performed in such a way as to listen to minority 
views and avoid 'groupthink' and mindsets, without a tendency to confirm the presumed cause. 
Action should be taken to ensure that results are not only communicated to all those who may 
be able to learn from them, but that they are reflected in training, and steps taken to maintain 
them in the corporate memory. 
SC12 Within a strong safety culture, learning should be actively sought from all relevant sources and 
made relevant and useable for recipients. Application should take account of the spectrum of 
learning possibilities and should not be dismissed because it appears of limited immediate 
relevance. Learning in suitable form also should be made available to leaders and managers so 
that this can promote awareness, inform business decisions and guide oversight and scrutiny 
processes. 
SC13 Promoting a questioning attitude (asking 'what if') is an essential feature of an effective safety 
culture. This should increase awareness of warning signs (including weak signals) and their 
implications, as well as more readily apparent faults in plant or instrumentation or deficiencies in 
procedures. It is vital that anomalies are not subject to 'normalisation' on the basis of previous 
results or unjustified assumptions, but are explored with an open mind with sufficient in-house 
expertise to achieve this. Particular care should be taken in responding to reports of faults in 
new or less frequently used plant where there is a danger of them being regarded as unlikely to 
be significant. 
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SC14 Workforce teams should be given 'protected time' to discuss process safety and safety cultural 
matters with a view to suggesting improvements and/or raising concerns. They should be kept 
informed about developments and feel involved. Teams should be encouraged to stop work if a 
compelling safety concern arises and to seek urgent advice. Such action should be supported 
by management.  
SC15 The organisation should ensure that it is able to respond flexibly when the need arises, with 
decisions being taken by competent people at the right time. Thus, a balance should be 
maintained between the strongly encouraged 'norm' of relying on procedures, and the 
organisation being decisive and 'quick on its feet' when there is an overriding need to do so - 
such as in a rapidly deteriorating situation. This should not be used to justify the non- 
observance of procedures or taking short cuts where action is not urgent. The SMS should 
provide the 'norm' for decision making whilst not becoming a substitute for thinking. More 
flexible responses should be subject to suitable safeguards. 
SC16 The SMS has a vital role to play in supporting and promoting a strong safety culture. It is 
therefore very important that it is not allowed to become degraded and is kept up-to-date, with 
staff strongly encouraged to report deficiencies and seeing it as relevant to operations. Strong 
scrutiny should be in place to ensure that 'casual' or non-compliance does not develop. How 
failure to comply can impact on other operations should be understood by users. It is particularly 
important that insidious degradation and non-conformance does not lead to an 'elastic 
waistband' effect where non-conformance becomes increasingly acceptable. The SMS should 
be recognised as an important 'tool' in supporting and enabling a strong safety culture. 
SC17 Where contracting organisations are being employed, they should fully understand safety 
culture expectations before work begins. Their capability in this area should be a factor in initial 
selection. They should also be required to maintain a questioning attitude, act cautiously in the 
light of uncertainty, communicate effectively and with integrity to all involved parties (and 
especially the client), seek competent advice where required and, report and respond effectively 
to all deficiencies. They should be made aware that safety culture performance may be subject 
to client oversight and scrutiny. 
SC18 Safety culture should be periodically reviewed by a dedicated specialist team to assess areas of 
strength and weakness using best practice techniques and reporting directly to senior managers 
and leaders. The process may be particularly important during periods of significant 
organisational change when maintaining safety culture standards could be under threat, and 
consideration should be given to strengthening the process in these circumstances. 
 
5.2 DISCUSSION AND COMMENTARY 
5.2.1 Principles and key attributes 
Safety culture is generally linked to the prevailing wider organisational culture(s). This is underpinned by core 
principles and values leading to ethical principles that set out requirements for matters such as integrity, 
honesty, openness, transparency, respect and mutual trust. It is important that safety culture is consistent with 
these and recognisably derives from them. 
Several (often inter-related) requirements have been found to be important in establishing and maintaining a 
strong safety culture: 
a) leadership commitment, visibility, setting of clear expectations and maintenance of an understanding of 
workplace 'reality'; 
b) managing the impact of change on safety culture; 
c) developing and maintaining a questioning attitude and critical thinking; 
d) involving the workforce in improving safety culture;  
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e) encouraging the reporting of concerns and deficiencies within a 'just' framework and an environment of 
respect and trust; 
f) an ability and willingness to learn from all relevant sources; 
g) 'flexibility' in responding to change and unplanned conditions, and 
h) effective review of safety culture within all parts of the organisation. 
The development and maintenance of an effective SMS is an important pre-requisite for the support of a 
strong safety culture. There is a clear need to maintain effective interfaces including with any contracting 
organisations, and between teams and functions (e.g. engineering support and operations). Interfaces should 
be supported by clear accountabilities. 
5.2.2 ‘Setting the tone at the top’ 
A strong and effective safety culture can only be established and sustained if those at the top of the 
organisation make it clear to the workforce (including contractors) what is required in terms of attitudes and 
behaviours ('setting the tone at the top'). These expectations or organisational norms should be communicated 
in a way that shows that leaders are listening to staff and understand the pressures and 'realities' of the 
working environment, and that all involved understand that severe accidents can happen. Effective 
communication of these behavioural expectations requires that leaders do not simply 'issue edicts', but show 
their commitment by being visible to staff, understanding and acting in response to feedback and concerns, 
and seeking to engage with them. Leaders should also ensure that parts of the organisation do not become 
'detached' from the expectations and available learning, and that there is effective oversight and regular review 
of risks and their control.  
Where the workforce perceives a lack of commitment from the top, with leadership communications regarded 
as 'management speak', and where safety messages are 'diluted' by what are perceived to be stronger 
messages about the need to meet production or improved efficiency targets, the likely result may be one of 
cynicism and distrust leading potentially to a negative impact on safety. It is thus important that leaders and 
managers) convey consistent messages and act as visible role models by demonstrating through their 
personal attention and actions the high priority with which the subject is being treated. One important aspect 
of this is to ensure that the support and resources required to achieve the necessary standards are made 
available - particularly during times of major change or business stringency. 
The role of supervisors is also very important. In some of the events studied, organisations failed to develop 
the supervisory competences of those in the role. With the right approach, supervisors can play an important 
part in ensuring that standards are being met and alerting higher management to concerns and shortfalls. 
They are often in the position of needing to respond to both management requirements and those of their 
teams. They thus need the support and capability to feel confident that their safety-related decisions (e.g. stop 
the job until safety concerns are resolved) will be respected and supported by managers, and that they are 
not left in a position where they have to 'trade' safety for what are perceived by management to be more 
pressing objectives.  
Those setting behavioural expectations should strive to understand the safety concerns of subordinate 
personnel and maintain strong awareness of such issues as the degree of adherence to procedures, and 
whether a precautionary approach and questioning attitude is being taken in all areas of activity relevant to 
process safety, including non-routine operations. Awareness should be maintained not only of specific areas 
of elevated risk, but also of the overall, cumulative level of process safety risk facing the organisation by taking 
an 'integrated' view and ensuring that there is an understanding of where current risk levels have the potential 
to escalate. 
Some of the events studied have resulted from what has been referred to as 'organisational blindness'. Past 
success and a history of few, if any, significant negative events does not mean that a plant or process is not 
vulnerable to the emergence of new and significant risks. This mindset has also led to situations where what 
were intended to be open-minded assessments of aspects of process safety performance became 
confirmatory exercises to demonstrate acceptable safety, even where evidence pointed to an opposite 
conclusion. Other examples have included situations where those raising safety concerns were required to 
reverse the normal starting point for review by being required to 'prove that the plant or process is unsafe' 
FINAL DRAFT PRE-PRINT 
31 
 
rather than establishing its safety. To counter this sense of complacency and invulnerability, again requires 
leaders to be in touch with reality, with effective feedback, measurement and oversight. 
In some organisations, prior to major events, there have been initiatives to improve safety and aspects of 
safety culture, but these have not always taken root because too many initiatives were being introduced 
concurrently with a failure to prioritise or explain their importance and context to staff. 'Initiative overload' 
should be controlled - particularly where there is a danger that initiatives are being introduced by different 
parts of the organisation with little coordination or effective control. In some cases, a rapid turnover of site or 
project managers, each with a programme of improvements, has led to over-commitment and a failure to see 
them through to a satisfactory conclusion. The situation can be seen by the workforce as a constant barrage 
of initiatives in the form of 'flavour of the month', and the perception (sometimes justified) that their 
engagement is unlikely to lead to meaningful improvement because something else may take priority before 
very long. 
Wherever possible, reliable and measurable criteria should underpin organisational expectations. 
Measurement and review of safety culture performance provides very important information on the 'health' of 
the organisation, but particular care should be taken in using overall safety culture review results as a key 
performance indicator (KPI) because general measurements can be influenced by wider organisational issues 
such as concerns about change. Particular safety culture improvement objectives may provide more suitable 
lead indicators. This issue is further discussed in Part 2. 
More generally, the development of meaningful KPIs is important but requires significant care in formulation - 
particularly when incentives are introduced to encourage achievement. Reward systems have often been 
dominated by those for meeting commercial objectives (e.g. meeting production targets, schedules etc.). It is 
important that when introducing a suite of KPIs, that these are balanced, and that those related to safety are 
not seen to be dominated by production incentives. KPIs and associated incentives, should also be carefully 
thought through as there is a danger that unforeseen consequences could emerge. For example, a 
concentration on more easily measurable parameters relating to occupational safety may lead to a view that 
safety is improving, when in fact process safety is receiving less attention because incentives on performance 
do not exist. Furthermore, introducing what may be perceived as measures with an impact on safety culture 
and process safety (e.g. 'events' reported or training received) without careful controls, could lead to 
inappropriate use in order to meet targets. The development of suitable indicators is discussed at some length 
in Part 2 in terms the types, roles and use of indicators, and the need to consider the implications of related 
incentives is considered as a specific case study in Part 3 using CLDs. 
When leaders decide to what extent the organisation is to be operated in a 'centralised' or 'decentralised' 
mode, this can also have an impact on the way that safety culture is managed. Whilst a decentralised 
approach may offer strong business advantages in some situations, it is important that there is clarity about 
accountability for leadership in safety culture and the degree of consistency to be sought in organisational 
expectations and their communication and follow-up. In the extreme, it is possible that requirements stressing 
the need for a cautious, questioning approach to safety culture may be delivered by corporate leaders, but 
this may be undermined by a more 'entrepreneurial' approach at the business level in circumstances where 
there is strong operational autonomy. It is thus necessary for clarity to be established about boundaries and 
consistency of approach with, for example, the corporate centre setting standards to which all are expected 
to conform, whilst allowing agreed operational freedom as to how these are achieved. Independent oversight 
then provides an ability to assess whether, in practice, expectations are being met.  
Some organisations have developed a 'fragmented' culture with the existence of 'local cultures' and silos that 
become resistant to perceived corporate 'interference' and that leads to an approach that does not recognise 
or respond to developments that are 'not invented here'. In other cases, a lack of clarity on accountabilities 
has led to required actions being neglected or deferred, and a failure by leaders and managers to 'take a grip' 
on an evolving, potentially dangerous situation. 
5.2.3 Capacity to recognise the impact of organisational change on safety culture 
During periods of organisational change, it is vital that the attitudes and behaviours that underpin a strong 
safety culture and other 'defensive' systems such as audit and oversight are visibly and convincingly reinforced 
- with particular attention given to management and leadership commitment to safety and the avoidance of 
mixed and confusing messages. Approaches to business change can easily be perceived by the workforce 
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as being in conflict with the aspiration of maintaining a strong safety culture, with management focus and 
resources being seen primarily to reward and recognise efficiency, production, and budgetary control at the 
expense of the more precautionary and questioning ('safety first') approach that underpins safety culture. 
It is important that there is seen to exist a strong and independent safety 'voice' within the organisation with 
power to ensure that safety priorities are maintained and not degraded (sometimes insidiously in a way that 
can be overlooked), and that defensive systems such as rigorous and well-implemented management of 
organisational change requirements and oversight on a searching and questioning basis, are both effective 
and visible. 
A particular danger to maintaining a strong safety culture includes a possible reluctance by the workforce to 
report and respond to safety concerns and learning opportunities since they may perceive this as not welcome 
by management. This is a general point, but is included here because it is most likely to be the case when 
organisational priorities are seen very strongly focussed on business requirements, with a lower priority 
attached to safety. This is particularly relevant if as a consequence, there is a reduction of support to teams 
in their efforts to improve safety culture.   
During substantial organisational change, the workforce may likely be attempting to respond to safety culture 
concerns in a business environment that involves turbulence, greater work pressures, uncertainty (including 
over jobs), and with managers distracted by other business concerns. Thus, it is important that leaders are 
fully aware of the potential impact of this working environment on safety culture and act appropriately. 
5.2.4 Encouraging reporting of 'events' and learning from experience 
An effective safety culture requires that all deviations from normal or expected operations or practice (actual 
events or 'near hits') are reported and investigated to the extent warranted by their significance. Investigations 
should be carried out by competent, well-resourced teams that follow agreed investigation procedures. These 
should include requirements for assigning significance and the depth of investigation; the level of internal and 
external reporting and sharing of conclusions required; exploration of 'root causes' - including organisational 
and cultural deficiencies, and, requirements for follow up of recommendations. This follow-up should not be 
subject to deferral or delay (e.g. by unnecessary re-testing) and verification of the effectiveness of remedial 
measures should be undertaken. Clear accountabilities should underpin these requirements, with advice 
being sought in the case of uncertainty. 
There are many reasons why reporting does not always occur in practice. For example, the process of 
reporting is not always made as simple as possible. Undue paperwork and bureaucracy may be involved and 
the consequence of follow-up may be seen to involve a greater workload falling on the individual or team 
making the report. There may also be other behavioural disincentives, including the fear of attribution of blame 
when errors by the individual or team are involved; concern that others may be blamed (seen to be 'telling 
tales'); being seen to 'rock the boat' or 'make trouble' and, fear of being seen to be speaking out against the 
consensus. On occasions, the view may be taken that it is the responsibility of others to report, or where a 
deficiency has been apparent for some time and has not been previously reported, it may be regarded as 
being acceptable as established custom and practice. 'Living' with such deficiencies that have been apparent 
(such as procedural flaws) is common in many organisations, and a particular objective of a reporting system 
as it develops, should be to encourage the exposure of these often accepted shortcomings ('latent system 
pathogens').  
To overcome some of these understandable concerns, strong support and encouragement should be given 
to those individuals and teams providing feedback. An atmosphere should be generated where discovery of 
a deficiency - whether an error or a shortfall in plant or procedures is seen as an achievement - even when it 
may adversely affect production or schedules. Those reporting should receive recognition and thanks, whilst 
management should make it clear that it is failure to report that is unacceptable. 
Reporting should be part of a 'just' system where blame is not attributed, but each report treated as a learning 
opportunity that is appropriately shared in order to improve safety more widely. The basis for such a 'just' 
system should be agreed with the workforce and their representatives. Should the reported event draw out 
the need for re-training, this should not be done in such a way as to disadvantage those reporting. Disciplinary 
action may be required in extreme cases where there has been a failure to report or where there has been a 
flagrant disregard for safety, but such cases should preferably be considered independently (out-of-line) in an 
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atmosphere that is regarded as balanced and fair. Where confidentiality needs to be maintained in order to 
encourage reporting, a system should be in place to offer protection to the individual. 
Follow up to internal reporting of events or near hits is an important aspect of successful organisational 
learning with clear corrective actions and recommendations that are 'seen through'. Businesses should work 
towards being responsive to learning from all sources. It is also important that dedicated engineering capability 
is available that identifies learning opportunities and ensures that it is available and understood by those parts 
of the organisation that are capable of benefiting from the learning. This should take account of the fact that 
whilst detailed plant or processes may be different, the broader learning may be applicable to another part of 
the organisation (the spectrum of learning opportunities should be considered). It is again important, however, 
that the organisation is not 'overwhelmed' by learning opportunities and a system of filtering and prioritisation 
is necessary. 
A number of the events that have been reviewed in preparing this report occurred despite events with very 
similar root causes having occurred elsewhere in the industry or even within other parts of the organisation. 
Sometimes the relevance of these had been ignored or not appreciated and others lost from the 'corporate 
memory'. Learning should be drawn from (and shared) not only internally, but with other organisations in the 
industry sector and beyond - with the necessary arrangements made to facilitate this. It is important to identify 
tendencies towards insularity within the organisation and to ensure that 'all eyes are kept open' to the bigger 
picture.  
Learning should not be confined only to relevant operations and support functions, but also to leadership and 
management, such that significant risks being communicated to senior levels are not 'censored' or 'rolled up' 
in the course of the reporting process. This is particularly important in considering learning in relation to 
organisational and cultural factors. Events and associated risks should not be seen in isolation but in a broader 
perspective within an integrated approach, and leaders and management should be helped to obtain this 
perspective in order to identify emerging risks and areas of more generic vulnerability. 
Behavioural issues related to data reporting and the use of incident and incidence data are discussed in depth 
in Part 2. 
5.2.5 Promoting a questioning attitude 
A questioning attitude amongst all personnel is a fundamental requirement in establishing a strong safety 
culture. In nearly all of the events studied, there were prior indications (in several cases alarms or test results) 
that were inadequately addressed with a sufficiently questioning attitude. Sometimes warning signs presented 
as 'weak signals', such as developing trends in data which were not sufficiently questioned to minimise the 
likelihood of the subsequent event. 
It is vital that all members of the organisation are encouraged to challenge assumptions, ask 'what if?', and to 
approach issues with vigilance and with an inquiring mind. The response to an off-normal finding also requires 
the exercise of engineering rigour to ensure that, for example, instrumentation and software are performing 
acceptably. Safety margins may also need to be reconsidered in the light of findings.   
Faced with a range of possibilities when unexpected results or findings are observed, a precautionary, 
'conservative' approach is required that avoids overconfidence (such as unrealistic optimism engendered by 
previous success) and considers the full range of possibilities that may have led to the result or finding. There 
should also be a genuine commitment not to normalise and defer action because previous occurrences have 
not led to unacceptable consequences (or in the terminology used by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) at the time of the Columbia Shuttle disaster, regard an occurrence as 'in family'). They 
should be investigated in a way that attempts to avoid bounded 'mindsets', a shared world view that may 
sponsor 'groupthink' and a narrow focus - with consideration of symptoms rather than root causes. The results 
of investigations should not be predicated on the need to confirm the presumed cause and/or to validate 
previous thinking and conclusions. This often happens insidiously, sometimes arising from a view that the 
organisation, plant or process is so well designed or special that it could not fail ('the perfect place' or 'new 
plant' syndrome), or because a peripheral plant or well-established process is now no longer 'mainstream' and 
is not regarded as a source of significant risk ('orphan plant' syndrome). Ill-structured problems or issues 
(those that are not clear or well defined) have been noted to be particularly prone to being ignored or treated 
as not significant. 
FINAL DRAFT PRE-PRINT 
34 
 
5.2.6 Involvement of the workforce 
The workforce (including contractors) should be involved in seeking process safety improvements and in 
developing a strong safety culture. Those 'closest to the tools' are generally best placed to identify process 
safety-related problems and potential issues. Developing a culture where they feel empowered and where 
their ideas and concerns will be listened to is thus essential. Maintaining a dialogue with safety representatives 
is also important because they are often able to take a wider view and can represent worker concerns 
independently. 
The workforce should feel more motivated to participate if they are given time in team meetings to discuss 
safety-related issues, can see results arising from matters that are raised, are kept informed about progress, 
and are provided with the time and opportunity to be involved in developments where appropriate. To ensure 
that visible actions result from matters that are raised by the workforce, it is important that there is sufficient 
resource available for those responding to safety-related concerns.  
Clear routes and open channels for raising concerns and improvement ideas are essential, and steps should 
be taken to ensure that communications are not 'blocked' by supervisors or line managers - particularly if they 
feel that concerns raised may reflect on them.  
Managers and supervisors should be trained in the necessary people skills so that they listen, are 
encouraging, seek out and provide a voice for dissenting or minority views, and are able to act as positive role 
models. Their approach to safety should form part of personal objectives and performance appraisals. 
When safety-related matters arise that are judged serious and which require urgent action, staff should be 
able to obtain immediate advice and should feel empowered to stop work safely if there is a compelling safety 
issue. This should be consistently supported. 
5.2.7 The role of the SMS in supporting safety culture 
The SMS and related documents such as operating instructions, etc., have a vital role in ensuring excellence 
in process safety and in supporting a strong safety culture. Many of the events studied have involved a poorly 
formulated or degraded SMS with 'casual compliance', 'workarounds' and unapproved short cuts. These can 
result from a lack of understanding or as a result of custom and practice - especially when the workforce sees 
requirements as not meeting or conforming to their own experience. Where the SMS is wrong, out-of-date or 
inappropriate, it is important that staff are motivated to report this, and authorised changes are made - taking 
specialist advice on potential wider implications (knock-on effects) of the proposed change. In some cases, a 
situation has been allowed to develop where it has become accepted practice to work outside the SMS. This 
can lead to an unrecognised progressive increase in risk (sometimes referred to as the 'elastic waistband 
effect'). 
In the lead up to some events, there has been a tolerance to deviations and a lack of operating 'discipline''. In 
some cases, there has been evidence that the workforce has not understood the need to comply - particularly 
in regard to the effect a failure to do so can have on other operations. It is therefore important that everybody 
in the organisation understands the importance of the SMS and receives adequate training on not only its 
structure, content and relevance to their own and other roles, but also its importance in supporting a strong 
safety culture. 
5.2.8 Developing a 'flexible' organisation 
A sometimes neglected attribute of a strong safety culture is to maintain flexibility in the organisation's 
response to safety concerns. Whilst the importance of an SMS that assigns clear accountabilities and which 
provides well-understood procedural requirements that are respected by the workforce is a vital component 
of maintaining a strong safety culture, in some cases those involved have 'hidden' behind protocol and 
bureaucracy or blamed faulty paperwork, and have spent so much time following hierarchical rules, that 
flexibility of response to unexpected or important 'signals' has not been achieved. A clear view of 'essentials' 
has been lost. It is important that a balance is maintained between procedures and the ability, when required, 
to respond flexibly - ensuring in changing circumstances that decisions are taken by competent people at the 
right time when a compelling need arises. This requires a free flow of information to those making decisions, 
and the need to ensure that minority or dissenting views are able to be heard. 
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In other words, the SMS should not become a substitute for thinking and self-critical awareness. In some 
cases, a 'tick the box' mentality has developed which provides 'comfort' and is seen as an end in itself. In other 
cases, the organisation has become so 'cluttered' by committees and process, that important interfaces have 
been degraded (e.g. with contractors or direct communication between operations, engineering and 
maintenance). Further examples of this failure 'to see the wood for the trees' have arisen because of 
requirements to collect more data and information even where this is not really necessary given a clearly 
deteriorating situation, and to defer decisions and remedial actions. This has led in some cases to serious 
consequences. 
On the other hand, there is a danger in allowing too much flexibility, since in some circumstances this could 
be used to justify short cuts, failure to ensure that specialist opinion is obtained, and in leaving out vital links 
in the decision-making process. A balance is therefore required, with adherence to procedures as the required 
norm, but with arrangements in place (with suitable safeguards) to ensure that the organisation can be 
decisive and 'quick on its feet' when circumstances demand such a response. 
5.2.9 Safety cultural interfaces when using contractors 
Where contractors are being used in design, construction and in running operational projects, it is important 
that they understand the safety culture expectations of the client organisation and are able to meet them. This 
should play an important part in assessing bids. Before work commences the relevant staff and management 
of contracting organisations should be made fully aware of the need to operate to the same high standards of 
safety culture as are expected of staff in the client organisation. For example, the contractor workforce should 
be empowered to take a conservative view and questioning approach when anomalies are observed, raising 
and listening to concerns, and ensuring that issues arising are promptly reported to decision makers within 
the organisation and to the client. These should then be reviewed by the client to ensure that necessary 
checks have been performed (including the acceptable completion and testing of work and any subsequent 
modifications).  
Where contractors are involved in the construction and commissioning of plant, it is important that observed 
deficiencies are communicated, where relevant, to all other parties in the project chain and satisfactorily 
resolved before proceeding further. In this process, it is important that the client organisation (or others 
appointed to help in the assessment of quality and the witnessing of critical plant and process), maintain strong 
and effective oversight. The role of all parties and communication routes should at all stages be clear, so that 
issues do not 'fall between the gaps' as the project progresses.   
5.2.10 Review of safety culture 
Given the importance of maintaining a strong safety culture, it should be the subject of regular specific 
measurement and review. Such review should be carried out by an independent group using a range of tools 
including questionnaires, staff surveys and interviews, observations, and focus groups.  If such a team is 
established from within the organisation, there is a danger that it may not be sufficiently detached from the 
organisational culture and careful consideration should be given to achieving sufficient independence. The 
review team should report to business and corporate leaders, with clear recommendations on what may be 
needed to maintain and, where necessary, improve the existing safety culture. 
When substantial organisational change is taking place and/or the organisation is subject to strong commercial 
pressure, there may be a temptation to reduce the review programme because of pressure of other 
commitments. However, the changes may themselves be impacting on safety culture. Thus, in these 
circumstances, rather than reduction, consideration may need to be given to strengthening the review process 
so that leaders and managers are aware of any impact on safety culture and thus process safety, and can 
take appropriate action. The use and effectiveness of review processes is discussed in Part 2. 
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6 EXPECTATIONS: BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT – COMMERCIAL 
PRESSURES 
 
6 OVERVIEW 
Most of the events studied have occurred during or after periods of major organisational change and 
accompanying organisational and commercial pressures. Whilst change is clearly necessary and can be 
beneficial in improving organisational arrangements, it can, if not carefully controlled, have a potentially 
adverse effect on process safety. For example, commercial pressures to get projects or work programmes 
completed to schedule (sometimes against extremely demanding requirements) have resulted in 
unacceptable safety standards.  
Change requirements and production pressures should be balanced by defensive precautionary systems to 
avoid over-commitment relative to available resources and a short-term focus. 
It is clearly a function of senior leadership to be fully aware of the imposition and build-up of commercial 
pressures and their potential impact on safety and to act accordingly to ensure that appropriate steps are 
taken to ensure that process safety risks remain acceptable. Where pressures are being imposed higher in 
the organisational structure or by external bodies (e.g. by government), it is important that leaders make clear 
the potential impacts and challenge these at an early stage. The importance of the issue is judged to be such 
that the topic is presented as a separate theme rather than an aspect of leadership - important though this is. 
The reasons why interventions involving organisational change can fail and the need to adopt an iterative 
cyclical process with progress towards defined milestones and the active use of feedback to reconfigure the 
intervention where necessary is discussed in Part 3. 
Other parts of Part 1 of the report where business environment related issues are discussed explicitly include 
Sections 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 13. 
Table 3 - Summary of the business environment expectations 
BE1 Leaders making business decisions should retain an awareness of how these may impact 
process safety and ensure that appropriate steps are taken to ensure that resulting risks to 
process safety are acceptable. Where major changes are planned, a robust management of 
organisational change process should be in place that enables independent assessment of 
the impact of proposed changes on process safety. 
BE2 Availability of resources should be such that process safety requirements are not 
undermined by budgetary and resource constraints. Performance incentives, where used, 
should fully recognise process safety performance. In particular, managerial incentives 
should not reduce their commitment to maintaining standards such as assessing and 
controlling process safety risk. 
BE3 During the change process, communication with staff and visibility of senior management 
should be strengthened. Clear evidence should be presented that process safety continues 
to take precedence over other matters and that safety standards are being maintained. 
Communications should ensure awareness of any emerging process safety risks and 
facilitate an understanding of the safeguards being implemented to ensure safety. 
BE4 The continued need for concerns to be openly raised and supported in regard to process 
safety should be emphasised wherever change is taking place. The pressures placed on 
staff and its effect on their health and performance should be monitored and action taken to 
provide support where necessary. Working conditions and plant, including maintenance 
provision and technical support, should not be allowed to degrade, and investment in safety 
critical plant should not be deferred without a strong safety case. 
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BE5 Work programmes and operational tasks should be carried out to agreed and realistic 
schedules, with clear procedures and quality requirements. The appropriateness of these 
should be monitored and the safety implications of schedules fully assessed and understood 
- particularly for outages and higher risk operations. 
BE6 Client oversight of contractor performance and capability should be maintained to monitor 
effectiveness. The potential demands of schedules for the delivery of contractual work should 
be fully considered with providers. Assumptions about preparatory work and the maturity and 
transferability of the technology being used should be fully assessed. 
BE7 Competence levels and associated training should be maintained at all times. 
Accountabilities and all aspects of the SMS should be kept up-to-date to reflect changes 
taking place. Staff should be informed and trained to take account of the impact of changes 
on their role. 
BE8 Multiple initiatives for business improvement should be prioritised, and implemented in an 
ordered and effective way with careful consideration of resource requirements and pressures 
on staff - including managers, who may be under pressure to maintain safe practices with 
fewer staff and resources. 
BE9 During periods of major change, audit and oversight processes should be strengthened 
where necessary, so that leaders have sufficient information on the evolving situation and 
action taken as required. Areas assessed should include such matters as: impact on the 
workforce and their performance; changes to the SMS - including ensuring that over 
complexity does not develop; clarity about roles and accountabilities and, the maintenance of 
competence and expertise. 
BE10 The longer-term impact of outsourcing should be assessed including the organisational 
implications of loss of competence in business-critical areas. The cumulative effect on 
process safety of incremental changes should also be examined. An independent safety 
function should monitor potential impacts and have direct access to leaders and senior 
managers so that any concerns can be raised. 
BE11 As appropriate, regulatory bodies should be kept adequately informed about change 
initiatives, their progress, and the safeguards being adopted to ensure that safety is 
maintained. It should be understood that they may need to resist pressure to accede to duty 
holder timescales when these are not compatible with carrying out a rigorous risk 
assessment. 
 
6.2 DISCUSSION AND COMMENTARY 
6.2.1 Potential impacts of major organisational change 
To ensure acceptable levels of safety, it is essential that there are robust management of change requirements 
and procedures in place that are not merely a 'rubber stamp' for decisions that have already been taken. 
These should be independent of those making the decisions, and those reviewing the possible safety 
implications should not feel under pressure to confirm their acceptability.  
Impacts that have occurred widely following major organisational change include weaker supervision and 
audit, and loss of capability in key support functions (e.g. engineering support, maintenance, training etc.). 
There is often a substantial increase in workload such that critical staff are placed under unacceptable 
pressure and can thus be tempted or encouraged to take short cuts in carrying out safety-related tasks; an 
SMS that no longer addresses operational reality; leadership instability (e.g. rapid rotation of post holders) 
such that the change process is not managed to completion; key staff taking on multiple roles ('dual hatting') 
with responsibility being assigned for multiple systems and, new duties leading to greater organisational 
complexity with a potential blurring of accountabilities and less effective communication. There is also a 
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danger that experienced and capable staff may be lost without due consideration of how their expertise will 
be replaced and passed on.  
Multiple small changes ('salami slicing') can lead to the same long-term effect as a major change and it is 
important that provision for assessing the cumulative impact of these is built into the management of change 
process. 
6.2.2 Avoiding unrealistic schedules 
Commercial pressures can often lead to projects being carried out to very 'tight' (if not unreasonable) 
timescales. On some occasions such tight schedules have been justified by the view that the work to be 
carried out involves tried and tested techniques that therefore do not require major re-assessment or testing 
and can be compressed. On some occasions, however, alterations and extensions to plant or methods, or 
differences in the 'environment' in which they are to be used can, in effect, mean that the technology is 
'stretched' such that it is more developmental than mature and consequently requires much greater analysis 
and scrutiny than envisaged. It is therefore important that requirements and procedures are in place to ensure 
as far as reasonably practicable that this possibility is recognised. 
Pressures on timescales can also occur in an operational context when it is necessary to carry out work to a 
demanding schedule. This can involve specific operational tasks (e.g. outages, start-ups etc.) or activities 
such as inspection and maintenance for which a specific time has been allocated. Here, there is a danger that 
scheduled work, may fail to be completed or unduly rushed with consequent short cuts and poor quality. Work 
is also sometimes carried out against procedures that are not up-to-date or appropriate. It is thus important 
that before approving such operations, timescales and procedures are critically assessed  
Aggressive schedules can also arise in work to be carried out by contractors. Here, there is a danger that to 
win a contract, those bidding may offer and then agree to carry out the work to a very tight and sometimes 
inappropriate schedule. It is therefore important for clients and contractors to be clear that schedule pressures 
should not be allowed to undermine safety. This requires clarity about contractual and associated technical 
requirements; project assessment and preliminary analysis; acceptable quality standards and, processes 
should be in place to ensure that the normalisation of deviations, the taking of short cuts and /or turning a 
blind eye to non-conformances do not develop. Audit and client oversight arrangements should ensure that 
the possible development of these potential concerns is carefully monitored during the course of the contract. 
The need for the leadership of all parties in a contractual relationship to understand obligations and goals is 
used as an example of how the use of CLM can develop insights into a complex issue in a case study in Part 
3. 
Where targets or specified timescales are imposed for work completion, it is important that the views of those 
involved are sought and considered, and that management reinforce their commitment that safety should take 
precedence. In particular, they should support those who raise a safety concern, even if this requires an 
extension to planned timescales, rather than directly or indirectly giving precedence to the need to 'get the job 
done'. 
6.2.3 Impact of business pressures on the workforce 
Major change, if not carefully planned, monitored and discussed with staff can have a significant impact on 
morale and as a consequence potentially on safety culture. If the message is conveyed, however 
unintentionally, that cost savings take precedence, this should be picked up by the workforce, including their 
line management, and a variety of negative consequences may follow. These include 'turning a blind eye' to 
signals of potential danger; the development of a 'mindset' that 'short cuts' are acceptable; that deviations 
from the norm can be accepted without investigation (normalisation) and, that it is pointless to raise concerns 
or challenge because this will not be welcomed. This change in attitudes can lead to living with inadequate 
systems of risk control, casual compliance, 'making do' and not 'making waves', and can ultimately lead to 
significant increases in risk that become self-reinforcing. Risks can also be compounded by under-investment, 
leading to deteriorating plant condition, inadequate maintenance, and deferred capital investment on important 
safety provisions. 
Reductions in staff numbers and other resource reductions can lead to impacts on mental health (e.g. anxiety 
about jobs), overload leading to excessive overtime and sickness absence (as the inquiry into the Columbia 
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shuttle disaster succinctly put it 'The few, the tired'). Another result can be a reduction in training (resulting 
partly from cuts in the training function and partly from workplace time pressures) at a time when training may 
be most needed as a result of changed roles and new work patterns and processes. In addition, management 
may have to spend more time fighting for a sufficient 'slice of the cake' from those who control budgets and 
who may not fully understand potential impacts and the importance of the need to address safety concerns. 
This should also result in distraction from the technical and people-related problems that may be building up 
as a result of the mounting pressures. Furthermore, there is a danger that managerial attitudes may be shaped 
by performance contracts or bonuses that reward cost saving and meeting budgets more than by measures 
of process safety performance. 
It is thus important that pressures placed on the workforce and their potential impact on health and operational 
performance should be monitored, with a clear commitment to minimise adverse impacts. It is also important 
to continue to provide adequate time for training and team discussion with a sufficient focus on safety issues, 
and to maintain acceptable working conditions.  
6.2.4 Leadership and senior management actions 
As noted in the introduction to this section, it is a primary responsibility of those leaders responsible for 
business decisions that lead to organisational change to consider how the changes and any consequent 
business pressures, may impact on process safety and to ensure that associated risks remain acceptable. 
In addition to an effective management of organisational change process, priority should be given to 
communication with the workforce with visibility of senior managers and leaders. This may be viewed as 
difficult since they may feel 'uncomfortable' in discussing the envisaged major changes with those most 
affected. However, it provides an opportunity to reinforce corporate commitment to safety, explain the 
safeguards in place, and to encourage staff to raise concerns during a potentially higher risk period.  
'Initiative overload' can lead to a loss of focus and 'change weariness'. Thus, it is important that support is 
given, where necessary, to ensure prioritisation of the changes to be made so that they can be implemented 
in an ordered and effective way. 
Audit and oversight processes may need to be strengthened to monitor the implementation of the changes 
and to monitor the adequacy of the time and resources allocated to process safety. This should enable senior 
managers and leaders to stay in touch with the reality of the process and to be seen to be acting if issues 
arise. A well-resourced independent safety function with direct access to senior leaders can have an important 
role to play in advising on concerns, necessary improvements, and in facilitating the transfer of learning as 
changes proceed - so that 'mistakes' are not unnecessarily repeated.  
Accountabilities should keep pace with the change process. For example, where changes are made to support 
functions, it is important that those managing operations and/or projects remain clear about where they can 
obtain support and that changing roles and responsibilities are understood by both users and providers.  
Changes require the provision of up-to-date procedures that keep pace with requirements. If change 
requirements are merely 'bolted on' to existing systems, this may lead in some cases to an ineffective and 
over complex system. Provision therefore should be made to ensure that required changes are effectively 
integrated into the SMS, that they fully reflect the new requirements, and that users are not only aware of 
these, but are trained in their application. 
The use of contractors to carry out some functions that were previously 'in-house' can present significant extra 
challenges to leadership. It emphasises the need for a longer-term view to be taken about loss of competence, 
over reliance on external resources and for strong client oversight in situations where there exists the potential 
for adverse impacts on process safety.  
The need, where appropriate, to keep regulatory bodies informed and to listen to any concerns should be 
recognised. This may need to occur at various levels from strategic concerns about the nature of the change 
process and its impact on safety, to discussion about impacts at 'local' level and the management of the 
process. It should also be recognised that rigorous timescales for the approval of projects, where required, 
can place significant pressures on regulatory bodies and affect their own ability to carry out effective scrutiny. 
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7 EXPECTATIONS: EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION 
7.1 OVERVIEW 
The effectiveness of communication within an organisation is often discussed in relation to safety culture. 
Whilst it is an important aspect of safety culture, the events studied in this research have arisen without 
exception, in part, as a result of ineffective communication. It has thus been presented here as a separate 
topic. The need for effective communication pervades all parts of an organisation and those with which it 
interacts. 
Communication 'oils the wheels' of all aspects of safety management. The failures that occurred (sometimes 
multiple) in the events studied, all led to missed opportunities to mitigate or avoid the ensuing event. Thus, 
improvements in communication both in the longer term and during the lead up to an event, and understanding 
how to make it more effective, are an important aspect of minimising the organisational and cultural precursors 
to major events. 
Five important situations requiring effective communication are addressed in the discussion and commentary 
on this topic in the sub-sections below. The first of these is the effectiveness of the communication that takes 
place 'downwards' from leaders through to those carrying out operations and the reverse 'upward' process 
(feedback). It then considers good communication in an operational context. This involves interaction between 
operators, control rooms, engineers (technical support), maintenance personnel, and between those working 
within each function - particularly during shift handover or in abnormal conditions. Where work is being carried 
out by contractors this adds an extra dimension to the communication process. When an organisation is 
undergoing major organisational change, this can have a substantial impact on the need and effectiveness of 
communication. Finally, communication with outside organisations is considered - this includes all parts of the 
supply chain, regulatory bodies, industry organisations and other external stakeholders.  
It should be noted as a point of clarification not specifically mentioned in the reviewed event investigations, 
that communication can take place in a variety of forms. In this report, only 'official' communication is 
discussed. 'Unofficial' communication may be verbal or non-verbal. It may be very effective in making a point 
in a way that is intended to convey a 'message' whilst no formal communication has been made. 
Organisational expectations can be undermined or reinforced by 'a nod and a wink'. It is thus important that 
awareness is maintained and that the inappropriate use of these informal and potentially detrimental ways of 
'communicating' are discussed in training and discouraged by leaders. 
The specific issue of 'message' content and, in particular, the pathway from message transmission to 
behavioural impact is discussed in Part 2. This also considers the proportion of individuals who change their 
behaviour as a consequence of the communication process. 
Other parts of Part 1 of the report where communication related issues are discussed explicitly include 
Sections 5, 10, 12, and 13, with some references in sections 4, 7 and 11. 
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Table 4 - Summary of effective communication expectations 
Comms1  
 
There should be clarity regarding communication routes for all operational matters. 
Communications should be timely, intelligible, and relevant to those in receipt of them, 
and recipients should not be 'overwhelmed' by communications such that key messages 
are lost. Communication and its importance should be included in training programmes. 
Comms2 The workforce (including contractors) should be encouraged to provide feedback on any 
concerns and should feel that this is valued and acted upon and should know how to 
provide the feedback. They should be made fully aware of the process safety 
expectations of the organisation relevant to their role - such as the expected behaviours 
underpinning a strong safety culture and the importance of this to ensure safety. 
Comms3 Effective communication can be achieved in a variety of ways including the use of 
modern communication media, but face-to-face communication should be a primary 
method. In the case of leaders and senior managers this provides an opportunity to stay 
in contact with operational 'reality' and can also help develop trust and respect - 
providing evidence that senior management are committed to listening and are 
genuinely concerned to achieve a high level of process safety. 
Comms4 Leaders and relevant managers should receive regular briefings on process safety risks. 
They should be encouraged to remain open to information that does not conform with 
existing perceptions. It is thus important that the information received is not 'censored' 
or 'rolled up' such that they miss important concerns. Following discussion, leaders 
should satisfy themselves that effective actions are being taken on identified concerns, 
whilst retaining awareness of the 'big picture'. 
Comms5 Where serious concerns arise regarding a major process safety issue, work should be 
halted, where it is safe to do so, until the matter is resolved with the input of specialist 
advice where necessary. This should be clearly supported by management. Such 
actions have the added advantage that they emphasise very effectively that maintaining 
process safety is an overriding management concern. 
Comms6 Particular emphasis should be given to maintaining effective communication with all 
concerned parties during higher risk operations (such as start-ups). Engineering and 
supervisory expertise should be available at all times and support functions should be 
made aware of plant status. In emergencies, clear channels of communication should 
have been established and tested during exercises, such that confusion on what to do is 
minimised in the case of an actual event. 
Comms7 The role of line supervisors and their managers in ensuring good communication is very 
important. They should retain full awareness of all current operational matters within 
their control, ensure that specialist advice is sought if concerns arise, and be aware of 
the need not to create a 'dam' against minority views or other 'uncomfortable' feedback. 
By maintaining effective communication routes, the existence of operational 'silos' 
should be minimised. 
Comms8 Procedural requirements should explain the importance of key steps and should be 
presented succinctly - minimising paperwork and bureaucracy. Process safety-related 
matters, including the need for full procedural compliance, should be included in regular 
'toolbox talks' and review meetings. Records should be kept of actions arising from 
these and their completion and effectiveness. 
Comms9 Shift handover should be subject to rigorous procedures and a log kept of the process. 
Any plant changes or concerns should be covered, together with the status of current 
operations and monitoring provisions. Understanding should be confirmed. Trained 
deputies should represent supervisors if absent. Sufficient working time should be 
allocated for the process. 
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Comms10 During normal operations, it is also important for effective communication channels to 
be established and kept open. Important channels include those with and between 
supervisors, control rooms, maintenance and engineering teams, and any contractors 
involved. New work should not be started without clear instructions, awareness of any 
process safety issues that could arise, and information about assessments or changes 
to plant that have taken place or are about to take place. 
Comms11 Team meetings (or toolbox talks) should be held regularly. Among other things, these 
should seek to remind staff of key plant issues and procedural requirements - including 
the need to conform to procedures and monitoring requirements and to listen and 
respond to feedback. Staff should also be enabled to maintain a clear understanding of 
the safe operating envelope, the prioritised actions to be taken in response to alarms, 
and the need to seek advice when concerns or uncertainties arise. Engineering support 
should be located at the plant or site and available at all times. 
Comms12 Where contractors and subcontractors are being used, it is important that the client 
ensures that communication systems are sufficiently well aligned and effective at all 
levels of the organisations before work begins. This should ensure, for example, that 
changes to the organisation, processes and plant are communicated to all parties 
concerned. In addition, those involved should be kept up-to-date with developments at 
regular documented review meetings. All changes (including repairs carried out during 
construction) and results of risk assessments should be notified to the client and 
reviewed as necessary. Future users of project output such as operational staff, should 
be sufficiently involved to ensure a good understanding of implications for future 
operations. 
Comms13 Consultants engaged to provide technical advice for projects should be kept fully 
informed about relevant developments. Their conclusions should be reviewed with 
assumptions carefully examined. Written reports should explain the basis of conclusions 
and recommendations and should be written in a form that should be intelligible to 
recipients. Where organisations are employed to provide project oversight, their role 
should be fully explained to all other involved parties. 
Comms14 The safety significance of supplied equipment or plant should be clear to both supplier 
and client. The agreed specification, including quality requirements, should be fully met. 
Suppliers should be aware of the risks inherent in the application of the supplied goods 
and that any changes to specification should not be carried out unless fully reviewed 
with the client - who should also be fully aware of limitations and potential vulnerabilities. 
Comms15 Communication processes can be seriously affected by organisational change and they 
should be reviewed to reflect any 'new reality'. This should ensure that the identification 
and discussion of matters such as staff feedback, monitoring data, and performance 
indicators 'get through' to those responsible for ensuring their effectiveness. 
Comms16 Wider communication should be maintained with outside bodies to improve mutual 
learning. Output from this should be 'tailored' to the needs of those in the organisation to 
whom it may be relevant before it is made available and recipients should not be 
overwhelmed with information that is not relevant and that might affect identification and 
response to that that is important. Regulatory bodies should be kept informed of 
significant matters where appropriate.  
Comms17 Staff should also be kept broadly informed of safety developments of potential interest 
through mechanisms such as organisational newsletters. This should help them feel 
more 'engaged' with wider learning, such as the results of investigations into serious 
events within and beyond their industry sector. 
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7.2 DISCUSSION AND COMMENTARY 
7.2.1 Communication up and down the management hierarchy  
There is a need for recognised and effective routes for communication with clarity regarding points of contact. 
These primary routes should not preclude other communication routes being established where judged to be 
necessary, but the agreed primary routes should not be neglected. It is also important that 'messages' are 
provided in a form that are timely, relevant and intelligible to those receiving them and that recipients are not 
so overwhelmed with communications that they lose sight of areas that should be of interest and concern to 
them.  
One important area of communication is that staff understand the process safety expectations (or equivalent) 
of the organisation, including the behavioural standards that underpin safety culture. In some cases, 
management communication has not been consistent with actual working conditions, requirements and 
practices, and it is thus important that leaders and managers recognise operational 'reality' because, 
otherwise, their pronouncements might be regarded with cynicism by the workforce. 
The workforce should also feel that their feedback on process safety concerns is valued and acted upon, and 
the results of consequent investigations fed back to the workforce. Feedback routes should be clear to all 
personnel on a plant or within a project.  
It is important that communication is not just in electronic form although modern communication media may 
have an important place. Key process safety messages benefit from face-to-face contact wherever possible. 
By this means, managers and leaders should be able to get a better understanding from those 'closest to the 
tools' about safety concerns, with the opportunity to develop greater trust and mutual respect. It also provides 
an opportunity for leaders to reinforce safety messages, particularly when staff may feel that safety is 
becoming secondary to other business objectives. 
Leaders and relevant managers should receive regular briefings on process safety risks, particularly from the 
independent safety function, and remain responsive to these even when their content may be 'unwelcome' or 
where it does not align with their previous perceptions. Information provided should not be 'rolled up' or over 
simplified, and leaders should be aware of emerging risks and understand the implications and actions being 
taken to bring specific risks to acceptable levels. They should ensure that responsibilities are clear and that a 
'grip' is being taken of the ensuing risk reduction process. They should also retain a clear view of the 'big 
picture' of the hierarchy of risks facing the organisation.  
A key message is that if there is concern about a major safety issue - including  uncertainty about the potential 
for the development of a dangerous situation - work should, where possible, be safely stopped, advice sought 
and operations should not re-start until it is safe to do so and uncertainties have been resolved. Such actions 
should be strongly and consistently supported by management. This can play a major role in reinforcing staff 
belief that safety is a genuine priority. 
7.2.2 Operational communications 
In addition to up-to-date technical training reinforced by checks on understanding, communication skills should 
be included in training programmes with examples of how events can occur through communication failure.  
All staff and contractors should be aware of the process safety risks relevant to plant and how to respond in 
the event of problems or concerns. This is particularly important during higher risk operations such as start-
ups, or operations in non-standard conditions (e.g. a line of protection undergoing maintenance). Strictly 
enforced procedures and communication channels (e.g. to other relevant operations) should be in place, and 
staff should be reminded of requirements before proceeding. Safety advisors and engineering specialists 
should be aware of the relevant operations and should be readily available at all times, such that advice can 
be sought by operations staff in the light of any concerns or uncertainty regarding process safety. 
If emergencies occur, clear channels of communication should be in place. Regular exercises should ensure 
that potential confusion about roles, procedures and reporting routes is minimised. 
The knowledge, capability and communication skills of supervisors and their managers is particularly 
important and they should ensure that they remain fully aware of matters such as current plant status 
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(including any abnormal results or conditions), work in progress, and monitoring data. They should also be 
aware of routes for reporting and obtaining advice. Minority views should be encouraged and supervisors and 
managers should not create a 'dam' against dissenting voices. Open communication should be encouraged 
at all relevant levels (not just between managers) and thus the establishment of 'silos' within and between 
functions minimised. The complexity of reporting routes should also be minimised wherever possible to avoid 
the development of unofficial hierarchies. 
Procedural requirements should be available in written form with clarity about why key requirements are 
important. They should be presented as clearly and succinctly as possible, minimising paperwork and 
bureaucracy as this can be a disincentive to use. 
Regular team meetings, 'toolbox' talks and performance reviews should be part of the communication process 
and attendance should be a requirement of the job. Records of these and other relevant meetings should be 
kept, and it should be made clear who is taking forward actions and what checks are to be made on completion 
and effectiveness. 
The need for strong communication in an operational context has many facets but particular areas have been 
highlighted by the reports into the twelve events studied. One of these is shift handover, and another relates 
to requirements during normal operation, including the need to maintain engineering/technical presence and 
support - particularly during higher risk operations or when unexpected problems arise.  
a) Shift handover 
Rigorous formal procedures should be in place at change of shift for both operational staff and engineering 
and technical support teams so that the status of operations and any possible problems can be reviewed and 
requirements clearly set out. A record should be kept of the handover process. This should be reinforced by 
management awareness of practices with checks on conformance. The process should involve a formal 
written log that is not 'cursory' but has meaningful, complete and intelligible entries, and face-to-face 
discussion between shift supervisors. If the incoming supervisor is absent from the plant at handover or at any 
subsequent time during the shift, a trained deputy should be available. As with all safety-related decisions, 
sign off at shift handover should not take place until the incoming team fully understand the current plant 
condition, including any elevated risks, and any checks that are to be carried out or that have been performed. 
Monitoring data on operations from preceding shifts should be fully available to the incoming shift and shared 
as required with support functions. The handover process should be carried out during work (paid) time and 
not rushed. 
 b) Continuing operations 
During normal operation, there should be effective communication between all parties involved in day-to-day 
operations including operators and their supervisors, control room staff, those dealing with faults and 
maintenance, engineering (technical support), and any contractors involved. In particular, it is important that 
assumptions are not made about the status of plant or procedures, that changes are communicated in a timely 
and intelligible way, and that new work is not started without clear supervisory instructions and awareness of 
the process safety issues that could arise. For example, records of recent decisions about changes to the 
plant or to process, hazard reports, risk assessments and any recent repairs, should be briefed to all 
concerned.  
Maintenance requirements should be part of a formal system within the SMS and should not be communicated 
on an informal basis. Requirements for this and other operational issues should be entered in an operational 
log that records and explains decisions. This should be a 'living document' and available to other relevant 
teams. 
In regular safety briefings, individuals and teams should be kept up-to-date with any changed priorities, 
amendments to work instructions, and other operations that may interact with their work programmes. It is 
vital that at all times, operational and associated staff are enabled to retain a clear understanding of the safe 
operating envelope and the relevance and importance of alarms and their follow up - with a log kept of alarms 
and actions taken in response to them. 
It is very important that effective communication is maintained at all times between operators and engineering 
support. This should be 'around the clock' so that if unexpected process safety problems, concerns or 
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uncertainties arise, there is always competent support and advice available. Engineering capability should be 
located sufficiently close to the plant or project so that open continuing contact between operators and 
engineering support is an accepted part of the operational process. Any proposed changes to procedures or 
plant should be appropriately reviewed and authorised by a competent, approved manager. 
7.2.3 Communication with contractors 
Organisations with different cultures, management systems and processes for communication should make 
provision to ensure that for process safety in particular, there is sufficient understanding and alignment of 
systems to ensure that communication is effective. This also includes subcontractors whose work might affect 
process safety.  
Ensuring acceptable systems is an important role for the client. For contracts potentially affecting process 
safety, the communication pathways need to be clear at all levels in the organisation and for all project 
partners, with good liaison between teams. All relevant parties should be involved at an early stage following 
the establishment of a contract, to prepare arrangements that seek to ensure good communication at various 
levels in the organisations, including senior managers. This should ensure, for example, that changes during 
the contract to plant, organisation or process are communicated and discussed, and that all parties are briefed 
and kept fully up-to-date with developments. Regular review meetings should be held with all involved parties 
and with representation at an appropriate level of seniority. The meetings should review project developments, 
including quality and maintenance information. Output, including actions and decisions, should be 
documented.  
If consultants are engaged to provide technical advice, they should be kept closely informed about project 
developments and their views made clear to all concerned so that existing assumptions can be reviewed as 
necessary. Consultant's reports should be kept fit for purpose without unnecessary detail that may influence 
readability and understanding. Assumptions on important matters should be reviewed before acceptance. 
Where organisations are employed to provide contractual oversight on behalf of the client, their role should 
be fully explained to all other parties so that there is no ambiguity about who is responsible for what. 
If changes are planned or repairs are to be carried out during construction, the client should be notified and 
any necessary assessments carried out before work proceeds. Future users of project output should be 
involved, where possible and appropriate, in the project in order to ensure that they have a good understanding 
of matters relevant to subsequent operations.   
Clients should also be aware of the potential motivation of contractors to obtain follow on work. Whilst this 
may encourage good performance, there may, on occasions, be an incentive to 'hide' difficulties or shortfalls 
in progress in order not to 'upset' the client. The latter should ensure, therefore, that adequate arrangements 
exist to monitor and challenge, and where concerns arise, to ensure that the matter is resolved at an 
appropriate level. 
Communication about the safety significance of supplied equipment or plant in a process safety context should 
aim to ensure that the agreed specification is always met, there is good quality control and that suppliers 
understand that some components may be used in safety critical applications. In such cases, they need to 
understand the vital importance of conformity to specification with no changes, however minor, unless a 
mutually agreed risk assessment has been performed to a depth commensurate with safety significance. 
Equally, the end-user should be enabled to develop a sufficient understanding of the supplied product such 
that limitations and potential vulnerabilities are recognised. 
7.2.4 Role in organisational change 
Organisational change can have profound effects on established lines of communication and this should be 
recognised and addressed during the change process, and effectiveness monitored. Sometimes, however, 
organisational change can also enhance communication by simplifying structures and streamlining processes. 
If an unsatisfactory communication system is implemented that does not reflect changed 'reality' and/or is not 
clear and simple to use, communication over important aspects of process safety can deteriorate. The 
consequence can then be that important data may be lost, weak signals missed, and engineering inputs and 
workforce concerns neglected. Furthermore, important feedback can fail to 'get through' as it progresses up 
the management chain.  
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7.2.5 Wider communication 
Industry associations and other external organisations should frequently have available reports and safety-
related information. It is thus important that sharing of available knowledge relating to process safety is made 
available to all who may find it of value. Where such learning is available, promulgation should be targeted so 
that recipients are supplied with information that is relevant to them. A recognised and competent part of the 
organisation to facilitate this should be established.  
Regulatory bodies should, as appropriate, be kept informed of any matters that are relevant to their role. Apart 
from those matters that are formal requirements, there should exist a communication process that ensures 
that regular discussions occur and that there are 'no surprises'. This should generate regulatory confidence 
that the organisation is listening to their concerns and suggestions, and being open with them. It should also 
minimise unexpected regulatory action. 
In addition to the specific requirements for effective communication over safety matters, staff should feel more 
'engaged' and committed to the organisation if they are regularly updated on developments and other matters 
of potential interest through communications such as organisational newsletters. Ensuring that process safety 
issues are included in communications can provide added confidence that the issue is treated as high profile 
and is receiving continued leadership commitment. 
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8 EXPECTATIONS: SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) 
  
8.1 OVERVIEW 
The SMS (SMS) should be a comprehensive, living set of documents containing sufficient detail to minimise 
ambiguity, whilst retaining clarity and intelligibility to ensure that control can be maintained (and thus high 
levels of process safety achieved) in operations. The SMS should ensure that operators understand the 
importance of key steps in relation to the goals to be achieved.  
The SMS should be designed to ensure that all regulatory and legal requirements are met in construction, 
operations, projects, and decommissioning for all activities. It is also an important vehicle for ensuring that 
organisational expectations for process safety are translated into well-understood working practices that if 
appropriately supported and used, can reinforce and support a strong organisational safety culture. 
In all of the events studied, there have either been serious inadequacies in the SMS and/or a culture of non-
compliance arising for a variety of reasons. Often the need 'to get the job done' to meet schedules or as a 
result of poorly thought through changes, including reductions in resource below a level that is required to 
achieve acceptable levels of safety, have adversely affected the SMS and its application. 
Other sections of Part 1 where SMS related issues are discussed explicitly include section 10, with some 
references in section 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 11. 
Table 5 - Summary safety management system expectations 
SMS1 The SMS should be formulated by specialist staff - applying risk assessment where 
appropriate. It should take into account human factors and the experience of users to 
ensure effectiveness in operation. It should be made clear where the SMS is goal based 
and where it is prescriptive. 
SMS2 Promoting and checking of compliance and actual operating practice is an important role 
for supervisors and line managers. They should ensure that a 'tick-box' approach to the use 
of procedures does not develop. There should be clear accountabilities for the control of 
each part of the SMS with a clear 'process owner'. It should be kept up to date as a 
'controlled' document. Operational 'waivers' that allow non-compliance with the SMS should 
be carefully controlled and authorised at an appropriate level. 
SMS3 Leaders should ensure that they are able to maintain a clear overview of the management 
and adequacy of the system - receiving reports on any major issues. They should support 
and promote the importance of the SMS, encourage a questioning, cautious approach that 
takes full account of the reporting of user concerns, particularly during periods of 
organisational pressure. They should set an example through their own actions. 
SMS4 The SMS should not be over complex or bureaucratic as this may discourage compliance 
and the process safety reasons for key steps should be made apparent. All SMS related 
documentation should be aligned and integrated within an accessible easy-to-use overall 
system. Periodic checks should be carried out to ensure that the SMS is fit for purpose and 
is meeting its objectives. It should align (or be suitably integrated) with other systems such 
as those relevant to quality (quality management system, QMS) and the protection of the 
environment. 
SMS5 The SMS should also fully align with the safety case that should provide a basis for key 
aspects of it. For example, the safe operating envelope should be clearly presented to 
operators with an explanation of the need and approach required to stay within in it. 
Administrative controls should be identified, and systems that do not rely on human 
intervention as the primary mechanism to ensure safety should be introduced where ever 
it is possible to do so. 
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SMS6 The content of the SMS should address all matters relating to control of work, including 
roles and responsibilities, communications, maintenance requirements, and testing and 
monitoring. It should also set out requirements for upward reporting of concerns and their 
follow up, management of projects and contractors, risk assessment practices as well as 
records such as safety classification of plant, risk registers and authorisation of changes to 
the system. 
SMS7 For safety critical operations such as start-ups, all plant should be confirmed as meeting 
requirements, and only then should formal agreement be given to proceed. Run-throughs 
and briefings should be in place to remind staff of the SMS and its requirements. These 
higher risk operations should be subject to effective monitoring with ongoing supervision. 
SMS8 Anomalies and unexpected findings should not be 'normalised' and treated as routine, and 
'signals' that challenge assumptions should be treated as learning opportunities and fully 
investigated. Requirements to respond to off-normal conditions and emergencies should 
be set out in the SMS. 
SMS9 The SMS should aim to reduce identified risks as far as is reasonably practicable. The risk 
assessment process used should be kept up-to-date (dynamic) in the light of emerging 
findings and data, including the results of management audit and independent oversight 
processes. All identified risks should be addressed as part of a prioritised reduction plan. 
Particular emphasis in the SMS should be paid to new or less familiar technology. 
SMS10 All changes to procedures (including those that are temporary) should be independently 
assessed, verified and appropriately authorised. This should include the need for the 
change and any potential 'knock-on' effects. Proposed changes should be discussed with 
relevant teams and those in interfacing areas, requirements for refresher training 
assessed, and compatibility with the existing safety case carefully considered and 
addressed. The process should not be over lengthy or bureaucratic, however, as this may 
act as a deterrent to effective reporting. 
SMS11 In addition to line management checks and audits, independent oversight of the SMS 
should be carried out on a regular basis. This should enable a 'wider view' of the system 
to be taken drawing on experience and good practice. As well as more specific checks on 
coverage and content, the impact and response to changes, workforce and management 
attitudes, approaches and workforce views on the system, should all be considered. In 
addition to these, topics such as: the response to deviations from the expected; treatment 
of monitoring and test results; the build-up of backlogs in maintenance; the availability 
and use of engineering advice; the extent of supervisory control and, the effectiveness of 
the implementation of previous actions, should be addressed as appropriate. 
SMS12 Rigorous training and refresher training should be in place to support the SMS and raise 
awareness of requirements and changes. The process should use a variety of 
approaches (not just information technology (IT) based) to allow 'simulations' and 
discussion where required. Records should be kept of training and individual and team 
needs updated. Understanding in training should encompass topics such as critical 
operations, contractor issues, the need for compliance and the reporting of concerns. 
SMS13 The mutual requirements of contractors and the client relating to safety management 
should be addressed at an early stage in all projects in order to ensure mutual 
understanding of practices and requirements as part of a 'joined up' approach. The client 
should ensure that uncertainties are minimised, and that the requisite degree of control 
and oversight is in place to ensure acceptable practices. 
SMS14 The client should require a questioning attitude with an agreed approach to such matters 
as the identification of deficiencies in the management system, remedial actions, required 
records and reporting of concerns. There should be an intolerance from all parties to 
proceeding with the presence of shortcomings in the SMS. 
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SMS15 Contractor self-certification of safety and quality, including the effectiveness of the SMS 
and conformance with it, should be appropriately overseen and monitored by the client. 
Any potential 'trade-offs' between the requirements of the management and quality 
systems against project progress should be identified and addressed before they are 
implemented. Client oversight should include all matters that might influence the SMS 
during the operational phase, including trial and test results and changes or repairs during 
construction. Alignment with the safety case, monitoring, and maintenance requirements 
of the as-built plant should be considered and provisions put in place prior to operations. 
SMS16 Regulatory bodies should, where appropriate, be made aware of any major changes to 
the SMS and the results of major reviews. Their views and advice should be sought as 
appropriate. 
 
8.2 DISCUSSION AND COMMENTARY 
8.2.1 Formulation and role 
The SMS should be formulated with specialist input based, where appropriate, on risk assessment at a 
suitable depth, but also with input from users. This input should help to ensure that procedures can be 
performed as written (thus minimising deviations), and more generally, should promote ease of practical 
application by taking account of human factors and other operational considerations. Control room practices 
and response to alarms are particularly important areas to be considered.   
It is important that there are clear accountabilities for control of the SMS, including independent authorisation 
of changes with a clear 'process owner' for each part that takes into account interactions with other plant and 
processes. The development and promotion of the SMS, together with the need to ensure rigorous compliance 
and awareness of actual working practices, should be a key task for supervisors and line managers. 
Leadership engagement and support is very important and leaders should receive clear and transparent 
reports of important issues, enabling them to be aware of the 'big picture'.  
Managers and leaders should act as role models in demonstrating:  
a) the importance attached to the SMS by maintaining good working knowledge of its requirements; 
b) keeping the system up-to-date as a 'controlled' document;  
c) ensuring audit of content and use;  
d) providing training to promote understanding of its role and importance among staff;  
e) encouraging a questioning and cautious approach avoiding unwarranted consensus and,  
f) by promoting effective reporting and 'uncensored' feedback of concerns supported by operational 
monitoring. They should systematically check continued compliance and ensure that an uncritical 'tick-box' 
response in that completion of paperwork takes precedence over actual practice does not develop. 
In formulating the SMS, it is important to achieve a balance between a goal-based approach with sufficient 
detail to ensure compliance, and a more prescriptive approach with a significant level of detail. Complexity 
can create more ways in which failure can occur. In some of the events studied, a safety critical perspective 
was lost with the generation of paperwork containing 'impenetrable' detail and bureaucracy, and with the need 
to maintain 'hierarchy' taking primacy over the achievement of actual safety. The opportunity should therefore 
be taken regularly to examine whether the SMS is fit for purpose, taking account of the views of users. 
Business pressures should not be used as a reason for failing to address important process safety 
requirements in the SMS. Management pressures should not be allowed to over-ride valid engineering 
concerns.  
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8.2.2 Basis, content and format 
The SMS should derive from and be consistent with the relevant safety case. This is particularly important in 
ensuring that the operating limits and conditions that delineate the safe operating envelope are properly 
established and understood. It is also important in promoting an understanding of the importance of alarms 
and other critical control measures in alerting operators if the safe boundary is approached, and then in taking 
appropriate action.  
Wherever possible, there should not be over-reliance on operator action to maintain control in safety critical 
operations. The SMS should promote awareness of where administrative requirements are present in order 
to control residual risk, and to the extent possible, these should be minimised and replaced by systems that 
are not reliant on human intervention.  
The overall SMS, in addition to providing operating procedures such as 'tech specs' and method statements, 
should include or provide reference to a suite of associated documents. As far as possible, all of this 
documentation should be aligned and integrated and be understood, accessible, and easy to use.  
The SMS and associated documents should contain clear requirements for matters such as:  
a) maintenance and mechanical integrity (including the required approach to non-routine repairs);  
b) control of work systems;  
c) shift hand-over practices;  
d) requirements for monitoring;  
e) testing of critical equipment;  
f) action tracking and,  
g) verification.  
It should also define: reporting requirements and follow up - including investigations; risk assessment 
requirements; arrangements for the management of contractors and projects and, roles, responsibilities and 
accountabilities of identified staff, teams and functions. Within the management system, there should also be 
requirements for the identification, specification and the safety classification of plant and components (with 
associated requirements for monitoring and trend analysis), and for inspection and maintenance. It should 
also define requirements for records, checklists, databases and systems for matters such as risk control, the 
making of changes to the SMS and associated authorisations. 
All plant should be confirmed as working and effective before key operations such as start-ups take place and 
any deviations should be the subject of review. The SMS should also provide instructions for responding to 
off-normal conditions and emergency preparedness - with clarity about lines of authority for addressing more 
serious events.  
It is important that when system failures occur, these are treated as potentially important precursors that could 
occur again with a different outcome. They should therefore not be normalised and treated as routine. 
Risk assessment based upon both specialist and user input should provide the basis for the safety case and 
associated documents and thus for the SMS, and provide an understanding of specific and cumulative risks. 
Risks should be reassessed, where necessary, in the light of any emerging findings and data, and in response 
to the results of management audit and independent oversight. It is important to ensure that 'signals' that 
challenge assumptions about risks are recognised and analysed. 
Risks should be addressed on a planned and prioritised basis. An overview should be maintained to ensure 
that risks are reduced as far as is reasonably practicable. Assessments should be up-to-date and 'dynamic', 
with particular attention being given to new or unfamiliar aspects of the technology. They should reflect 
changes in operational and organisational conditions. 
The SMS is sometimes part of a wider QMS and, whatever the formal organisational relationship between the 
two in a particular organisation, it is important that their roles and interfaces are clear and that they are mutually 
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consistent. It should also align with systems in place such as those, for example, used to manage 
environmental matters. 
8.2.3 Review of the SMS and control of changes 
All changes to procedures, even those that may appear to be small - such as proposed extensions and 
temporary changes - should be independently assessed at an appropriate depth, verified and appropriately 
authorised before implementation. This should include understanding of the case for the change and the 
identification of any potentially wider consequences ('knock-on' effects) as part of the management of change 
process, with records kept of how and on what basis decisions were made. In this respect, procedural changes 
should be treated in the same way as proposed changes to plant or organisation. Proposed changes should 
be discussed with teams and their supervisors and systematically communicated to other relevant teams 
whose activities could be affected. This should ensure that a mutual understanding of management system 
requirements, and the potential importance of these at interfaces is achieved. Modifications such as changes 
to plant, or lessons learned from operating experience, should be reviewed to ensure that refresher training 
needs are identified and that relevant safety considerations are fed back into the safety case thus providing a 
'reinforcing' system. 
In carrying out these processes, it is important however that changes do not take too long to implement. Not 
only should this increase the time at risk from inadequate procedures, but a bureaucratic process may deter 
the workforce from raising concerns and increase the likelihood of non-approved 'fixes' and a culture of non-
compliance. 
In addition to management inspections, checks, and regular line management audit, the SMS should also be 
the subject of independent review. This should be carried out on a regular basis and to agreed criteria, with 
findings and actions recorded. The response should be commensurate with safety significance, and 
completion and effectiveness monitored. Review should include the approach of managers and supervisors 
to ensuring compliance, the extent that the SMS is up-to-date and reflects needs, and the level of 
understanding and effectiveness of feedback on identified deficiencies.  
These independent reviews provide an opportunity for a view of the system to be taken that is wider and more 
holistic and which draws on good practice and learning from other sources. In order to ensure adequate 
'defence in depth', a layer of protection analysis (LOPA) or equivalent has been used in some organisations. 
The frequency and depth of review should not be relaxed because significant problems have not become 
apparent in the past. 
In carrying out reviews of the SMS, particular note should be taken of its ability to generate an adequate 
response to any 'signals' such as deviations from expected measurements (e.g. leakage rates or temperature 
excursions), increased rates or backlogs in maintenance, and test results that lie outside expectations. 
Maintenance procedures should not only require standard tests and defined periodic checks and servicing to 
be carried out, but the system should require checks to be performed on in-service behaviour and 
performance. These checks should take account of the experience of users and, where appropriate, the 
condition of components and associated plant. Other checks carried out on the effectiveness of the SMS 
should include such matters as:  
a) the extent of supervisory control;  
b) the availability of specialist advice when required;  
c) the effectiveness of links between functions such as operations and engineering;  
d) confirmation that actions arising from previous audits and reviews have been completed and their 
effectiveness verified;  
e) the quality of work performed in response to the procedures (not just 'sign off') and,  
f) the response to any emerging concerns - particularly in relation to 'defensive systems' that are designed to 
ensure safety. 
By exception, and where there is a strong safety-related need to do so, there may be a need to seek an 
exemption to application of the requirements of the SMS. Such exemptions or 'waivers' should not be routinely 
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granted and where they are granted, they should be authorised at an appropriate senior level. The extent of 
the use of 'waivers' should be regularly reviewed to ensure that they are not becoming too prevalent. 
Regulatory bodies should, where appropriate, be made fully aware of substantial changes to the SMS and the 
results of major reviews on an agreed basis. This can inform their own priorities for regulatory scrutiny. 
Regulatory bodies can also be an important source of advice, given their knowledge of good practice. 
8.2.4 Maintaining user competence 
In addition to rigorous initial training on the content and regulatory and cultural requirements for an effective 
SMS, all users and their supervisors and managers should undertake refresher training to ensure 
understanding of significant changes made, and the process safety reasons for them. It is important that 
reliance is not placed solely on 'learning on the job'. Records of training and certification, and particularly its 
relevance to authorised roles, should be kept up-to-date and used as input to assess training requirements 
as part of regular performance reviews. Refresher training should be carried out using a variety of approaches 
(not just IT based) allowing specialist input, simulation exercises, and discussion, as appropriate.  
Particular steps may need to be taken to reinforce understanding of requirements prior to critical operations 
such as re-starts and shutdowns, the initiation of new projects (which may involve contractors and thus new 
interfaces) and, major maintenance activities. These steps can involve not only specific refresher training but 
run-throughs and briefing sessions to raise awareness of the importance of compliance with the SMS, key 
aspects of safety that may be of particular relevance, and the importance of reporting and dealing effectively 
with any concerns that may arise. 
 
8.2.5 Compatibility of systems with contractors  
There should be a clear system in place for the management of contractual work that is agreed in advance of 
the project being established. This should ensure that there is good mutual understanding of the requirements 
on the designer, constructor and operator (including intermediate phases such as commissioning), with feed-
through and continuity of systems. 
It is very important that management systems are adequately 'joined up' - particularly between contractors 
and the host/client organisation. A failure to achieve this can lead to potentially significant issues, particularly 
when contractor-led projects are being carried out on a client's site rather than at a separate location. In this 
case, there exists the potential for failure to appreciate areas of potential conflict or uncertainty between 
systems and approaches. Even if contractor activities appear separate from client operations, it is important 
that the requisite degree of monitoring, control and oversight is maintained by the client organisation, and any 
identified areas of overlap carefully examined to ensure acceptable procedures, mutual understanding and 
operational compatibility.  
Any contractor self-certification of the agreed SMS, quality etc. should be subject to client monitoring and 
scrutiny. Also, any decisions regarding potential trade-offs between quality/safety and project progress should 
be discussed and reviewed on a timely basis before the project has moved on. Clients and any other 
organisations working under their control, should have sufficient knowledge of the contractor's management 
systems in order to achieve effective oversight of contractor work. This should include checks at agreed critical 
points on the design and construction process, the quality of construction, and the results of any trials and 
tests (with witnessing as necessary). 
Several other matters relevant to SMSs should be considered as a project proceeds from design to build, and 
on to operations. The safety case and resulting SMS should reflect the 'as built' plant as distinct from original 
design intent, and the impact of any changes during design and construction considered before they are 
introduced. Maintenance provision and associated procedures should be fully considered in design and fed 
through to operations. Records should be kept of matters such as measurements and test results and the 
basis of safety-related decisions, so that this is available at subsequent stages in the plant or project life to 
inform the provision of management systems if required. 
The client should require a questioning attitude with an agreed approach to the reporting, investigation and 
the timely correction of deficiencies that become apparent. Repairs and remedial actions should be carried 
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out in a controlled way with suitable recording and certification. There should be an intolerance from all parties 
to failure to report emerging concerns or to proceeding with the presence of faults or poor quality. 
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9 EXPECTATIONS: RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
 
9.1 OVERVIEW 
The process of risk assessment and management, whether applied to occupational safety or process safety, 
should follow the same basic approach. It involves identifying hazards, analysing and identifying potential 
consequences, and using the output to ensure that risk reduction measures are in place wherever reasonably 
practicable. Assessments should attempt to take an integrated view of risks, utilising both a 'top down' and 
'bottom up' approach and looking at longer term potential process safety risks - as well as the short term. 
Taking a broad perspective, risk assessment and management can be considered to take place at three 
levels:  
a) holistic, structured assessments that aims to stand back and assess the risks from a plant or process as a 
whole. Techniques such as PRAs provide a basis for this;  
b) operational management assessments that entail the use of hazard identification processes and the design 
of appropriate mitigation for identified risks. Techniques employed should include the use of check lists, 
operational reviews and HAZOPS, and  
c) what might be termed operational risk control. This should involve approaches used by constructors and 
operators to identify and mitigate risks as part of their ongoing activities. This may utilise processes such as 
'STAR' (Stop, Think, Act, Review) or 'Take Five' that involves stepping back and reflecting for five minutes on 
likely hazards and the potential safety implications of a particular task. The process should be reinforced by a 
strategic overview of the entire process. 
Other parts of this chapter of the Report where SMS related issues are explicitly discussed include sections 
10 and 13, with some references in sections 4, 6, 7, 8, and 12. 
 
Table 6 - Risk assessment and management expectations 
RA1 An open-minded view of what may emerge from risk assessments should be maintained at 
all times without preconceptions. Critical consideration should be given to relevant 
operational experience (such as observed defects and unexpected occurrences) and 
underlying causes carefully evaluated. Provisions should be in place to ensure that a 'tick 
box' approach without sufficient challenge and an over-simplified view is not being taken. 
Assessments should be carried out using a team approach where ever possible, so that 
diverse viewpoints can be considered (e.g. workplace experience). 
RA2 Changes to safety provisions (such as monitoring programmes) should not be made unless 
fully risk assessed, and waivers enabling non-adherence to established procedures should 
only be granted after full consideration of risks and through an approved authorisation 
route. 
RA3 Assessments should not be rushed or deferred to meet business requirements and should 
be carried out with sufficient competent resource and using approved standards. They 
should be performed under the direction of a designated suitably competent manager who 
is accountable for ensuring effectiveness and prioritised implementation of ensuing actions. 
Definitions of levels of risk should be agreed and set out for all risk assessments. 
RA4 Assessments should be 'dynamic', avoid a narrow focus, and should be based on industry 
good practice and up-to-date standards. They should carefully assess the claimed integrity 
of safety critical equipment and any changes to plant or processes - including interactive 
effects, incremental changes, and the results of related assessments. Consideration should 
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be given to any measures that can stop the escalation of a process failure or mitigate its 
consequences. 
RA5 All of those involved in carrying out and interpreting risk assessments should have a full 
understanding of ALARP (and its legal basis where relevant) and how this can be achieved 
and demonstrated. All findings and the basis for decisions should be documented. 
RA6 Issues such as ageing and reliability of plant, including any known or long-standing 
problems, should be subject to review. Assessments should also be carried out of less 
frequently used plant or processes of relevance to process safety. Particular attention 
should also be given to 'legacy' (inherited) plant and systems. 
RA7 Investigations into important areas such as control room operations (e.g. response to 
alarms) and other operational human factors considerations should be fully taken into 
account in carrying out risk assessments. 
RA8 Changes to plant and processes (including temporary works or modifications) and 
organisational change should be subject to rigorous management of change risk 
assessments and these should be periodically reviewed for independence and 
effectiveness. 
RA9 A 'stand back', holistic view of risks using techniques such as PRA should be carried out at 
a designated periodicity. Critical issues such as assessment of fire safety, requirements for 
dealing with process upsets, and emergency response provision, should be regularly 
reviewed. 
RA10 Duty holders should preferably retain the expertise to carry out their own risk assessments. 
If, however, contractors are employed, the client should ensure that it has the expertise and 
capability to act as an intelligent customer. This requires ownership of the process with 
sufficient 'challenge', awareness of the risks and assumptions used, maintenance of good 
communication with the contractor and, a questioning approach which ensures that there is 
sufficient rigour in the analysis.  
RA11 Lessons and relevant findings from risk assessments should be used to raise awareness 
(for example through training) among designers, constructors and operational staff and 
support functions, about the importance of identifying emerging 'symptoms' and reporting 
anomalies. 
RA12 Safety cases should be 'living' documents which reflect the findings of relevant risk 
assessments. They should be set out in a form that provides useful input to operational 
decision making. A record of identified risks and their mitigation that is of value to 
operations, can be provided by the establishment of a risk register. 
RA13 In design and construction, particular attention should be paid to the risk assessment of 
new technology or novel processes. Good practice engineering principles should be 
incorporated with adequate safety margins. Likewise scaling-up or other significant 
alterations to existing plant or processes should be the subject of rigorous analysis. In all 
cases, suitable codes and standards, calculations and models should be used. Where 
possible, assessments should be based on actual data (e.g. from trials or proof tests). 
RA14 Potential risks arising from construction defects, lapses in quality, or unexpected findings 
should be rigorously assessed (including any remedial work). In design, awareness should 
be maintained of the range of conditions in which the plant may be operated and suitable 
instrumentation made available to ensure that operation meets design specifications. Use 
of administrative controls in higher risk areas should be minimised with effective alternative 
systems introduced that do not rely on direct human input where possible. Consideration 
should also be given to ease of maintenance. 
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RA15 Oversight of design, construction and commissioning should be carried out in order to 
assess key process safety risks. Clear accountabilities should be in place for this. Effective 
communication should be maintained within a 'joined up' approach. The process should 
take account of the appropriateness of the analytical tools used and the results of trials and 
tests that should be witnessed where appropriate. 
RA16 Independent oversight should also be carried out to confirm that risk assessments at all 
levels are being carried out thoroughly and effectively and should also seek to determine 
whether subsequent operations align with the output of assessments. Oversight should 
also be carried out to examine the quality of construction, the potential impact of any 
changes to design or construction, and the identification of critical components that require 
specific operational monitoring and maintenance provision to be established. 
RA17 To ensure that leaders are fully aware of important process safety risks, a process should 
be in place to ensure that a 'corporate' strategic overview is taken of process safety risks 
and their management. This should allow senior leaders to maintain a better appreciation of 
risks and allow them to be managed alongside other business risks. 
 
9.2 DISCUSSION AND COMMENTARY 
9.2.1 Generic considerations 
Risk assessments should be carried out for all plant or processes involving possible process safety risks. In 
carrying out risk assessments of all types, it is important that individuals and organisations approach the task 
with an open-minded view of what may emerge  and, in particular, do not start from a pre-conceived, over-
confident view of what should be found (e.g. that the plant or process is safe and the exercise should confirm 
this). This can lead to a 'tick-box' approach and a view that identified hazards and their associated risks are 
acceptable even when they are not, and thus to normalisation. A strong culture of challenge ('what if') should 
be encouraged throughout the process, including from more senior staff. This critical, precautionary approach, 
also should ensure that an over-simplified view is not taken in dealing with complex issues. In particular, 
critical consideration should be given to unexpected problems and findings, and their underlying causes 
assessed. 
It is important that risk assessments are not rushed to meet business deadlines or constrained by lack of 
competent resource and, as a result, are not sufficiently thorough. Assessments should not be deferred except 
when there are compelling reasons to do so and an assessment should be carried out of the potential 
implications of any deferral. 
Analysis should use approved standards and good practice. An ad-hoc approach should be avoided. Risk 
definitions should be agreed in advance and not adapted to suit circumstances. Where used, a common 
consequence - frequency matrix should be applied so that agreed measures of risk are adopted. The output 
from the assessment should be prioritised to reflect the seriousness of the risks identified, and ensuing actions 
should focus on the higher risks as a priority. Where appropriate, risk reduction actions should be incorporated 
in business planning. 
Clear accountability should be placed on a competent manager (with adequate support and resources) to 
manage the process and to ensure that responsibilities for the assessment are not 'divided, dissipated and 
dispersed' in such a way that teamwork and communication is ineffective. Actions resulting from assessments 
should be closed out and implemented and their effectiveness confirmed. 
A 'stand-back', holistic view should be taken to re-assess risks on a periodic basis using, for example, PSAs. 
Assessments should also be carried out on a regular scheduled basis of response plans for such critical areas 
as fire safety, management of 'process upsets' and emergency response. These should reflect all credible 
scenarios and pathways. 
The risk assessment process should be 'dynamic'. Checks need to be carried out of safety critical equipment 
and its fitness for purpose and should ensure that any changes being proposed to safety-related plant or 
processes (including any temporary modifications) are subject to a risk assessment. They should include 
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interactions with supporting equipment and related processes (co-faults) - thus avoiding a narrow focus - and 
should take account of the results of previous risk assessments (whilst not allowing these to 'shape' the new 
assessment). Assessments should also consider incremental changes and any long-standing chronic 
conditions (e.g. leaks). Other operational information, including maintenance data and unexpected findings 
that have occurred (e.g. failure of plant or components), can also provide valuable sources of input for risk 
assessments.  
Longer-term process safety issues arising from changes to accepted good practice and changes in standards 
should receive attention. The ageing of plant or components should also be the subject of review. 
Consideration should be given to engineering or management measures that can be implemented to stop the 
escalation of a process safety failure or mitigate its consequences. Examples in petrochemical processes 
would include the provision of flare systems and measures to remove sources of ignition from areas where 
flammable materials may be present. 
Independent oversight may also be required to confirm that the process has been thorough and effective - 
particularly where new plant or processes are being assessed or when significant changes are being made. 
Review should be carried out to determine whether actual operations align with the assumptions and results 
of the assessment - particularly in safety critical areas. 
Areas for risk assessment should include less frequently used plant or processes and those that may be 
operational for short periods of time or outside the mainstream of the business (sometimes referred to as 
'orphan plant'). 'Legacy' systems (those inherited from a previous site 'owner' or operating organisation) should 
be examined particularly carefully and any outstanding improvements or remedial work incorporated. 
Risk assessments should be carried out where procedures or equipment are changed or where temporary 
modifications are to be introduced.  They should also be carried out for organisational change, such as to 
levels of supervision and engineering support, using agreed and rigorous procedures designed to ensure that 
changes are not introduced that have a serious impact on safety - including those that may have been 
proposed at senior levels in the organisation. The need to encourage challenge and provide independent 
oversight to important proposals applies in the case of organisational change as well as for engineering or 
process change. 
A team approach is valuable in conducting risk assessments as this can provide diverse viewpoints and a mix 
of skills, drawing on wider experience. For example, risk assessments during design, need to take account of 
construction requirements and operability and maintainability, whilst assessments of operational plant and 
processes should take account of experience from maintenance (particularly of critical components) and 
workforce experience and concerns. The results of more formal processes such as audits and inspections 
and any behavioural (human factors) investigations into issues such as control room operations and response 
to alarms, are also important potential inputs to analysis. 
Those engaged in risk assessments and those managing them, should have a full understanding of the 
concept of ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable) and its legal basis in the UK, together with the necessary 
steps that need to be taken to establish that this has been achieved. This should be supplemented by an 
understanding of how regulatory bodies assess risk, which in the UK, is underpinned by a tolerability of risk 
framework (Reducing Risks, Protecting People: R2P2 - HSE's decision-making process). 
Findings and decisions emerging from risk assessments should be documented. In addition to meeting legal 
requirements and providing an auditable trail of actions, the output in a suitable form can be of continuing 
value in raising awareness of risks, the importance of mitigation measures, and the need to adhere to 
procedures and work instructions. 
9.2.2 Wider use of risk assessments 
Lessons from assessments, suitably presented and incorporated in training, can raise awareness and further 
inform designers, constructors, and operational staff about requirements such as the importance of identifying 
and reporting emerging 'symptoms' (early signs of incipient failure) and anomalies, and can thus strengthen 
safety culture.  
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A valuable way of providing a record of identified risks emerging from assessments and how they are mitigated 
is through the use of risk registers. They can, if effectively presented and used, provide a useful input to 
operational and engineering staff and their managers. 
Risk assessment is a vital input in the development and review of safety cases. These have, on occasions, 
been viewed as 'paper vaults' and not 'living' documents that can contribute substantially to improving process 
safety. They have also been used to give a false sense of security through 'paper safety and not real safety'. 
If proportionate, accessible and made intelligible to the user, they can also be very valuable to operational 
teams and their management - particularly in providing an integrated view of risks and promoting an 
understanding of the safe operating envelope and the most important risks.  
9.2.3 Risk assessment and the role of contractors 
Because of its importance to the control of process safety, organisations should preferably retain 'ownership' 
and sufficient in-house expertise to assess and fully understand the risks that they face. If, however, external 
bodies are asked to take on the role of carrying out risk assessment, the client needs to maintain an ability to 
act as an intelligent customer with awareness of the risks involved. It should therefore provide overall 
management of the process and retain control of it. For example, it should understand the depth of analysis 
required, ensure that all data and experience relevant to its needs is available, and provide sufficient specialist 
'challenge' of the process, assumptions and conclusions - ensuring, for example, that short cuts are not being 
taken. With several parties involved, communication and project control become even more important and 
there should be clear accountabilities for all of those involved. 
Contractors should be encouraged to carry out work rigorously and not present the client with the results that 
they believe the client wishes to hear. The need for succinct reporting and the avoidance of bureaucratic 
length (sometimes providing an illusion of rigour - the so-called 'thud' factor), should be made clear to those 
carrying out the process. 
9.2.4 Role in design and construction 
Particular attention should be given to design and construction risks where new technology or novel processes 
are to be used or where there are recognised challenges in the complexity of the project.  Focus should be 
maintained to ensure that the key engineering principles of ensuring redundancy, diversity and resilience 
against single failure (including external events) can be fully demonstrated.  Where possible, 'fail-to-safe' 
provision should be included.  
If it is planned to scale-up existing plant or processes, this requires rigorous analysis and attention, and over-
simplified extrapolations from existing practices should be avoided. It is also important that assessments are 
based on suitable codes and standards which are directly relevant to the design and are fit-for-purpose (where 
possible by calibration against data from trials).  Any calculations or numerical models should be set out clearly 
and independently checked. Where possible, actual plant data rather than generic data should be used in 
assessments, and design and construction should draw on specific trials or proof test results.  
In construction and commissioning, rigorous risk assessment should be in place to analyse potential risks 
relating to any defects, lapses in quality or unexpected findings, and to control remedial work.  Ad-hoc redesign 
should be avoided.  Attention should be given to ensuring that data is monitored and analysed to check 
conformance with assumptions incorporated in the final design, and any concerns assessed. Risks related to 
remedial work during construction, should be considered by competent staff and be subject to engineering 
control. In some projects, a register of safety critical equipment has been developed, maintained, and used to 
help identify requirements for operational requirements such as maintenance and testing. 
In design there should be full awareness of requirements for end use - including full details of the environment 
in which the plant should be operated and the range of conditions to which it may be subjected - including 
loadings and the impact of fatigue and friction.  
Account should also be taken of previous learning which might be relevant to the design. Designers and 
constructors should ensure that there are adequate safety margins and that operators are aware of critical 
components and potential fault sequences, and that suitable instrumentation is available with defined trigger 
points to ensure that actions are taken if operated close to or beyond the design intent or specification. The 
required actions should be incorporated in operational procedures.  
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It should be clear to all parties (including responsible managers) as to why safeguards (e.g. mitigating actions) 
are in place, with periodic checks on the understanding of their importance. Consideration should also be 
given to ease of maintenance and clear instructions made available to operators. The use of administrative 
controls should be minimised, but where used, their role, effectiveness and potential vulnerability as a line of 
defence should be fully understood. 
Independent oversight should be in place at all stages of design, construction and commissioning to confirm 
assessment of key safety issues. This should be based on a fully joined-up approach (with requirements not 
falling through organisational gaps), and effective communication maintained between all of the involved 
parties. Accountabilities should be clear and, in particular, the role of those undertaking oversight should be 
fully understood by all others involved. 
On a regular basis, a 'corporate' strategic overview should be carried out in order to draw to the attention of 
senior leaders the extent of process safety risks facing the organisation and their management. This should 
enable leaders to manage such risks alongside other business risks. 
Organisations undertaking project oversight should have the competence to check the appropriateness of 
codes, standards and other analytical tools being used and that the final design is in conformity with test 
results (e.g. from trials and witnessed tests). They should assess the quality of construction and, in particular, 
any changes to design or construction which may have been undertaken to overcome emerging problems.  
The functioning of critical components identified in design should also be assessed in order to ensure that 
they meet specification, are correctly installed, suitable data for monitoring is provided, and that adequate 
operational requirements are established. 
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10 EXPECTATIONS: REPORTING AND LEARNING FROM EVENTS 
10.1 OVERVIEW 
In nearly all of the events studied there had been significant precursor events either in the organisation itself 
or in another part of the relevant industry. Had learning opportunities been taken from these, it is very likely 
that the ensuing events would have been averted. Thus, ensuring adequate reporting, learning and awareness 
has a vital part to play in establishing excellence in process safety. 
There are three fundamental processes within a structured system that are required to ensure that 
organisational learning is effective in an operational experience system (OE). The first of these is a process 
for the reporting of events, near hits and non-compliances with the SMS and associated procedures. This 
should be in place during all phases of plant lifetime - from design, construction, commissioning, operation, 
maintenance and through to decommissioning. The second is that events are investigated to clear criteria 
reflecting their significance and learning is fully extracted. The third requirement is that all available learning 
(including good practice) is distilled, made relevant and promulgated in such a way as to maximise its 
effectiveness. 
Several important aspects of the learning process - particularly the potential for adverse knock on effects 
when incentivising KPIs and the role of leading and lagging indicators - are also addressed in Parts 2 and 3. 
Other parts of Part 1 of the Report where learning related issues are explicitly discussed include sections 4, 
5 and 13, with some references made in sections 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12. 
Table 7 - Summary of reporting and learning expectations 
RL1 There should be a systematic and effective process for the reporting of 'events', near-hits 
and non-conformance with the SMS that are relevant to process safety as an input to a wider 
operational experience programme (OE). This should apply also to any contracting 
organisations. The reporting process should be kept as straightforward as possible to use to 
ensure uptake. 
RL2 Reporting should take place within a 'just' culture and should also be actively encouraged by 
management at all levels even when the input may not provide welcome news. Feedback 
should be given to those reporting in order to reinforce commitment. It should be made clear 
that failure to report is unacceptable. Anonymity should be respected where requested.  
RL3 Teams should be encouraged to discuss findings of events relevant to their activities taking a 
broad view of applicability. The effectiveness of the OE process should be periodically 
reviewed taking account user views. 
RL4 Other potential sources of learning (e.g. various operational records, effectiveness of 
communication, audit processes etc.) should be periodically reviewed and learning from 
these (including trends or recurring deficiencies and good practices) used to augment and 
check on the effectiveness of the learning process. Learning from other organisations 
(including regulatory bodies) should be incorporated in the OE system and contacts 
established and maintained in order to facilitate the exchange of important learning wherever 
possible. 
RL5 Adequate competent resource should be available to analyse all learning material and to 
ensure that relevant material is made available to each business area that may be able to 
learn from it, taking account of the spectrum of learning possibilities but minimising 
'overload'. Checks should be carried out to ensure that necessary actions have been taken 
and that they are effective.  
RL6 The importance of reporting and learning should be incorporated in training to ensure 
understanding of events and their causes, raise awareness of the need for vigilance and 
effective reporting of deficiencies, and to explain how defences (e.g. the SMS and safety 
case) are designed to minimise the risks of repetition. 
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RL7 Action should also be taken to ensure that important learning is recorded and kept alive in 
the corporate memory, and that organisational 'silos' are not developing in some parts of the 
organisation such that learning is not given the attention that is required. 
RL8 All events should be investigated to the extent warranted by their significance and 
requirements documented. For more serious events, or those that exhibit a repeat pattern of 
shortcomings, investigation by a competent independent team should be carried out that 
examines root causes, including any leadership or management shortcomings. Examples 
may include failure to address management of change requirements and other 
organisational and cultural issues. The approach to investigation should be clearly set out in 
the SMS. 
RL9 Output from all investigations should be kept as relevant and useable as possible and made 
available to all for which it may be of value - including support functions, designers and 
constructors (where relevant), and other contractors for which the findings are likely to be of 
value. Consideration should be given in advance to resource requirements for competent 
follow up 
RL10 A system should be established to check that actions have been prioritised, carried through 
on a timely basis, and that they are effective. When supervisory or management changes 
take place, incoming personnel should be made fully aware of findings, actions relevant to 
their area of authority, and the importance of ensuring continuity of support. 
RL11 Learning, including its wider potential implications, should be fully taken into account in 
reviewing the SMS, processes for risk assessment (e.g. Hazops and PRAs), and the safety 
case and operating envelope. When changes are made, they should be incorporated in 
workforce training to raise awareness of the reasons for the changes and their importance. 
RL12 Potentially adverse business influences on the OE process should be recognised and 
addressed wherever possible. This includes the potential impact of changes such as 
reductions in workforce numbers. Cuts to the OE process should be minimised given its 
importance in maintaining process safety, and 'ownership' of OE should be retained within 
the organisation as far as is possible. Any changes to the process should be subject to a 
rigorous management of change assessment.  During periods of organisational change, 
leaders should reinforce their commitment to reporting and learning. 
RL13 Leaders, including boards, should be kept aware of important events and emerging risks so 
that account can be taken of this in decision making. Leading indicators can be valuable to 
gain a measure of progress in seeking continuous improvement in process safety, but care 
should be taken in using KPIs to incentivise improvements as this can have the potential 
unintended consequence of adversely affecting the reporting process. 
RL14 Leaders and managers should remain alert to emerging concerns and the possibility that 
things can go wrong. They should ensure as far as possible that they do not develop a 
mindset that fails to review evidence and maintain constructive challenge - especially when 
dealing with new plant where problems are not expected or plant with a limited projected 
remaining life. Previous success should not be used to justify inaction, and concerns should 
not be 'normalised' because they have not hitherto led to more serious consequences. 
Leadership teams should remain strongly engaged and should make it clear that concerns 
and significant risks should always be brought to their attention. 
RL15 O&S processes should be used to review trends and patterns in reported events (e.g. 
recurring issues) and to take an independent view of where deterioration in process safety 
performance may be occurring. The O&S process should check periodically on the 
effectiveness of reporting, investigation, and the suitability and impact of output from the OE 
process. 
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10.2 DISCUSSION AND COMMENTARY 
10.2.1 Reporting and learning sources 
The overall process for reporting and follow up to 'events' and other shortcomings should be systematic and 
structured within an Operational Experience (OE) system that establishes clear criteria for both. The reporting 
process should be made as simple as possible, and the effectiveness of the reporting system, including 
workforce perceptions, should be periodically reviewed. 
There should then be sufficient competent resource to ensure that the learning that emerges is distilled and 
communicated in an intelligible, prioritised and relevant way to those to whom it may be of value. If this is not 
achieved there is a danger that because material is not directly relevant, 'overload' of information may occur 
and recipients may not recognise and act on findings that are relevant to their activities.  
Feedback should be given on actions taken and the contribution of those reporting should be 'recognised' 
such that they feel that their efforts have been worthwhile. Teams should be given the opportunity to discuss 
findings where relevant to them. 
Managers and supervisors should welcome reports from the workforce and provide opportunities to listen to 
feedback and should not erect barriers to this process. The workforce (including contractors and key suppliers 
who themselves should be working to high standards of reporting) should be encouraged to achieve a culture 
in which reporting is supported, 'bad news' is not hidden, and in which blame should not be attached to 
individuals or teams or disciplinary action taken, except in the case of gross negligence or deliberately 
dangerous acts. It is important that the workforce and their representatives perceive the approach to be 'just' 
and consistent, and that they do not fear 'retaliation' for reporting of deficiencies. A parallel process that 
ensures anonymity may also be valuable to add confidence to members of the workforce that they will not be 
'singled out' by line management as a result of reporting. Against such a supportive approach, it should be 
made clear that failure to report is unacceptable.  
Other important sources of learning may also be found in the output from quality assurance (QA) and other 
audit processes, maintenance records, operational records covering key processes such as start-ups, 
mechanical integrity records and hazard logs, as well as organisational issues such as the strength of the 
interaction between operations and engineering support. Relevant databases should be periodically searched 
for learning opportunities and trends analysed. Interrogation of a variety of such sources can provide checks 
on the effectiveness of the various reporting routes, particularly in relation to recurring deficiencies/events. 
10.2.2 Wider learning from events 
In addition to learning from the 'free lessons' provided by internal reporting of 'near hits' and safety deficiencies, 
significant learning can be achieved from events outside the organisation. This can be from within the industry 
sector, where similar plant and processes may exist, and in other sectors, where although the technology may 
be different, the organisational and cultural deficiencies underpinning events may still be a source of valuable 
learning as this document seeks to demonstrate. It can often provide a basis for discussion on whether similar 
vulnerabilities exist, and provide a 'wake-up call' to challenge complacency. 
Regulatory views and requirements can also be an important source of intelligence about good practice 
elsewhere and used as an input to standards and expectations. 
The process of identifying, extracting, distilling and transferring learning should be integrated within the OE 
programme. This is sometimes centrally managed by the safety function, but with identified, dedicated 
personnel within each business or other activity (including contractors and suppliers of critical equipment) 
taking responsibility for promulgation and follow up in their area of responsibility. The learning should again 
be presented in a form which is relevant to recipients (from business leaders to operational teams) and it 
should be emphasised that in considering relevance, the 'spectrum of possibilities' should be considered in 
an open-minded way. Learning should also be transferred to designers, constructors and end users as 
appropriate. Where 'trials' have been carried out of new plant or processes, this should be available to those 
subsequently using them.  
Learning from events should be incorporated in training, with advice and input from those who are 
knowledgeable about the events. This can also be used as a way of raising awareness as to why certain SMS 
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and procedural requirements are in place, and thus increasing understanding of the relevance of these and 
the need to observe them.  
Sometimes, important learning from particular events fades from the corporate memory, even where it was 
once regarded as highly significant and may have led to damaging consequences. It is important to keep alive 
such learning and this should be periodically checked. Incorporation in training and team reviews are valuable 
ways of trying to ensure that the learning is retained.  This loss of corporate 'memory' also has implications 
for record retention and requires steps to be taken, for example, to ensure that when key staff are no longer 
available, their experience is passed on as far as possible through an effective transfer process. 
In some of the events studied, organisational 'silos' had been allowed to develop. Thus, learning that was 
satisfactorily recognised and applied in some parts of the organisation was not considered in others. Barriers 
had been erected for a variety of reasons. It is thus important that organisations not only remain aware of 
where this may be occurring and take measures to address it, but also seek to understand how and why the 
situation has developed. 
10.2.3 Investigation and follow-up process 
All reported events should be investigated to the extent warranted by their significance. This should also take 
account of whether the reported event is part of a pattern of shortcomings (for example repeat events or 
repeated non-conformance with procedures). This process should be documented within the SMS such that 
the requirements for follow up are unambiguous. 
Investigators should not propose ad-hoc solutions or unnecessary requirements for re-testing such that 
investigation and remedial action is deferred for resource or other reasons.  
For more serious events or those that recur, the organisation should appoint an independent team with the 
necessary expertise to investigate and propose timely, prioritised follow up actions. When the investigation is 
complete, or if there are important interim requirements for urgent action, findings should be suitably 
communicated to those for whom it has relevance, and checks carried out to ensure that action has been 
taken and that it has been effective. It is important that root causes are fully investigated and any weaknesses 
in the SMS (including the management of the organisational change process) and shortcomings in leadership 
and management, are identified and pursued. Newly appointed personnel (particularly supervisors and 
managers) should be made fully aware of any ongoing investigations affecting their roles and the concerns 
leading to them. 
Carrying out effective investigations and ensuring that findings are communicated on an effective and targeted 
basis with checks on the effectiveness of resulting actions, requires consideration to be given in advance to 
resource and competence requirements. If this is not done, there exists a danger that short cuts may be taken, 
or the work not carried out systematically with full knowledge of its implications. 
In some cases, events may originate from deficiencies in design, construction, maintenance or engineering 
capability. Such learning should be traced back and, where possible, those involved made aware of any 
shortcomings. It is also important that contracting organisations maintain an effective OE system that is 
audited to ensure that reporting and investigation of events, including those raised by the client, are receiving 
adequate attention. 
10.2.4 Other potential uses of learning process output 
The learning process can be a valuable input to other organisational processes affecting safety. It can provide 
information relevant to the risk assessment process during operations by introducing further appropriate 
checks. More generally, it can provide input to periodic risk assessments (such as HAZOPs and PRAs) by 
enabling operational experience to help facilitate the identification of risks. Likewise, the learning process can 
be used to re-assess the safety case by reflecting operational experience. This should again take into account 
not just 'narrow learning', but the spectrum of possibilities to which the learning may apply. It may also, in 
some cases, require the 'operating envelope' to be updated.  
Important  learning relating to the risk profile should be communicated to senior managers and leaders so that 
they are fully aware of changes, the underlying reasons for them, and the level of residual risk. 
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Changes arising from the learning process and the reasons for them, should again be the subject of staff 
training. Information about changes and updates should be made available, where relevant, to contractors, 
including designers and suppliers of safety critical components.   
10.2.5 Impact of business pressures on the learning process 
In addition to potential concern about attribution of blame, various other business factors may influence the 
effectiveness of reporting, investigation and follow up, and in ensuring learning from external events. Where 
there are strong pressures to increase efficiency such as reductions in staff numbers or design, construction 
and production pressures to meet short term targets, this may lead to short cuts being taken and a general 
weakening of safety culture - including less willingness to report deficiencies. Commitment to safety should 
be reinforced at such times and the need for continuous improvement sustained as far as possible.  
Considerable caution should be exercised in making cuts to the OE system (including associated training and 
workforce involvement).  Proposed changes should be subject to a rigorous management of change 
assessment. It is important that duty holders retain strong ownership of the reporting and learning process 
and support to it. 
When business pressures are imposing particularly high workloads, staff may be reticent about reporting if 
they feel that consequent actions are likely to fall on them - thus increasing workload even more.  
Consideration of this should be taken into account in placing improvement and follow up actions and due 
allowance made for impacts. 
10.2.6 Response to reporting and feedback - avoiding complacency 
Significant issues should be reported to senior management and business leaders (including business and 
corporate boards) such that they are fully aware of emerging risks and so that any preconceived attitudes 
towards risk can be 'challenged'. This should lead to greater awareness of the 'health' of key processes and 
of the organisational safety culture, and enable leaders to consider the impact of organisational and policy 
changes on the standards of process safety that are expected. 
If a high level of reporting can be established across the organisation to consistent, agreed standards, this 
can provide an important input to business and corporate safety oversight. Those in receipt of data should be 
made aware that as reporting improves, an increase in reports does not necessarily signal a decline in 
performance, but may reflect an improved reporting culture. 
In some organisations, success in achieving continuous improvement is tracked and may then be incentivised. 
This is sometimes achieved by developing 'leading' indicators (i.e. actions being taken to achieve 
improvement, rather than measures of events that have occurred). Where such indicators are used and 
incentives offered to achieve improvements, steps should be taken to ensure that 'perverse' incentives do not 
then lead to unanticipated degradation of the reporting system in order to meet objectives.  
The use of KPIs and potential 'perverse' incentives is the subject of consideration in Part 3 through the use of 
CLM. Behavioural issues relating to the use of indicators, the use of incentives and particularly the role of 
leading and lagging indicators and the care to be taken in their development and use, is discussed extensively 
in Part 2.  
Events can arise for a range of reasons relating to managerial attitudes. In some cases, this involves 
'sweeping concerns under the carpet' since perceived gains from ignoring them are seen to outweigh the risks 
of occurrence. This is sometimes particularly prevalent for new plant that is perceived to be without flaws and 
where failure is not thought credible. It can also arise in the case of short-term projects or older plant where 
time at elevated risk is viewed as likely to be of short duration.  
It is important that signals are not missed or ignored and that a culture is established that remains open to 
constructive criticism and avoids the tendency to rely on previous success to justify lack of appropriate action. 
In some events studied, identified concerns (e.g. malfunctions or systems failures) were 'normalised'.  Actual 
events, near hits or failures to conform to requirements that would once have been regarded as serious threats 
that required investigation, were 're-assigned' as issues that occurred on previous occasions without leading 
to major problems and were thus ignored - or classified as maintenance issues or lower priority concerns.  
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This has been referred to as 'the elastic waistband effect', where serious deficiencies are increasingly re-
classified as expected deviations. 
These behaviours can be exacerbated by supervisors and middle managers if they believe that senior 
managers and business leaders do not wish to receive 'bad news' and do not wish to be 'engaged'. 
Sometimes, unwelcome news is 'rolled up' such that its full significance is not made clear to senior decision 
makers and the impression given that significant problems are not present in a plant or project. This 
demonstrates again the importance of supporting constructive challenge at all levels in the organisation and 
ensuring that a competent, independent and well-resourced safety function is able to make its voice heard in 
situations where significant emerging risks are not otherwise being detected or acted upon. 
It also emphasises the need, more generally, for a system of audit and oversight that is able to detect failures 
in the system by a variety of means, and can compare approaches in business units with corporate 
expectations and share good practice. Oversight also presents an opportunity to look collectively at the pattern 
of events that are occurring and to assess trends.  
Line management audits, and independent oversight coordinated and scrutinised by an independent safety 
function, should be able to detect when degradation is occurring.  In addition to enabling any necessary action 
to be taken, the presence of an effective oversight process should act as a deterrent to those who may, for 
whatever reason, be tempted to accept inappropriate risks or fail to report or act when required to do so, since 
it should be clear that there is a high probability that this should subsequently come to light. 
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11 EXPECTATIONS: MAINTAINING COMPETENCE 
 
11.1 OVERVIEW 
Achieving and maintaining competence in understanding and managing process safety risks in an 
organisation is an essential requirement to provide defence against major events. The requirement requires 
effective, up-to-date training not only for those performing safety critical roles, but for all roles with potential 
impacts on process safety from the boardroom through to supervisors, operational staff, support staff and all 
those providing contractual inputs. The need to address shortfalls in competence have been highlighted in the 
reports into all of the events studied - some as a major contributory factor in causation. 
The process of skills acquisition and awareness raising and the role of mental models is discussed in the 
context of training in Annex D. 
Other parts of this Chapter where competence related issues are discussed explicitly include sections 4, 5, 8 
and 13, with some references made in section 6, 9 and 10.  
Table 8 - Summary of competence expectations 
C1 All staff (including contractor staff) with roles that could impact upon safety should be SQEP, 
with up-to-date training provision maintaining understanding of current process safety risks, 
signs of danger, and responsibilities and interfaces. Job roles should have defined 
competence standards relating to the process safety risks attached to them, and these 
should be kept up-to-date. 
C2 Requirements for training in process safety risks should include those with wider roles such 
as leaders at all levels, and others with influence on the organisation and on resources. 
Particular attention should be paid to ensuring the process safety competence of staff taking 
on new roles and those with newly assigned responsibilities (e.g. 'step-ups'). 
C3 Potential loss of capability/competence in safety critical posts should be monitored, 
particularly during significant organisational change. Monitoring should include ensuring 
sufficient numbers of staff and the potential effect of incremental changes. Reliance should 
not be placed on single key specialists or the use of 'cross-trained' staff with potentially 
inadequate process safety knowledge and experience. When staff with roles important to 
process safety leave an assigned post, provision should be in place to ensure retention of 
knowledge, and fully trained and competent staff should be available to carry out their former 
role. 
C4 Engineering and other technical support staff should maintain close contact with operational 
requirements and should be located close to operations to ensure availability. 
C5 In selecting contractors (including designers and suppliers of safety critical equipment), 
competence for the work carried out and its potential impact on process safety should be an 
important factor in selection. Where sub-contractors are employed, equally rigorous 
requirements should apply. 
C6 Contractors with a potential impact on process safety (including suppliers of safety critical 
equipment) should retain their knowledge about process safety requirements and fully 
understand the continuing relationship between their input and process safety risks. Clients 
should ensure that this is maintained as part of their role to act as an intelligent customer for 
work being carried out. 
C7 Leaders at all levels should be trained in the importance of retaining awareness of process 
safety risks and how their decisions and actions can affect these. This should include the 
need to demonstrate their commitment to excellence in process safety standards and culture 
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and how this should be supported by their actions. This should include initial training for 
those who are newly appointed. 
C8 Leaders, including those at the most senior levels in the organisation, should be informed 
and advised by competent safety specialists. Input should include the results of independent 
oversight and scrutiny. This is particularly important in ensuring informed decision making 
during major organisational change and in maintaining awareness of emerging issues. 
C9 When decisions are delegated, this should be to those with the required competence and 
level of assigned authority. Sufficient resource, and advice and support, should be made 
available to support decision making. 
C10 Training in process safety should be well-resourced, systematic, mandatory for all process 
safety-related roles, and carried out against defined standards with input, as required, from 
supporting expertise to ensure that the training reflects up-to-date requirements. For key 
defined roles, certification of competence should be required. 
C11 Training should be periodically reviewed for effectiveness. A balance should be maintained 
between different forms of training (face-to-face, IT based etc.). Staff should have access to 
refresher training and mentoring/coaching, and training needs should be assessed in 
appraisals/performance reviews. Particular attention should be paid to changing training 
needs, particularly during organisational change or with the introduction of new technology. 
C12 People-related issues and communication skills should be included in training provision and 
guidance given to senior managers and leaders on how conflicts of interest or different 
management approaches can impact effectiveness. 
C13 Learning from events should be incorporated in training. This should not only raise 
awareness of events and their direct causes and consequences, but also highlight the 
relevance of important matters such as safety culture (particularly maintaining a questioning 
attitude, seeking advice and raising concerns); effective communication; awareness of 
interfaces, accountabilities and where to seek advice; the importance of procedures and 
compliance; the role of audit and oversight and, approaches to risk assessment and 
management. 
C14 Decision makers should be fully aware of relevant legal obligations to take all reasonably 
practicable steps to ensure safety and what this means in practice. 
C15 Staff awareness should be reinforced regarding the important role of procedures and the 
importance of safety critical equipment in minimising the risk of events - including response 
to alarms and other indicators of unsafe conditions. The need to seek advice when there is 
any uncertainty over safety matters should be emphasised. 
C16 Training provision should extend to dealing with 'off normal' and emergency conditions and 
ensuring safety during less frequent operations such as start-ups and shut downs. It should 
also be available for incident response teams, those conducting exercises, and for those 
investigating events. 
C17 All staff should be trained to understand the impact of stress and fatigue and its potential 
effect on performance and thus potentially on process safety, and how to recognise and 
reduce it. In particular, managers and supervisors should be trained in how to respond 
appropriately to the issue as part of their 'duty of care' towards staff. 
 
 
 
 
FINAL DRAFT PRE-PRINT 
68 
 
11.2 DISCUSSION AND COMMENTARY 
11.2.1 Competence and training requirements  
All staff with responsibilities that might affect safety should be SQEP for their roles and all specific tasks that 
they undertake. Even those who have considerable experience should receive refresher training, not least 
since experience alone can itself sometimes lead to complacency.  
Competence standards and associated training requirements should apply to all safety-related posts and 
should be regularly reviewed. These requirements should apply not only to personnel designing, operating 
and maintaining technology and systems important to process safety, but also to those who make decisions 
that can affect it, such as leaders and managers - including those making decisions on investment and 
organisational change. All relevant personnel should be able to demonstrate a thorough understanding of the 
risks that are being controlled; the importance of safety-related plant and procedures; the interface between 
their roles and that of others and, signs of danger in process safety-related activities. This applies not only to 
the staff of duty holders but to all relevant parts of the supply chain. Particular attention should be paid to new 
personnel and those changing roles (including temporary 'step-ups' and those with newly assigned safety 
responsibilities). 
11.2.2 Declining capability 
Awareness should be maintained of any incremental decline in capability/competence, and acceptable 
numbers of SQEP personnel for identified safety critical posts should be maintained at all times. Particular 
vigilance in this respect is required during, or as a result of, significant technical or organisational change. 
Particular consideration should be given to avoiding reliance on single key specialists in safety critical areas 
and, the use of 'cross trained' or general engineering staff, without full and specific knowledge of key areas in 
planning, carrying out, supervising and monitoring safety critical processes and procedures. When key 
personnel are to leave an assigned post, steps should be taken to ensure retention of knowledge, and action 
taken to ensure the presence of competent staff to cover any period of absence. 
Engineers and others providing technical support should maintain close contact with operational staff and their 
requirements and should not, wherever possible, be located remote from operations, otherwise there is a 
danger that their expertise may not be fully up-to-date and immediately available when required. 
11.2.3 Contractor competence 
Where contractors are to be used to design, construct or operate plant (or carry out any other work that affects 
or interacts with safety critical plant or processes), they should be trained to the same standards as those 
required of duty holders and have sufficient knowledge of the wider context of their input. Duty holders should 
ensure that they maintain adequate control and engineering capability to act as an intelligent customer for all 
contractor work.  
In selecting main contractors, competence for the full range of requirements on them should be fully taken 
into account as well as the specific requirements of the assigned task or project. Arrangements should then 
be in place to ensure that competence and associated standards are maintained. Where contractors 'fill gaps' 
in capability by sub-contracting other organisations to provide input, the client should ensure that suitable 
arrangements exist to ensure that the necessary standards of competence in all aspects of the role are met 
and maintained. The competence of suppliers, designers and other service providers with potential impacts 
on process safety should also be ensured. 
11.2.4 Leadership roles  
Leaders, from supervisors/team leaders and their managers, through to executive leaders and board 
members, should be trained to be aware of the risks involved in the technology and how their decisions and 
actions (or lack of action) may influence these risks or introduce new ones. Training in these issues should 
be given to those who are newly appointed so that they also understand the systems and processes used to 
identify and control risks within the organisation, including the importance of their own actions and 
commitment. 
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Boards should have sufficient collective experience of the technology to make informed decisions and should 
understand the importance of maintaining excellence in process safety as well as occupational safety.  Senior 
management should be made fully aware as part of their training of the importance of ensuring that a rigorous 
process, with independent scrutiny, is in place to examine the potential impact of organisational change on 
process safety and that no changes should take place until it can be shown that they should not adversely 
affect it.  
Leaders should have access to independent advice and support in making decisions that could affect safety 
and in addressing safety concerns. Where decisions are delegated, this should be to those with the required 
competence and level of authority.  
Training for leaders at all levels should include ensuring that they understand the importance of demonstrating 
their commitment to safety and the need to support this by their actions. In particular, they should be aware 
of the importance of promoting and maintaining a strong safety culture and effective communication. 
11.2.5 Training capability and review 
Adequate resources for process safety training should be maintained at all times. Training programmes should 
be systematic, carried out against defined standards, and periodically reviewed for effectiveness. This review 
should include assessment of the degree to which training programmes address new and emerging issues. 
Those designing and delivering them should have full access to the necessary supporting capability where 
required (e.g. availability of simulators, specialist advice etc.).  
 
A balance should be maintained between 'face-to-face', IT based, and structured 'on-the-job' training without 
over reliance on any one of these. Coaching/mentoring resource for individuals when performing new roles 
should also be available. Attendance at training should be mandatory and for identified roles, certification of 
competence should be established with refresher training requirements specified. Discussion of training needs 
should be formally included in personnel performance reviews/appraisals, so that further training needs can 
be identified and actioned. 
Training programmes should be subject to regular review to ensure adequacy (resource, balance, coverage 
etc.). Particular attention should be given to changing needs - particularly in those areas where new 
developments and/or changes are occurring and where new or unfamiliar technology is being applied. This 
requires a strong interface and good communication between training providers and users, to ensure that all 
parties involved understand needs and have access to up-to-date information and specialist input. 
Learning from actual events and 'near hits' should be integrated into training. This should include learning 
from those that have occurred not only within the organisation itself, but also in the wider industry and other 
relevant industries. It should include examples where important learning is still relevant and those that have 
influenced current safety requirements (e.g. procedures).  
 
11.2.6 Competence in broader issues 
Training for all relevant roles should extend beyond understanding and capability in engineering and technical 
matters. It should also include broader issues such as 'people issues' and safety culture; the importance of 
effective communication between those involved at all levels; the need for clear accountabilities and 
awareness of the role of others; procedures and the importance of compliance; audit and oversight, and risk 
assessment. In addressing 'people issues', guidance should be given to senior managers and leaders on how 
conflicts of interest or different management approaches can impact effectiveness. These conflicts may arise 
from historical issues and/or from different approaches to management arising from differences in business 
background.  
The understanding and awareness of personnel at all levels of the need to maintain vigilance and a 
questioning attitude in all areas with potential impacts on process safety should be highlighted in all training. 
The workforce should know when to seek advice and help in the case of uncertainty, and where to obtain this 
support. Decision makers should understand their obligation to ensure that all reasonably practicable steps 
are taken to minimise safety risks at all times in design, operation, maintenance and decommissioning and 
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what this means in practice both in terms of the organisational approach and in the context of legal 
requirements where relevant. 
11.2.7 Abnormal conditions 
Training provision should extend beyond normal operational conditions to include 'off-normal' and emergency 
conditions. Particular attention should be given to less frequent operations such as start-ups and shutdowns. 
It should involve participation in simulated 'off-normal' conditions - including emergency exercises. 
Training programmes should include an understanding of how systems may fail, the reason for specific safety 
critical equipment and procedures, and should enable staff to recognise the importance of alarms and other 
indications of abnormal conditions and the consequent risks of not responding effectively to these. Training 
for event investigation should be in place for relevant staff. 
Operators and engineers should be trained to understand the importance of asking for advice and help from 
others when they are unsure of the safety importance of monitoring data or alarms or the potential 
consequences of actions. Competent incident response teams should be available at all times and have clear 
accountabilities. 
11.2.8 Stress and fatigue 
Staff at all levels in the organisation should understand the potential impact of human performance and 
behaviour on safety and, in particular, the impact of stress and fatigue on performance. Ways of recognising 
and dealing with it, particularly in those that they manage or supervise, should be part of training programmes. 
Managers should provide support and take appropriate action where possible - particularly where stress and 
fatigue may be affecting those with important safety-related roles. The duration and rotation of shift systems 
is an area that may require particular attention. 
Along with working conditions and a responsive listening approach, attention to matters such as these is an 
important way for leaders to demonstrate their duty of care to staff and that business related priorities are not 
their only focus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FINAL DRAFT PRE-PRINT 
71 
 
12 EXPECTATIONS: MANAGEMENT OF CONTRACTORS (THE SUPPLY 
CHAIN) 
12.1 OVERVIEW 
The majority of the events studied involved significant shortfalls in contractor management. This section 
highlights the need for the client to act as an intelligent customer, setting out and maintaining acceptable 
standards and specifications for the services or products to be supplied. In particular, it emphasises the steps 
that should be taken to ensure not only technical capability, but strong management processes, and a culture 
which establishes reporting of deficiencies, constructive challenge, and a questioning and cautious approach 
to managing risks - all underpinned by effective audit and oversight arrangements. 
Other parts of this chapter of the Report where management of contractor related issues are explicitly 
discussed include Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 13. 
 
Table 9 - Summary of management of contractor expectations 
MC1 Those submitting tenders for work that could affect process safety should be made aware 
of client expectations regarding safety management, safety culture, risk assessment and 
oversight arrangements, in addition to all relevant information regarding the project design, 
context and associated risks. This should enable those tendering to appropriately 'scope' 
the requirements of the contract. 
MC2 Evaluation of tenders should include the approach and record of those tendering in terms of 
their commitment to meeting high standards in process safety and meeting  organisational 
and cultural requirements. 
MC3 Timescales for contracted work should be realistic and compatible with the achievement of 
continuing high standards of safety, and contractual requirements should not act as a 
disincentive to the identification and reporting of emerging risks. 
MC4 Suitable mutually understood interface arrangements should be established with the 
principal contractor and all other parts of the supply chain, including any sub-contractors, in 
order to ensure 'joined up' communication; suitably aligned and mutually understood 
procedures; a compatible approach to safety culture - including the need for openness and 
a cautious and questioning attitude; risk assessment and, project audit, oversight and 
review. 
MC5 Full consideration should be given to the skills that need to be retained in order to be 
capable of challenging and verifying contractor assessments and to act as an intelligent 
customer meeting all regulatory requirements. The retention of the skills required to be a 
competent end user of project output, and to respond to any emerging engineering 
concerns without over-reliance on contractual input, should also be ensured 
MC6 A client project manager should be appointed supported by competent resources for the 
duration of the contract, to independently assess emerging project risks and to provide 
overall project control. This includes ensuring acceptable safety provisions; effective 
communication within the supply chain; acceptable quality; clarity about roles and, 
provision of effective monitoring, audit, oversight and project review. Any third parties given 
the role of overseeing aspects of a project should have a defined remit that is made clear to 
all parties involved. 
MC7 Verification should be sought for contractor safety claims with the potential to affect process 
safety. Any changes to design or specification should be identified and risks assessed, with 
all relevant parties kept aware of these. For all contractual work, the client organisation 
should have the competence to carry out its own independent oversight and retain a clear 
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picture of emerging risks, so that it is not reliant on contractor judgement and self-
verification. 
MC8 'Signing off' work as acceptable should be carried out by authorised competent personnel, 
and independently verified for higher risk work. Those carrying this out should have 
sufficient technical and managerial support, and should not be placed under pressure to 
give approvals to meet rigid project timescales. 
MC9 An integrated process should be established for audit and oversight that minimises 
duplication and overload. Audit should go beyond paper systems and include operational 
practice. Wider learning resulting from the process should be made available to all parties 
in the project. Key steps such as important tests or commissioning relevant to process 
safety should be witnessed by the client or competent representatives. An independent 
safety committee should be established, where appropriate, to carry out review and provide 
advice. 
MC10 All project participants including management teams should be suitably qualified and 
experienced for their roles. Tasks relevant to process safety should not be delegated to 
less skilled staff and where additional specialists and/or subcontractors are appointed, their 
competence should be assessed and maintained. 
MC11 Adequate competence of project participants should be ensured for the duration of the 
contract and sufficient team and leadership stability maintained to ensure continuity in 
decision making and follow up. For innovative work, discussion with others with relevant 
experience should be encouraged and facilitated. 
MC12 Operational staff should be involved in any project to the extent necessary to ensure that 
the output can be used effectively and safely. Provisions for maintenance should be 
addressed on the basis of the as-built plant and taking account of operational requirements. 
MC13 The processes for risk assessment should be agreed and output shared between project 
participants. They should be underpinned by a questioning attitude and precautionary 
approach to process safety risks. In particular, pre-conceived assumptions regarding 
project risks should be recognised and challenged, and minority views properly considered. 
MC14 Designers should be aware of the operating environment of the project. Codes and 
standards etc. and provision for redundancy and diversity and other engineering principles, 
should reflect rigorous process safety requirements with adequate safety margins. They 
should be independently verified where necessary. Constructors and the client should be 
made aware of any matters (e.g. test results; assumptions made in design etc.) that could 
affect safety at a later stage. 
MC15 The entire supply chain (including suppliers and subcontractors) should be aware of the 
process safety standards required. Sourcing of safety critical plant should be carried out by 
specialists. The specification for goods and services should be complete and consistent, 
validated and verified by the purchaser and understood by the supplier. Any changes to 
specification should be fully assessed before acceptance. It should be subject to rigorous 
quality control procedures, with witnessing of key construction steps and testing as 
appropriate. 
MC16 Risks should be reviewed at regular progress meetings where contractor assessments and 
claims can be evaluated by the client, paying particular attention to emerging risks; 
changes being made or proposed; innovative features of the project, and the results of risk 
assessments and oversight. Senior management should be kept informed of important 
emerging issues. In carrying out risk assessments, wider 'systems' implications should be 
considered in order to minimise unintended consequences arising from changes that could 
potentially lead to undesirable consequences (e.g. the taking of short cuts) at a later stage 
in the project. 
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MC17 All regulatory requirements, including the ability of the client to act as an 'intelligent 
customer' should be met, and liaison maintained with regulatory bodies as appropriate and 
they should be kept informed of any major contractual changes. Formal reports to 
regulatory bodies can also provide a further opportunity to review the project, including 
contractual interfaces and associated risks. 
 
12.2 DISCUSSION AND COMMENTARY 
12.2.1 Formulating contracts 
In describing the work to be carried out and its context, together with the role and responsibilities of the supplier 
in achieving this, those submitting tenders should be provided with sufficient detail to be fully aware about the 
risk profile of proposed work. It should also make clear client expectations regarding contractor safety culture, 
reporting, oversight arrangements, safety management and, risk assessment requirements. Suppliers should 
thus be clear before entering into a contract about requirements on them relating to safety standards for 
process safety. By this means, they may be able properly to 'scope' the required work and understand the 
resource and competence requirements required. They should also be furnished with other important 
information such as specifications and design briefs (including foreseeable operational and environmental 
conditions) at an appropriate stage in formulating the contract.  
If the contract is 'turnkey' rather than one in which the client is fully involved in the project management, it is 
particularly important for the client to be satisfied that the work does not have implications for any other 
process safety aspects of their operations. If identified, action should be taken to ensure that suitable interface 
requirements are in place (e.g. clarity about roles and assigned tasks, and fully 'joined up' procedures and 
communication processes in the areas affected). 
The client should evaluate tenders not only in terms of cost, technical capability and ability to meet timescales, 
but the submission and record of those tendering in demonstrating understanding and commitment to meeting 
the organisational and cultural requirements to achieve high standards of process safety. 
Timescales for the work should be realistic and pressure should not be placed on contractors that could lead 
to shortcomings in design and/or to shortcuts in construction being taken. In requiring the open reporting of 
emerging risks as the work proceeds, it is important that provisions in the contract should not act as a 
disincentive to reporting these, because contractors may incur financial penalties. 
Some of the key issues that may arise in formulating contracts and the interactions that may occur - in 
particular, the need for all parties to align goals in order to avoid disincentives in meeting their obligations is 
the subject of a specific case study in Part 3.  
12.2.2 Client role 
Before contracting out work, it is important for the client to consider whether in doing so it may lose valuable 
skills and capability that it may require as the end user of the contracted work or in undertaking future similar 
undertakings. It should also satisfy itself that it is not (or may not become) too dependent on the chosen 
contractor, such that its competence to respond to emerging safety concerns is impaired. 
The client should ensure that it is fully aware at all management levels of the need to meet regulatory 
requirements for contracted work (including project management arrangements) and the requirement for it to 
be an 'intelligent customer'. These obligations cannot be delegated. In order to achieve this, the client should 
maintain competence to assess risks, assess the quality of contractor input, provide monitoring and oversight, 
and ensure overall project coordination and control. This requires good communication with all other parties 
involved in the work (e.g. suppliers and subcontractors) about key issues and the vital importance attached to 
achieving high standards in process safety. As part of its capacity to be an intelligent customer, the client 
should not become too dependent on contractor claims and judgement, and should be in a position to 
challenge and verify all matters important to process safety. 
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12.2.3 Management of the contract 
An overall project manager representing the client should be appointed. The client project manager should 
have responsibility and authority to ensure suitable management arrangements and overall project control. 
This should ensure that the arrangements set out in the contract are translated into working practices and 
procedures that are clear and agreed by all participants. The project manager should be empowered to take 
appropriate action if deficiencies or non-compliances are identified. To the extent possible, arrangements and 
reporting routes should minimise complexity.  
The role should include setting requirements and ensuring compliance for all project teams in matters such 
as: reporting of deficiencies or emerging risks and taking action - including upward reporting where non-
compliance occurs or more serious risks emerge; challenging unsafe acts or conditions; ensuring agreed and 
effective roles and communication channels; checking that competence meets the standards required; 
agreeing a system for witnessing of key steps; ensuring that acceptable quality standards are maintained and, 
ensuring that effective monitoring, audit and oversight is carried out. These arrangements should apply to all 
participants - including sub-contractors and relevant suppliers. The project manager should emphasise the 
requirement for openness in raising and discussing potential difficulties or delays and maintain an environment 
where constructive challenge is accepted. 
Regular coordination meetings and more formal review points should be agreed at which, among other 
matters, any emerging potential conflicts of interest affecting the contract can be discussed, resolved (or 
reported upwards for higher level resolution), and faults and emerging design or construction concerns can 
be fully assessed and discussed. The meetings should be attended by relevant management and key staff, 
and attendance should not be routinely delegated. Verification should be sought by the client for contracting 
party statements and claims where these could impact on process safety. Changes to design or variation from 
specifications during implementation should be identified and consequent risks assessed. All parties should 
be made aware of agreed changes. 
In facilitating the management of the contract, the client project leader should ensure that there is alignment 
and full mutual understanding of SMSs and procedures, and that safety cultures are compatible across the 
project such that openness, a questioning attitude, and reporting of deficiencies or unsafe conditions are given 
high priority. 
'Signing off' satisfactory completion of work should only be carried out by those authorised to do so, and 
important steps should be independently verified. Those carrying out these functions should have sufficient 
technical and managerial support to make the necessary decisions, and should not be placed in a position 
where they feel obliged to accept the work because of other pressures or through insufficient skilled support. 
Where third parties are given the role of overseeing aspects of the project, it is important that their role is 
defined and made clear to all parties involved in the project. 
Where required, arrangements should be made to ensure that regulatory bodies are kept fully informed about 
project progress and particularly about any major changes to the agreed programme or technical 
requirements. Formal reports provided to regulatory bodies can provide an additional opportunity to critically 
review project risks. 
12.2.4 Oversight arrangements 
Clear arrangements should be established for witnessing key steps, monitoring, auditing and providing 
broader oversight. Both audit and independent oversight should go beyond paper systems and include how 
these are being put into practice. Each component of the overall process should be integrated into a coherent 
system that minimises 'audit overload' and is understood by all the parties involved, and from which results 
and the associated learning can be shared. A dedicated safety committee should also be established for major 
projects to review and provide guidance. Its role should be understood by all parties. 
Those responsible for each part of the oversight process should be competent to undertake the work. 
Depending on the safety significance of the work being examined, the client should carry out its own oversight 
and scrutiny and not rely totally on contractor engineering judgement and self-verification. The client project 
leader should develop a clear picture of emerging risks and other important developments, so that matters of 
concern can be addressed and wider and deeper implications of any shortcomings fully examined as part of 
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the oversight process. The involvement, where necessary, of the senior management of the parties involved 
should be obtained to ensure their understanding and agreement to any significant changes required. 
12.2.5 Ensuring competence 
Competent individuals and teams should be maintained for the duration of the work being carried out with 
major changes to management and key personnel kept to a minimum to ensure project 'stability' and continuity 
in decision making and follow up. 
The client should be in a position to satisfy itself that all leaders, managers and supervisors, together with key 
members of the workforce, are SQEP for their assigned roles and that changes during the course of the project 
do not dilute this requirement. Controls should also be in place to preclude delegation of key tasks/roles to 
insufficiently skilled staff.  
For less familiar (or new) technology or for some specific tasks, capabilities may need to be enhanced by 
further specialist expertise and/or specialist subcontractors. Their competence to carry out the assigned role 
should also be fully assessed and steps taken to ensure that it is maintained.  
Projects may require operational staff to develop a sufficient understanding so that resulting output can be 
used effectively and safely in subsequent operations. They should thus, where possible, be appropriately 
involved, thus facilitating a more effective transfer of knowledge at completion. They should also be in a 
position to advise on issues such as maintainability, and provide a deeper understanding of the working 
environment in which the output should be used. 
Those engaged in a project, or aspects of it which are innovative, should be encouraged to discuss it with 
others who have relevant experience to ensure as far as possible that learning from previous use of the 
technology is understood and fully utilised. 
12.2.6 Risk assessment 
The process of risk assessment should be understood by all parties with the results of risk assessments 
shared between participants. They should be underpinned by the need for all parties to maintain a questioning 
attitude and precautionary approach to potential risks that may affect process safety. It is thus important to 
ensure that any pre-existing or developing inappropriate assumptions towards the project, such as 'this is a 
low risk project' or 'risks may be acceptable because the technology is well understood', are identified and 
challenged. Searching questions and minority views should be welcomed and concerns visibly acted upon. 
Designers should ensure that they fully understand the environment in which the facility is to be operated and 
that the design is approached on a 'conservative' basis - including requirements for redundancy and diversity 
in safety critical plant. Steps should also be taken to ensure that any design issues and assumptions are fully 
understood by constructors and the client. Codes and standards (including analytical software) should be fit 
for the analysis being performed, with adequate safety margins. Where appropriate, they should be 
independently verified. Constructors should be aware of any test results and their significance. 
The entire supply chain (including suppliers of safety important components and any sub-contractors used) 
should be made fully aware of process safety requirements, quality requirements and the need to comply with 
specifications - together with the safety-related reasons for these. Any changes from specification should be 
approved and reported to all parties involved in the project.  
Requirements should extend to the suppliers of equipment that could impact process safety. Sourcing of 
safety critical plants and components should be carried out by competent specialists. A clear specification 
should underpin the supply of goods or services and should be subject to validation and verification by the 
purchaser. Steps should be taken to ensure that the supplier fully understands the significance of all aspects 
of the specification. Supplied equipment should be the subject of agreed QA procedures and, when safety 
significant, tested - where possible at the point of use with supplier participation. For equipment vital to process 
safety, consideration should be given to witnessing key steps in the manufacturing process. 
At review points, not only should project progress be reviewed openly and with full disclosure, but a 'stand 
back' view taken of any emerging risks that could affect process safety. Contractor methods of analysis and 
any remedial actions taken to faults should be reviewed and, where appropriate, be subject to verification. 
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Assessment at review points should again pay particular attention to new or unfamiliar aspects of the 
technology, seeking independent specialist views as necessary. Senior management should be kept informed 
of emerging risks that are identified in the reviews and asked to take action when high level agreement on 
action is required. 
In carrying out risk assessments and implementing identified improvements, wider 'system' implications 
should be evaluated as discussed fully in Part 3. Unless recognised in advance, it is possible to generate a 
'bow wave' of unintended consequences arising from 'knock on effects' that were not considered at the time 
when the actions were taken, and these can lead to serious implications for later stages of the project and 
beyond. Their emergence can introduce the danger that short cuts or cost saving measures may then be 
introduced to try to meet budget and/or project deadlines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FINAL DRAFT PRE-PRINT 
77 
 
13 EXPECTATIONS: OVERSIGHT AND SCRUTINY (O&S) 
 
13.1 OVERVIEW 
The term oversight and scrutiny is used in this chapter to cover a wide range of activities relevant to process 
safety from monitoring, quality checks and audit carried out within a particular operational context to the 
requirements of 'local' management, through to wider, more holistic business and corporate oversight 
processes. Exact details may depend on the structure of the organisation. The overall system should provide 
an integrated, hierarchical approach which taken together provides confidence that all process safety-related 
activities are carried out to acceptable standards. It should also ensure that emerging trends and developing 
concerns are identified, investigated and understood. It can thus act as a vital line of defence in minimising 
the risk of major events and in ensuring that a balance is achieved between production and 'defensive' 
systems. 
This section of the report concentrates primarily on business and corporate oversight. This may involve more 
holistic scrutiny in areas of potential vulnerability and concern. It provides a means of alerting managers and 
leaders at appropriate levels to emerging risks and serious shortcomings so that timely remedial action can 
be taken. It can also ensure that work being carried out conforms to good practice and up-to-date standards, 
and that it also meets organisational requirements and expectations. It provides a means of checking that 
safety critical actions and monitoring at local level have been performed adequately and that there has been 
full compliance with the requirements of the SMS within a strong underlying safety culture. 
Ensuring Oversight and Scrutiny is modelled using causal loop diagrams in Part 3 in the context of both 
understanding specific events and the complexity and value of the expectations presented in this section of 
the report. Part 2 also discusses issues relating to the use of audit and its follow up. 
Oversight related issues are also discussed in sections 4, 10 and 12, and some references in sections 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9 and 11. 
 
Table 10 – Summary of oversight and scrutiny (O&S) expectations 
OS1 A 'joined-up' O&S programme should be in place comprising monitoring, audit (which goes 
beyond paper systems) and higher level scrutiny. O&S should be carried out by well-trained 
staff who are not subject to potential conflicts of interest, to agreed schedules, and to a depth 
commensurate with the risk. Findings should, wherever possible, be made as straightforward 
as possible and bureaucracy minimised to ensure ease of follow up. 
OS2 O&S should be carried out by both personnel reporting to 'local' line management and 
independently by representatives of the business centre or corporate leadership, depending 
on organisational structure. Each should have clearly defined terms of reference and be 
independent, but remain aware of mutual activities and findings. 
OS3 Output should be reported at an appropriate level in a form which highlights risks and actions 
to be taken so that leaders are clear about operational reality, emerging risks, and follow up - 
even when this may challenge existing perceptions. More serious risks should be addressed 
promptly within a prioritised process, and the effectiveness of actions taken should be 
assessed. 
OS4 Where deficiencies are identified, root causes should be examined, including deeper-lying 
organisational and cultural issues such as any developing tendency towards insularity, 
complacency or a decline in safety culture. Any impacts of organisational change should be 
assessed and awareness maintained of any evidence for 'organisational drift', 
overconfidence in decision making, and the impact of any pressure to conform to established 
views. 
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OS5 Areas for audit and wider oversight should be chosen on the basis of their risk to process 
safety and may involve general or 'themed' assessments. Specific operational parameters 
subject to review may include 'local' monitoring and quality processes; logs and records of 
various types; maintenance and testing; trends in data and, the views of staff. Themes for 
wider, more holistic review may include such topics as: the effectiveness of the SMS and its 
use and modification; risk assessment processes; approaches to decision making; change 
management; training and accreditation processes and, the effectiveness of interfaces and 
communication (including with and between contractors). The O&S processes should make 
clear the extent to which organisational expectations are being met. 
OS6 Findings should be entered in a database that is kept up-to-date and is easy to use. This 
should be available across the organisation to facilitate learning. If certificates of compliance 
are required, these should only be issued when remedial actions are complete and their 
effectiveness confirmed. 
OS7 Particular attention in O&S should be paid to any operations that have taken place outside 
the safe 'operating envelope', the reasons for this, and the process of authorisation. If 
justified by arguments regarding time at risk (e.g. maintenance activities or short remaining 
plant lifetime), these should be carefully examined. 
OS8 In addition to regular examination of trends in data, KPIs specific to process safety should be 
developed. These should contain a combination of lagging and leading (proactive) indicators 
and should be tracked at appropriate organisational levels as an input to performance review 
and to prioritise areas for potential action. 
OS9 Members of boards and other senior leaders should receive regular reports as a result of 
O&S activities. These should have sufficient 'edge' to alert them to areas of concern 
(including in specific plant or projects) and should not 'hide' concerns or be 'rolled up' as they 
are communicated upwards, such that they are not fully aware of important issues and 
actions being taken. The reports should enable them to challenge where necessary, stay in 
touch with operational reality, and inform their interactions with staff. 
OS10 High level review of process safety should involve the assimilation of O&S findings, KPIs, 
and investigation into event reports. This can provide a company-wide picture of process 
safety performance and culture, whilst highlighting specific areas of concern and emerging 
risk. The process should be facilitated by an independent, well-resourced and competent 
safety function with 'authority' and a strong organisational 'voice'. It should be able to offer 
compelling process safety and associated safety culture advice at all levels. 
 
13.2 DISCUSSION AND COMMENTARY 
13.2.1 Structure, coverage and key challenges 
An effective O&S process should provide an integrated ('joined up') hierarchical system that is carried-out in 
sufficient depth and to an agreed schedule from which deviations are kept to a minimum. It is particularly 
important to maintain (and potentially strengthen) processes during organisational change or when major 
projects are in progress. O&S processes should be carried out by well-trained and experienced personnel to 
clearly defined terms of reference - wherever possible minimising overlap and bureaucratic complexity   
Feedback to 'local' management on the adequacy of process safety in operations (including support 
functions) can be provided by specialists reporting to line management, whereas the primary focus of 
corporate and business centre activities may be to obtain an independent (outside the operational line), 
more holistic view of performance, highlighting any particular areas of vulnerability and concern.  
Effective reporting routes should ensure that leaders - from those in specific businesses or projects, through 
to the board of the organisation - are aware of important findings relevant to their roles. To achieve this, 
findings should not be aggregated or 'rolled up' in upward transmission in a way that reduces the clarity of 
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concerns relating to a specific plant or process, and leaders should ensure that they are clear about the 
risks present, actions proposed or being taken, and the effectiveness of their implementation. 
It is important that those carrying out O&S activities are in close contact about planning and findings whilst 
retaining their own independence and reporting routes. It is also important that those carrying out and 
managing business centre and corporate O&S do not have other operational roles ('dual hatting') or be 
subject to pressure that might lead to a conflict of interest between 'production' or project progress, and 
process safety. 
Oversight and scrutiny processes should not just identify deficiencies and suggested remedial actions, but 
should also verify that these have been implemented and seek evidence that the change has been effective. 
It is important that the root causes of deficiencies should be identified. Those carrying out O&S should thus 
have not only technical and systems capabilities, but be able to identify deeper-lying organisational 
deficiencies and any human factors and behavioural factors. 
Those responsible for O&S processes should have sufficient influence and authority, with appropriate 
reporting routes, to ensure that important findings are dealt with promptly and thoroughly, and that remedial 
activities are not deferred or under-resourced.  
A further important role is to challenge the view that confidence in continued good performance is justified 
by past success. Thus, those carrying out O&S should remain alert to evidence of 'organisational drift' and 
should ensure that business and corporate leaders are helped to maintain awareness of the 'reality' of how 
operations are being carried out and the associated organisation and culture. This should be made apparent 
even when there may be real or perceived pressure to conform to the accepted view. 
For some events studied, it was found that organisations had become insular and did not properly consider 
industry good practice and the findings from previous relevant events. This is one indicator of a weak safety 
culture. Those carrying out O&S should have the competence to identify and respond to deficiencies in 
safety culture and to ensure that learning opportunities are being taken.  
13.2.2 Implementation and sources of data 
O&S may be focussed on specific areas of concern ('themed inspections') or aimed at obtaining an overall 
view of the performance of a plant, process or project. Results should be benchmarked against 
organisational expectations. 
- Various sources of information are available as input, depending on the nature of the review 
process. These may include records, observations, trends, and the views and concerns of the 
workforce. Sources and areas for potential review that have been highlighted in the reports into the 
events studied include the following:Conformance of management systems with the safety case and 
related documentation, and how conformity is achieved in practice; 
- Adequacy, understanding and compliance with the SMS. This requires, in particular, that 
procedures and work instructions, and the processes used to keep these relevant and up-to-date 
reflect operational requirements and are regularly reviewed. This should include processes for 
revision, and the authorisation process for changes to the SMS. Review should also include the 
potential impact of the aggregated effect of many small changes. In assessing performance, note 
should be taken of the number and importance of short-term deviations from the SMS or periods of 
operation outside the safe operating envelope, the reasons for this, and the process by which 
authority was obtained (e.g. a waiver system). Particular note should be taken of reductions in 
process safety provision justified by a reduced period at risk (e.g. the projected remaining lifetime of 
plant or equipment); 
- The adequacy and implementation of processes for risk assessment at all levels of application; 
- The views of staff (including contractors) on issues such as the adequacy of- and compliance with- 
procedures; whether decisions are being made on a precautionary basis; pressures on staff and 
working conditions; the reporting of concerns, and staff views on prevailing attitudes and behaviours 
more generally; 
- How decisions have been reached and recorded (for example, the response to safety concerns and 
processes for management of organisational and technical change), sources of advice received, 
and whether decisions have been made at an appropriate level;  
- Reports into witnessing of key safety processes and the response to findings. This should include 
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the installation and testing of safety-related equipment, and less frequent operations (such as start-
ups). It should also include the practice for obtaining associated authorisations; 
- The effectiveness of operational monitoring and audit systems (including inspection, checking and 
verification). This should also include the extent to which review has taken place of actual 
operational behaviours and not just paper systems, and the extent to which trends have been 
monitored; 
- Plant condition and maintenance records, including issues of reliability, alertness to plant 
degradation, backlogs and the access of operational staff to engineering support; 
- Processes employed in the authorisation and implementation of changes to plant both during 
construction and operation, and the implication of these for safety cases and management systems; 
- Records of training and authorisation for roles (including for abnormal conditions and emergencies); 
- Operational experience records such as logs of hand-over practices, response to alarms, and 
emergency exercises; 
- The effectiveness of reporting and investigation into 'near hits' and operational anomalies, with 
identification of root causes and any potential for wider implications. This should include the closure 
and effectiveness of actions; 
- The adequacy of processes at the interface with contracting organisations (including designers and 
suppliers) in areas with the potential to impact on process safety - particularly clarity about 
standards, culture, communication, and audit (including the rigour of quality assessments). 
Particular attention should be paid to novel plant or processes. It should also include assessing the 
adequacy of the client role in providing oversight, as well as that of contracting organisations; 
- The effectiveness of interfaces and communication between work groups and functions (including 
business and corporate centres) and, 
- The extent to which previous findings and recommendations have been followed through, and 
checks carried out on effectiveness. 
In some industries, certificates of compliance are issued following a satisfactory audit or review. These 
should not be provided until identified issues have been satisfactorily dealt with and their effectiveness 
confirmed or a caveat included that this remains an open matter. 
A common central database of findings and actions has been found to be valuable. This should be kept up-
to-date and as simple to use as possible to ensure ease of use. 
13.2.3 Examining trends and measuring performance 
Obtaining a more holistic view of process safety performance at senior level and examining trends is 
particularly important because in many cases over-reliance has been placed on more easily obtained 
occupational safety performance data. This does not generally provide a good indicator of process safety 
performance. 
It is thus important that performance indicators (KPIs) are developed to monitor process safety performance. 
These may be in the form of 'lagging' indicators that enable performance in key areas to be reviewed 
retrospectively (e.g. number of 'events' in a defined category), or 'leading' indicators that provide proactive 
information by allowing a measure to be obtained of the extent to which important actions are being taken to 
make improvements. A balance between leading and lagging indicators should be achieved and over-reliance 
not placed on one type. KPIs are an important input to the overall review of process safety performance and 
can provide valuable input to assigning priorities for action, both within the organisation as a whole, or in 
specific operational areas or projects. The selection, development and use of KPIs, including the selection 
and role of leading indicators, is the subject of more in-depth discussion in Part 2. 
13.2.4 Board and senior leadership role 
Reports with clear findings and recommendations should be made available to leaders at an appropriate level 
in the organisation. In particular, corporate and business boards and other business leaders should receive 
regular reports and critical overviews from independent safety functions. In some cases, board safety 
committees and members with assigned responsibilities for process safety are appointed, and they should 
also provide informed views and raise concerns where necessary.  
Reporting should have sufficient 'edge' to provide a clear understanding and view of key vulnerabilities and 
areas of emerging risk as they relate to identified areas such as plant or projects, so that leaders can take an 
informed view as to whether appropriate action is being taken and whether risks are being effectively 
FINAL DRAFT PRE-PRINT 
81 
 
controlled. This should include the way in which 'deeper' organisational, management and cultural issues are 
being addressed. Their understanding may also enable boards to take account of the potential impact of their 
business decision making on process safety. 
The knowledge and information received should also enable leaders to reinforce and focus their commitment 
to process safety and to 'inform' their interaction with staff. The view of performance that they obtain may 
challenge existing views and perceptions, and they should be alert and open minded to the possibility that 
operational reality does not always support previously held perceptions. 
Taken together, management reports, O&S findings on process safety, KPIs and relevant event reports can 
provide a valuable overall picture to senior decision takers and to safety committees. Assimilating this data 
and helping to interpret it for leaders is again often an important function of an independent safety function. 
Given their role in both conducting reviews and interpreting the data, along with their other roles in providing 
a challenging view of performance and proposed actions, it is important that they are well resourced with 
capable and experienced staff and with a leader who has, if required, direct access to the most senior 
leadership in the organisation. It is also important that their views are well respected within the organisation 
and that they retain a strong 'voice' and ability to offer compelling advice and guidance at all levels.  
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14 CONCLUSIONS TO PART 1 
Part 1 of the report has shown that organisational and cultural factors have been very important as precursors 
to a range of major events across a range of industries that rely for their safety on the effective management 
of interacting engineering, people-related and organisational (process safety') issues. The factors involved 
are often 'latent' and require dedicated attention to be paid to their identification and remediation. 
The collection of findings in this context from the twelve major events studied have been drawn out, interpreted 
and used as prompts to enable further discussion and to provide insights that should allow greater 
understanding and awareness of the issues involved to be obtained by decision makers and those involved 
in the development and use of the processes and systems. Presenting the material in the form of 'expectations' 
or good practice guidelines with associated discussion and commentary should provide an opportunity for 
current approaches across a range of industries to be assessed ('benchmarked') and action taken, where 
necessary, to make improvements to how these organisational and cultural factors are currently identified and 
addressed. It should also provide an opportunity to be taken to develop new 'tools' for the oversight and 
scrutiny of these sometimes neglected areas that would complement existing approaches used to assess 
engineering and people-related issues. The identification and presentation of these precursors may also 
enable more effective investigation of events and 'near hits' within organisations in order to facilitate improved 
learning. 
Developing suitable courses of action to improve resilience in these areas requires careful attention to be 
given to the behavioural and psychological influences involved, and also requires approaches to be developed 
that take fuller account of the interactions that very frequently occur within the complex systems involved. Part 
2 of the report addresses some of the key factors involved in dealing with the people-related issues, many of 
which are relevant to the findings above. Part 3 describes and illustrates the use of a potentially very valuable 
approach using CLDs to enable interactive effects to be better identified and addressed, and to provide the 
opportunity to develop more effective performance measures in complex systems. 
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PART 2 
Organisational learning and the design of evidence-based interventions 
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15 INTRODUCTION TO PART 2 
 
Whether arising from the analysis of major events, such as those discussed in Part 1, incidents within ones’ 
own organisations, or other intelligence highlighting weaknesses and deficiencies in SMSs, the need to 
engage with behavioural and cultural components is likely to constitute a key element of the process of 
enhancing resilience.  
Effective risk management in the workplace is about intervention, i.e. to change the natural or prevailing order 
of things, whether in traditional domains, such as machinery guarding and manual handling (reduction) 
systems, or more challenging areas such as human error and safety culture.  Proactive intervention is about 
finding ways to effectively manage the potential for undesired outcomes, and thereby mitigate the risks to 
employees, the public, and employers. 
Intentionally setting aside the veracity of widely encountered claims of a plateauing of safety improvement 
attributable to engineered controls justifying an increased focus on behavioural issues over recent decades 
(a premise that remains contentious), Part 2 focuses on the challenging issue of socially engineering cultural 
change. 
Finding ways to motivate managers and employees to behave in ways counter to their default inclinations is 
routinely challenging.  Potentially problematic, or otherwise undesirable, behaviour can have its basis in: 
natural reinforcement (i.e. it is simply easier and less effort to do it this way); the product of cognitive bias’s 
(section 3.6.1, Box 8); recourse to cognitive short-cuts (heuristics); habit; incomplete mental models (see 
section 3.6.1, Box 7), and, the intersect with normative influence (custom and practice) in the workplace.  
Importantly, under a wide range of circumstances, ostensibly non-rational behaviour, can simply reflect 
employee coping strategies, in response to a hostile choice architecture (see sections 3.3.3, Box 4; 5.1.2; & 
Annex C), e.g. conflicting organisational goals / managerial priorities or sub-optimal systems (structural, social 
and technical).   
Recognising what needs to change, in behavioural and cultural terms, can be challenging for work 
organisations, particularly where there is a desire to determine root causes.  However, this can represent a 
relatively modest objective relative to the challenges surrounding realisation of any desired change, 
particularly where this requires influence in rather nebulous and opaque domains, e.g. safety climate, safety 
culture, human factors, and psycho-social elements.   
Part 2 sets out to provide a critical perspective on the use of evidence to inform corporate decision making 
over identifying priorities for intervention and effective intervention design, to enhance system resilience 
though addressing behavioural and cultural components.  It focuses on the evidence gathering in the related 
domains of: 
• Identifying structural, organisational and socio-technical weakness. 
• Setting priorities for intervention to enhance resilience. 
• Intervention options appraisal – theories of change and ‘what works’? 
• Intervention design and delivery – intervention logic – how will ‘it’ will work? 
 
The term ‘evidence-based practice’ has seemingly become a central tenet of the lexicon of business speak 
over the last two decades.  While the concept of using evidence to inform practice undeniably predates this, 
the contemporary narrative can perhaps be traced back to the philosophical underpinnings evident in the New 
Labour white paper Our healthier Nation (1999).  A central and enduring legacy of the perspective on evidence 
within that document was that social and behavioural science evidence should play a more integral role in 
informing public policy strategy and intervention design.  The vision was that these principles should be applied 
to a broad array of public health and social problems, notably lifestyle health, crime, road safety, environmental 
‘greening’ behaviour, including occupational health and safety in the workplace. 
At first encounter, the reader might be moved to ask ‘Why is this relevant to risk management in high hazard 
sectors?’.  The answer is that the intense focus on behaviour change within the public policy domain led to a 
number of advances in thinking and practice in social engineering science.  Specifically, the following: 
• Enhanced practical relevance of academic research into behaviour change.  
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• Increase in funded research on behaviour change and intervention design. 
• New theories and new applications of established theories of behaviour change.  
• An intensified focus on ‘what works’ – and techniques for determining this. 
• An enhanced body of robust review evidence available within the public domain. 
• Wider adoption of robust techniques for determining priorities for intervention. 
• More systematic approaches to intervention options appraisal. 
• Intensified focus on the need for quantifiable evidence of impact. 
 
Part 2 provides a commentary on the relevance of these and related developments in the use of evidence 
with a view to harmonisation with established human factors and behaviour science perspectives on 
intervention within the occupational safety domain.  The principal topics discussed are: 
• Measuring health and safety performance. 
o What do we mean by data and evidence? 
o Incident and incidence data. 
o Contemporary perspectives on lead indicators. 
o Audits and climate surveys - reflections on practice. 
• Techniques for priority elicitation. 
• Setting an agenda for improvement. 
o Establishing a robust and defensible case for intervention.  
• Considerations when designing behaviour change interventions – the challenge of social engineering in the 
workplace. 
o Theories of behaviour change. 
o Intervention logic modelling. 
 
In the interest of brevity, the body text contains signposts to a set of annexes.  The annexes are provided for 
readers wishing to gain a deeper appreciation of the history and strength of the underpinning science relating 
to insights, concepts, tools, techniques, and models referred to within Part 2: 
• Annex A: High-Reliability Organisations 
• Annex B: Safety culture maturity 
• Annex C:  Strengths and weaknesses of influential behaviour change perspectives 
• Annex D:  Training and communication interventions 
• Annex E:  Incentives and rewards 
 
15.1 Identifying priorities for health and safety improvement and investment 
 
Many would recognise the potential pitfalls of the following: 
i. A corporate health and safety agenda dominated by reactive responses to incidents in which priorities and 
resource allocations that lurch from one crisis to the next.   
ii. Safety management agendas dominated by a focus on high frequency/rate, relatively low consequence 
workplace safety failures (e.g. slips and trips).   
Most mature organisations would aspire to a more strategic approach.   
The use of appropriate, high-quality evidence to inform decision making over priorities for improving risk 
control and where to invest and in what way(s), benefits from strong intuitive appeal. Success, however, hinges 
upon: 
• the nature and quality of the data gathered; 
• distilling this into a form that is accessible to decision-makers; 
• the scope for achieving change; 
• technical knowledge of what works to achieve the desired result, and 
FINAL DRAFT PRE-PRINT 
86 
 
• the capacity to measure the impact of arising initiatives and interventions. 
 
An observation is that many, perhaps most, organisations exhibit weaknesses in the following areas: 
• feedback on the effectiveness of investment in current risk control measures; 
• insight into latent (hidden) weaknesses/failures in risk management; 
• identification of root causes of past failures / near misses; 
• the capacity to use evidence to identify priorities for investment, and 
• the capacity to design appropriate, durable, high-quality interventions with demonstrable impact of their 
effectiveness in meeting headline objectives. 
 
The case for basing decision making and investment in health and safety on good quality evidence requires 
consideration of the relative strengths and limitations of alternative sources of data. 
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16 MEASURING HEALTH AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE 
 
Deciding what to measure, what constitutes a reliable measure of performance and how best to go about 
measuring it is far from trivial.   
 
At a basal level, mature, pro-active organisations, committed to continuous improvement need to be able to: 
• benchmark current performance; 
• monitor performance over time and identify trends; 
• identify priorities for intervention and improvement, and 
• measure the effectiveness of their interventions. 
 
16.1 WHAT DO WE MEAN BY DATA AND EVIDENCE? 
Data capture represents a cornerstone of effective learning.  However, before proceeding it is perhaps useful 
to pause and consider what is meant by data and evidence, their boundaries and potential roles.   
Traditional perspectives on health and safety learning have tended to be bounded by a focus on accidents 
and incidents; this being true of employers, trades unions, regulators and governments.  Recognition of the 
limitations of incident (lag2) data, has sponsored significant interest in developing lead3 indicators.   
Organisations with mature health and SMSs routinely use a combination of multiple lag and lead indicators 
to: 
• inform their decision making over identifying root causes; 
• set priorities for improvement, and 
• monitor the status of controls and progress towards realising safety objectives.   
However, scope for evidence-based practice within the risk management domain extends beyond the capacity 
to recognise vulnerabilities.  Having recognised who is at risk and determined what needs to change, the 
focus necessarily turns to the question of how this might be achieved.  Drawing upon the amassed social 
science evidence on ‘what works’, the latter embodies the dual challenges of identifying an appropriate: 
• theory of change – by what mechanism/technique will behaviour change occur? (Section 5.1; and Annex C)  
• intervention logic – the logistics of making it happen – i.e. the design considerations for an effective 
intervention (Section 5.2). 
16.1.1 Incident and incidence data 
It is important that the approach to data gathering is proactive and purposive. At first encounter, this may 
present as a statement of the obvious.  However, common experience is that while most, if not all, large 
organisations are awash with data, a high proportion of that gathered tends to be of limited utility from the 
perspective of purposive data-mining. 
Likely reflecting regulatory reporting obligations (e.g. Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous 
Occurrences Regulations 2013, RIDDOR), employer incident classification systems tend to be focused on 
manifest consequences, rather than immediate or latent causality, e.g. uncontrolled release, struck by moving 
object or, within the health domain, psychological stress.   
Summary data relating to such events offer little beyond the capacity to compare rates between one 
accounting period and the next, one site and another and similar and, even then, low frequencies tend to limit 
confidence in findings (see below). 
Few would deny the intuitive benefits of capturing contextual elements with a view to identifying latent 
influences and root causes, particularly for more complex/high consequence events.  However, many 
 
2 Lag indicators - sometimes termed 'trail' indicators relates to past failures – accidents, ill health and near misses. They  
exemplify instances where a desired safety outcome has failed, or has not been achieved. 
3 Lead indicators – relate to performance in managing precursors to harm. They are a form of active monitoring of 
defined key risk control criteria to determine their effectiveness 
FINAL DRAFT PRE-PRINT 
88 
 
organisations find this deeper classification challenging, not necessarily because they are lacking expertise, 
but because realisation of this objective is inherently challenging, particularly where the task is performed by 
plural individuals.  Levels of agreement between root cause classifiers are routinely found to range from 
modest to low.  The intuitive solution of adding more detail to classification systems, in many instances, seems 
to have the effect of amplifying rather than attenuating the degree of disagreement (see, for example, Barnett 
and Weyman, 2016).    
‘Incident classification systems risk generating more heat than light; obscuring as much as they reveal - their 
design requires careful consideration’ (Anderson and Weyman, 1998). 
While valuable lessons can be learned from the appropriate and effective investigation of major indents (see 
Part 1), their rarity is problematic as a source of effective feedback on the quality of risk management 
performance within a given work organisation.  This is because the relative paucity of data precludes reliable 
statistical testing, e.g. of change over time or between one site and another.  Equally, there is a need to be 
mindful that the absence of an inherently rare chance-related event may owe more to good fortune than 
prowess in risk control.   
The scarcity of major incidents tends to divert the focus on lag data to occupational safety events.  This is not 
wholly inappropriate, however, prowess in managing occupational safety is not necessarily a good proxy for 
the status of control of major hazards.  The often cited claim of a linkage between the two (see, for example, 
Heinrich, 1959) is based upon correlational, rather than causal evidence,  i.e. a good record in occupational 
safety may be indicative of a high reliability organisation (see Annex A) but, in and of itself, constitutes 
insufficient grounds for concluding that an organisation has achieved that status.   
Despite benefiting from strong intuitive appeal, occupational incident data tends to be problematic when 
attempting to monitor trends and detect emergent vulnerabilities.  As noted above, fatal and major rates, in 
almost all organisations, are too low to support formal statistical testing.  Insufficient data can result in the 
detection of both false positives (spurious indications of improvement) and false negatives (undetected 
improvement).  Similarly, it is not possible to determine whether changes reflect random variability or some 
substantive difference, e.g. should a drop from five to three cases within a given category be interpreted as a 
cause for celebration, or merely the product of natural fluctuation and good-fortune?    
In the domain of lag data, only minor injury and medical room entry data tends to be sufficiently prolific to 
support reliable statistical testing (particularly over relatively short accounting periods - e.g. quarterly or 
annual), or when attempting to compare one productive unit with another, and similar.  However, its principal 
limitation relates to its high susceptibility to reporting bias (both amplification and attenuation effects are 
possible).  Recognised influences include: management style; presence of safety performance targets; 
contractor selection criteria and injury compensation arrangements. 
Near miss reporting, while a potentially valuable source of intelligence, is subject to essentially equivalent 
amplification / attenuation effects.  It is also prone to producing a skewed profile of incidents by type, due the 
presence of systematic biases, i.e. greater propensity to report systems- rather than personnel- failures; 
under-reporting of events associated with personal / work team culpability; tendency to avoid getting peers 
into trouble (‘telling on’, ‘grassing’ etc.), and higher propensity to report events involving members of out-
groups4, e.g. contractors or agency personnel. 
While a positive, receptive safety climate can ameliorate the degree of under-reporting of minor incidents and 
near misses, it is prudent to assume that the phenomena will always be present to some degree. 
 
4 People outside one's own group, especially as considered to be inferior or alien; a group perceived as other than 
one's own. 
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Box 1 
Summary of the limits of incident (lag) data 
Linkage to risk - Relationship between risk behaviour and negative outcomes tends to be weak and highly 
chance related.  A high proportion of the time, individuals and their organisations will be lucky.  Particularly 
in complex systems, minor failures may routinely go unnoticed or have benign consequences; and, most 
will never achieve the necessary alignment to produce a significant failure.   
Identifying trends – Accident data is sparse.  A by-product of advances in risk control is that rates, 
particularly of major incidents, fatal and serious accidents, are typically low.  Routinely, too little data is 
available to identify trends, or support reliable statistical testing. This can be challenging at corporate level, 
but is acutely problematic when attempting to measure change at the level of the work site or unit.   
Identifying root causes - Lag data tends to be classified in terms of manifest consequences. This can 
mask deeper causality, particularly when presented in summary statistics.  While there is routinely scope 
to improve classification systems, at best, the output will be limited to who, what, where and how much 
issues – with little insight into why; the latter being key to decision making over future intervention to achieve 
improvement.   
Feedback on investment – The (short-medium term) non-linear relationship between risk and incidents 
renders lag data problematic as feedback on the effectiveness of investment in risk controls / improvement 
initiatives.  Investment in risk control relates to reducing the potential for harm.  To compare like with like, 
it is necessary to devise metrics of success in reducing that potential. 
Reporting biases – The only sources of lag data that are sufficiently prolific to support reliable statistical 
testing (minor injury and near miss data) exhibit high susceptibility to reporting bias.   Rates can become 
attenuated, amplified and skewed.   
Restricted scope - Lag data relates to recognised failures. The detection of deeper, rarer, possibly 
previously undetected pathogens and weaknesses in risk control requires additional systems for data 
capture, and consideration of pathways to failure, particularly where these relate to complex systems and 
where the consequences of failure may be high magnitude, even catastrophic, e.g. a large scale 
uncontrolled release of chemical, structural collapse, or explosion.  
 
At the most fundamental level, the utility of lag data is limited by the relationship between risk and incidents.   
For most practical purposes, this is most appropriately regarded as non-linear – certainly over typical business 
accounting periods (quarterly, annual, etc.).  
To suggest that employers, shareholders, regulators and other stakeholders should disregard accident and ill 
health outcome data is both untenable and undesirable.  Rather, the point at issue rests with the partiality and 
(in)sufficiency of lag data alone, as a source of feedback on corporate prowess in managing hazards and 
risks. 
Growing recognition of the dislocation between risk (potential for harm) and outcomes (manifest 
consequences), underpinned by the regulatory emphasis on risk assessment, has stimulated significant 
interest in the scope for developing effective lead indicators, i.e. tools and techniques for data capture, with 
the capacity to identify vulnerabilities (‘ticking bombs’) in socio-technical systems. 
A key distinction between lag and lead indicators relates to the relationship of each to risk and the potential 
for harm.  The chance relatedness of incident data means that using these as a measure of effective hazard 
management is not comparing like with like, i.e. a case of comparing ‘apples’ with ‘oranges’.  There is 
potentially a much closer match between risk management practice and (appropriately selected) lead 
indicators.  Where the latter relates to measuring and monitoring the effectiveness of the former, it becomes 
possible to reliably compare inputs against outputs.   
Common experience, however, is that despite the concept of lead indicators having entered the safety 
management discourse, many organisations appear to lack a clear conception of their nature and / or role; 
most acutely their potential to be applied in an active manner, to enhance learning and inform decision making 
over intervention to address vulnerabilities.  Embracing the concept also rests upon the presence of a degree 
of corporate culture maturity that is receptive to, and prepared to engage with, the implications of 'bad news'. 
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16.1.2 Contemporary perspectives on lead indicators 
Echoing features of the quality revolution of the 1980s (see Beck, 1992 and Power, 2004), the appeal of lead 
indicators is that they embody the potential to supplement and address recognised shortfalls in incident and 
near miss data, by providing early warning of problems before they become manifest.   
Contemporary perspectives reflect a strong orientation around audit, focused on recognised sources of 
vulnerability, e.g. compliance with rules and procedures, status and availability of machinery and equipment.  
The intuitive value of such output is that it provides (most commonly) quantifiable data on current performance 
for a defined group of employees / process / work-site, etc., that can be compared against a benchmark, or 
some other comparator, e.g. referenced to a defined standard / improvement objective, or to provide early 
warning dips in performance that require intervention. 
‘In essence, contemporary perspectives reflect a logical extension of quality management practice.  In contrast 
to earlier times, few manufacturers today limit their assessment of how well they have performed to the number 
of reject items piled up at the end of the assembly line - and the associated worry over the number of duds 
that were missed…’ Power, 2004. 
 
Box 2 
 
Lead indicators: 
 
• allow organisations to detect improvements in health and safety performance; 
• can be configured to measure success (rather than focusing on failure); 
• provide regular, monitored, timely, feedback to stakeholders; 
• embody the capacity to predict future performance; 
• can be used to stimulate employee engagement in problem solving around safety; 
• make transparent what needs to be done to achieve improvement; and, 
• track the impact – effectiveness - and return of improvement investment. 
 
 
Resilient organisations typically have a suite of lead indicators and effective systems for distilling results to 
inform senior management decision making and strategy over improvement / consolidation.  Such 
organisations can be characterised as ‘data hungry’.  They actively seek-out evidence on weaknesses and 
potential vulnerabilities, with a view to their resolution, rather than a default orientation of reacting to events 
as they unfold.   
 
The following discussion of lead indicators offers critical comment on a number of widely applied tools and 
techniques within contemporary safety management practice. 
Lead indicators essentially fall into two families: 
16.1.2.1 Measures of how effectively precursors to known sources of harm or failure are being controlled 
For example, rates of risk assessment completion/review; training; auditing of infrastructure and equipment 
status/availability; rates of employee engagement/involvement; behavioural audits, and similar. 
 
Under most circumstances, these should be based on some assessment of the physical properties of the 
issue being assessed.  Where behavioural elements are relevant, measures should focus on behaviour, in 
preference to attitudes or opinions5. The perspective on behaviour should also be broad and aim to address 
fundamental elements, and not be limited to the observation of real-time, overt behaviour at the point it is 
exhibited.  More is to be gained from a primary emphasis on the antecedents of behaviour, i.e. a focus on the 
trail of evidence that is the product of past behaviour.  For example, a defeated interlock may reflect laxity in 
supervision, possibly extending to tacit acceptance of the practice by managers; similarly, the presence of 
non-standard tools and equipment at the worksite, or the adoption of improvised solutions. 
 
5 Attitudes are a poor predictor of behaviour.  Behaviour is a more reliable predictor of attitude. 
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Where possible audits should be of objective elements, using measures that produce reliable, reproducible 
results.  A fundamental and necessary feature is that audit procedures and tools should be designed such that 
they produce equivalent results when used by multiple assessors (see Section 2.3.2. and Annex C).   They 
should also be conducted with sufficient regularity to provide ‘live’ monitoring feedback. 
 
Commonly encountered lead indicators: 
Point of work audits – designed to produce quantifiable indication of the effectiveness of controls of 
recognised vulnerabilities, with scope to constitute or be linked to KPIs.  Where the arising output is fed back 
to risk managers and actively used by them to inform decision making relating to the status of risk control, 
they can constitute a valuable component of oversight and scrutiny (see Part 1, section 2.5.10).  
Typically, they are designed to relate to: 
• Background monitoring of established systems and practices over extended periods, e.g. rates of risk 
assessment completion; training/certification; infrastructure and equipment status/availability; rates of 
employee engagement/involvement, and similar. 
• Bespoke measures, which may (but not necessarily) be of short duration, e.g. linked to specific 
improvement initiatives and interventions, such as housekeeping standards and hazard spotting 
campaigns. 
• Behaviour assessment and audit – widely applied in various forms, tend to be based upon snap-shot 
observations (of varying frequency) of active6 employee (generally aggregated across plural employees) 
behaviour and / or the antecedents of behaviour (the presence of out-of-date lifting equipment at the 
worksite; blocked access route and similar - see Annex C). 
Box 3 
Point-of-work audits   
Desirable features include: 
• Reflecting the principle of a hierarchy of control, a primary emphasis on structural, engineered systems 
and job design components. Behavioural assessment should address antecedent components as well 
as observable behaviour.   
• Where possible audits should be of objective elements, using measures that produce reliable, 
reproducible results.  They should be conducted with sufficient regularity to provide live monitoring 
feedback. 
Limitations: 
• High potential for low inter-auditor (observer) agreement raises questions over the reliability of data. 
• Scope tends to be limited to immediately observable elements, such that they are a better fit with 
occupational safety than major hazards risk control. 
 
 
Why conduct audits? 
To provide monitoring feedback on: 
• the status and / or prevalence of recognised vectors of harm; 
• the effectiveness of extant risk control measures; 
• the presence and / or status of machinery, equipment and work conditions; 
• compliance with rules, procedures and good practice, and 
• the effectiveness of behaviour change interventions for defined processes or groups of employees, 
e.g. to provide early warning of dips in performance that would benefit from managerial action. 
 
6 In contrast to behavioural antecedents – i.e. evidence of past behaviour. 
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Audit output is relevant to: 
Site managers - The arising data is of value for monitoring the status of risk controls on their site as a whole, 
and its component functions/personnel by type.  Good quality data identifies issues, functions and locations 
where action needs to be taken.  It also identifies where controls are effective, and ineffective.  Knowing this 
can bring efficiencies in resource allocation over intervention, by avoiding wastage on groups and issues that 
are already performing well. 
Senior managers / Board level - The arising data is of value for broadly equivalent reasons to those outlined 
above, but with the advantage that data of sufficient quantity can be used to support the identification of trends 
and contrasts, as well as identifying priorities for future improvement, but importantly, also provides feedback 
on the effectiveness of established risk control measures and topic-based interventions.   
 
 
16.1.2.2 Employee surveys 
These aim to tap employee orientations towards and perspectives on the prevailing health and safety climate; 
work related stress, and related topics (see Annex C). 
Box 4 
Safety Culture or Climate? 
• Much has been written regarding the distinction between the linked concepts of safety climate and 
safety culture.  The terms are often used interchangeably - but not always.  It may be useful to conceive 
of climate as relating to the context, or architecture7 in which employees operate.   
• There is strong evidence that climate plays an important role in shaping ‘shop-floor’ safety behaviour 
and culture.   
• Climate variables are potentially malleable, i.e. they are amenable to management intervention in ways 
that impact on employee orientation, behaviour and culture. 
 
While the data produced is inherently subjective, tapping employee impressions and beliefs, substantively 
accurate or otherwise, is valuable insofar as these impact upon behaviour.   
Being subjective, although quantifiable, the output is more reliable in relative than in absolute terms, e.g. to 
compare relative differences between, say one employee demographic (grade/role/work unit etc.) and 
another, or as a measure of relative change over time within the same organisations.  This is because, for 
these types of comparisons, any measurement error can be considered essentially common.8  Comparisons 
of survey results between organisations are not recommended (despite their popularity) and are best treated 
with caution, due to the high potential for local amplification or attenuation effects. 
 An array of commercially produced measures are available.  Most take the form of a set of attitude statements, 
against which a sample of the employees are asked to indicate their degree of agreement.  The statements 
map onto a set of themed measurement scales (typically between 8 and 10; with around 4 – 8 questions on 
each).   
 
7 Architecture extending beyond the built environment to include the design and availability of equipment and 
resources employees have to work with, the rules and procedures they operate to, systems of reward, 
organisational structure, management style, and more.    
8 Where measurement error is essentially equivalent between groups of respondents, or can be judged to be stable 
over time measurement can be treated as common and of little consequence, in relative terms. However, it should 
be kept in mind that staff survey results can reflect broader influences on employee attitudes, e.g. grievances arising 
from industrial disputes, threats of redundancy programmes and similar can be vented through ostensibly unrelated 
channels. 
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Box 5 
Safety Climate survey measures - desirable features 
• Commercially available measures should have an auditable account of their development.  Key criteria 
relate to:    
o Face validity – do independent specialists judge the scales to measure what they claim to measure? 
o Reliability – evidence that each scale (e.g. management commitment, compliance with rules) 
exceeds minimum standards of internal consistency; and do they produce equivalent results if 
repeated (authors should report Alpha coefficients >0.70 in each case). 
These criteria are important to verify as a number of commercially available scales have been found 
wanting in these respects - with the associated risk that the results they produce may be spurious.   
• The facility for recording demographic details of respondents that relate to structural (rather than just 
personal) details e.g. grade, role, function, location. 
• Questions that have a common reference subject i.e. questions that relate to the behaviour of the 
respondent or the behaviour of others; but not a mix of the two. – A number of commercially available 
measures exhibit a mix of ‘I/your’ (referring to respondent behaviour) and ‘they / people who work here’ 
(the behaviour of peers).  Questions that ask about personal behaviour in relation to risk are undesirable 
due to the high potential for self-serving attribution bias, i.e. people's tendency to portray their own 
behaviour in a favourable light.  Better measures use the behaviour of peers ('they') as the subject 
reference. 
 
There is notable variability between the different measures in terms of the elements that the claim to measure.  
However, the most widely encountered scales are characterizable as: 
• management commitment to health and safety; 
• supervisor commitment; 
• norms surrounding compliance with rules and procedures; 
• risk taking behaviour, and 
• incident reporting.   
 
Note:    Most organisations use commercially available off-the-shelf safety climate measures.  An inherent 
limitation of using generic question sets is that they may fail to capture employee perspectives on 
important variables within the organisation.   
 Recognition of this has led to a small number of organisations / sectors developing their own 
bespoke measures.   
 
Why conduct employee surveys? 
When appropriately interrogated, safety climate survey output can provide insight into a range of recognised 
precursors to failure.  Where weaknesses are apparent, this insight can usefully inform and direct thinking 
over priorities for improvement, not just by topic but also by employee demographic.  Effective application can 
support profiling and comparison of different demographics e.g. work-sites / functions / staff grades / parallel 
workforces.  As with audits, arising insights can be used to inform senior management thinking over the merits 
of a segmented, bespoke approach to intervention, e.g. by site, or staff grade, avoiding the waste that can 
arise from a one-size-fits-all strategy.   
 
Output is of relevance to the following: 
• Senior managers / Board level - to provide feedback on prevailing health and safety norms (typically, 
relating to infrastructure, equipment, work organisations and management style as well as behavioural 
components), the profile of which can be interpreted through reference to published guidance on good 
practice in maintaining risk control.   
• Site managers - site-specific data can be particularly useful in organisations with multiple sites, where a 
range of different health and safety cultures may be present.   
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16.1.2.3 Audits and climate surveys - Reflections on practice (see Annex C) 
A key consideration relates to whether the intent is to use the results as a passive monitoring measure of 
change over time, or to actively use the output to inform decision-making over priorities for improvement and 
as a benchmark against which to assess change.  Most organisations have objectives on each. 
It is generally more appropriate to deploy audits at a higher frequency than climate surveys.  A number of 
proponents of behavioural safety techniques, for example, recommend data gathering as often as once per 
shift, or multiple times per week.  Under most circumstances the appropriate frequency for climate surveys 
would not be greater than once in any 12 month period. 
Auditing techniques are better suited to monitoring the impact of improvement interventions (potentially 
referenced to KPIs) than climate surveys as, when appropriately configured, audit output has the potential to 
be more objective than climate survey data.  However, where the output of audits is based upon aggregated 
observations, care is needed to ensure that the data produced is reliable, particularly where audits are 
conducted by multiple observers, i.e. to be considered reliable, auditors need to produce equivalent ratings9.   
A significant limitation of the safety culture/climate perspective is that the area remains underdeveloped, in 
terms of the related science of application and intervention (see Annexes C, D and E). Specifically, it is not 
the shortage of assessment tools that constitutes a primary barrier to the realisation of the potential of such 
approaches, but the scarcity of guidance on their application and the contribution of the evidence produced to 
organisational learning, strategic decision making and intervention to address identified weaknesses. 
While performance measures possess the potential to provide intelligence on who is at risk and in what way, 
they are merely barometers, with the capacity to highlight and monitor ‘hot topics’ or ‘hot spots’ that would 
benefit from intervention and change. As such, they represent the initial stage in the change process, and 
produce no change in and of themselves. 
Measuring employee attitudes, beliefs and behaviour is relatively unproblematic, as is recognising what needs 
to improve.  Change rests with finding ways to technically and/or socially engineer solutions through 
intervention. Translating the output from audits and climate surveys into effective actionable interventions; to 
socially engineer positive cultural change, however, remains a very challenging objective and an under-
developed area (see Section 5.0; Part 3 and Annex C, D, & E). 
16.2 TECHNIQUES FOR PRIORITY ELICITATION 
 
A limitation of safety climate measures is that they provide no indication of the relative priority/importance of 
the variables measured, i.e. although the output gives a positive or negative rating for, say, management 
commitment or compliance with rules, it offers no indication of which element respondents regard as the bigger 
risk to the organisation's future. 
An array of techniques for capturing employee perspectives on priorities for risk management attention and 
improvement are encountered.   
Functionally, these can be characterised through reference to three typologies: 
1. techniques designed to achieve consensus (e.g. Delphi);   
2. relative ranking of priorities (e.g. direct ranking; Q-sort; paired comparisons) and   
3. subjective rating scales (high – low ratings, e.g. 1 to 5 scales). 
 
The output from these exercises tends to be used to: 
• prioritise threats, e.g. as part of the development of a risk register; 
• set priorities for safety management investment, and 
• set local priorities for improvement, e.g. at plant or work unit level. 
 
The choice of technique depends upon the intent of the exercise, but important considerations relate to their 
respective strengths and weaknesses (Box 6).   
 
 
9  Techniques are available to test inter-auditor agreement – see Duff et al, 1999. 
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Box 6 
 
 Widely applied priority ranking techniques 
 
Subjective rating scales - typically taking the form of a statement against which respondents are 
asked to indicate their degree of agreement or magnitude of importance etc.  They tend to be the 
most widely deployed technique, due to their intuitive simplicity, speed and ease to complete. 
Attempts at combining the output from multiple scales, through addition, multiplication, e.g. probability 
(P) x magnitude of consequence (C), as is commonly applied in risk assessment, can produce 
misleading results (P5 x C1 and P1 x C5 produce a common value (5), but are materially different); 
attempts at weighting risk introducing further opacity and error. 
Rating scales are also, prone to eliciting extreme (ceiling and floor) effects, i.e. respondents are prone 
to over use the highest or lowest value on the scale, with a strong disposition to select the highest 
rating when contemplating hazards that could produce catastrophic impacts. This is because people 
are prone to focus more on consequences than probability. 
 
Consensus techniques - e.g. Delphi.  Although widely applied to establish agreement over priorities 
amongst specialists and managers, a degree of caution should be exercised.  Being designed to 
achieve consensus (routinely where this has already proved difficult, e.g. where an issue is 
contentious) such techniques are designed to engender social conformity.  Typically, participants are 
asked to produce their own independent rating / ranking, followed by participation in a facilitator-led 
interaction (face to face or on—line) with other members in order to agree a group rating / ranking.   
In situations where achieving consensus is a necessary barrier to achieve an agreed way forward 
they can be useful.  However, in other situations the tendency to engender groupthink10 (a shared 
world view) may mean that important safety critical considerations are underplayed or omitted, i.e. 
the process tends to suppress rather than encourage critical voices; which is in some tension with 
what is claimed to be a core characteristic of high reliability organisations (see Part 3).   
 
Ranking techniques – Simple (direct) ranking: asking specialists or managers to place a set of 
alternative priorities in order of importance, a > b > c etc., at face value presents as simple and easy 
task.  However, where people are asked to rank more than three or four entities (particularly where 
these are complex multi-faceted issues, as is often the case within the safety/risk arena) this can 
induce high cognitive load (i.e. participants find it difficult).  Problematically, the reproducibility 
reliability11 for larger item sets can be low, particularly around the mid-range (i.e. the probability of 
eliciting the same response twice may be low). 
   
Consideration also needs to be given to whether the ranking task is performed alone, in groups, 
before any discussion of the constituent entities, or afterwards.   
 
More sophisticated ranking techniques, such as Repertory grid (Kelly, 1955), Q-sort (Stephenson, 
1935) and the method of Paired comparisons (Thurstone, 1927) address most of the weaknesses of 
direct ranking.  The method of paired comparisons affords the unique advantage of providing an 
interval rather than an ordinal output, i.e. proportionately, how much more important one item is 
considered to be relative to its neighbours on a simple linear graphed representation. 
 
 
Irrespective of the technique selected, the output can (and, under a wide range of circumstances, should) be 
significantly enhanced through gathering supplementary, qualitative evidence, aimed at eliciting the rationale 
of participants performing the ranking / rating task, i.e. while the ranking task can provide insight into the 
relative salience of the issues being considered, it is routinely also useful to gather information on their 
underpinning rational. 
 
 
10 Groupthink - see Janis, 1972. 
11 Reproducability reliability – the potential for an individual to produce the same rank order if they repeated the task 
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17 SETTING AN AGENDA FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 
As in other sectors, the setting of priorities for control and improvement within the major hazards domain 
routinely reflects a mix of internal and externally imposed (e.g. regulator, stakeholder, structural or market-
inspired) topics and issues12.  Reflecting the principles of organisational learning, our focus is on the former.  
However, the following material on intervention design is equally applicable to the latter. 
While establishing systems for intelligence gathering, via the development of a comprehensive set of 
appropriate lead and lag indicators, offers organisations the capacity to benchmark and monitor their risk 
management performance, any arising gain hinges upon what the organisation does (or does not do) with that 
learning.   
It is critical to keep in mind that lead and lag indicator data only constitutes an active part of the risk 
management system when its output is used to inform decision making, i.e. where the information captured 
is put to purposive use, rather than passively monitoring performance.   
As highlighted earlier within the text, functionally, lead and lag indicators are merely barometers.  Their 
contribution to risk management rests with the: 
(i)  quality of data captured (suitability of measures), 
(ii)  quality of analysis (appropriate treatment of data), and 
(iii)  accuracy/appropriateness of interpretation by leaders.   
Common experience is that each of the above is prone to be problematic and there is scope for 
enhancement within contemporary practice. 
 
17.1 ESTABLISHING A RESILIENT CASE FOR INTERVENTION 
The strength of lead and lag indicators lies in providing insight into what, where, who and how much.  
However, they afford little insight into issues of why and what needs to change, that are of core relevance 
to inform the thinking of intervention architects.  This embodies challenges for the safety/risk management 
function in terms of strategy, with respect to:  
(i) how best to go about gathering insight into why issues (e.g. engagement with employees, review of 
published research);  
(ii) technically – identifying and designing an effective intervention(s)(reviewing published research 
findings; seeking advice from specialists) – also see Part 3, and 
(iii) effective use of the evidence derived from (i) and (ii) to successfully convince others (senior managers 
/ budget holders within the organisation) of the veracity of the proposed approach(s). 
Deriving insight into why issues through interaction with managers and employees and / or their 
representatives affords an opportunity for workforce involvement and, in most contexts, should be relatively 
straightforward to achieve provided that it is conducted in a manner that encourages free exchange in the 
presence of sufficient mutual trust.   
Having derived this insight, there needs to be the capacity (typically within the human resources / safety / risk 
management function) to distil the amassed evidence from lead and lag indicators, as well as why insights, 
into a format that is accessible to decision makers / fund managers in order to support a convincing case for 
intervention. 
Having identified priorities for change, the configuration of effective interventions rests upon the capacity to 
review relevant human factors and management and behavioural science evidence essentially to determine 
'what works', and transform this into a deliverable format that is a good fit with prevailing, resources logistics 
and relationships within the organisation.   
A notable challenge to discovering what works in this area relates to determining the robustness and reliability 
of the underpinning published evidence.  The breadth of material can be daunting, and spans a range from 
 
12 A notably feature of the early 21
st
 century is the emphasis on themed approach to health and safety regulation / 
improvement by the Health and Safety Executive.       
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rigorous robust scientific evidence (typically published in peer-reviewed journals), to unsubstantiated and 
potentially spurious claims within the grey-literature and some web-based sources.   Material published in 
peer-reviewed journals is potentially more reliable, but tends to be less accessible, both in terms of obtaining 
copies and with respect to the concepts and terminology used - although the former is increasingly less 
problematic with strong drives towards open-access publication.   
Guidance based upon reviews produced by bodies such as the HSE, the National Institute for Care Excellence 
and other government departments / agencies and third sector bodies can be useful aids to navigation in this 
area.  However, the interpretation and application of material from some sources to the work context may 
require a degree of extrapolation, as the largest contribution by volume comes from outside the health and 
safety at work domain, from social policy and, in particular, public health contexts.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FINAL DRAFT PRE-PRINT 
98 
 
18 CONSIDERATIONS WHEN DESIGNING BEHAVIOUR CHANGE 
INTERVENTIONS – THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING IN 
THE WORKPLACE 
 
 
Beyond the traditional risk control domains of exclusion, substitution and engineering control, intervention 
options relate to the design of work and embody the need to engage with a potentially complex array of socio-
technical and psycho-social variables; notably, technology interfaces, leadership style, systems of reward, 
climate and culture. 
While physical solutions to behavioural issues, such as exclusion, interlocks and guarding, reflect strong 
alignment with engineering perspectives, it is apparent that many organisations find the task of addressing 
socio-technical, cultural and psychosocial issues significantly more challenging, not least because the subject 
matter usually lies at the periphery of many safety professionals’ comfort zone.  A more fundamental challenge 
is that the science relating to ‘solutions’ is relatively immature such that it is far from comprehensively mapped. 
The contemplation of intervention options requires engagement with the foreseeable outcomes arising from 
alternative psychology theories of change. It relates to the process of options appraisal and the consideration 
of alternative futures and foreseeable outcomes (see Part 3).  Done well, this involves reference to published 
findings on evaluation evidence to determine what works and suitable consideration of the fit with the 
intended intervention context. 
18.1 THEORIES OF BEHAVIOUR CHANGE 
The concept of ‘theory of change’ relates to the mechanism by which inputs impact on the behaviour of target 
groups and the predicted magnitude of arising effects.  This needs to be rooted in the relevant underpinning 
science (i.e. how strong is the evidence that stimulus X will produce response Y), principally psychological 
and sociological insights on human motivation. Some basic principles are discussed below.     
Robust published evidence will tend to have some theoretical basis, i.e. to account for the underpinning logic 
between inputs and outputs / effects.  This is not to suggest a need to become deeply embroiled in the 
technicalities of social and behavioural science, merely that the selection of alternatives requires a critical 
perspective informed by a working appreciation of basic principles. 
18.1.1 To educate or to motivate? 
Errors and risk-taking can be the product of insufficient or incomplete knowledge - in essence, unintended 
acts - alternatively they can be the product of well-intended / appropriately motivated acts that, simply, resulted 
in unintended consequences.   
While plugging knowledge gaps in employees' mental models of their world (Box 7), via training and education, 
can enhance their perception and understanding of hazards and risks, where individuals are motivated to do 
otherwise, new knowledge is clearly not sufficient in itself to guarantee the desired change in behaviour.   
Education and training play a key role, but organisations are prone to place an over-reliance on health and 
safety education initiatives.  As on other issues, a critical perspective is desirable, to avoid rushing to the 
conclusion that the undesired behaviour is the product of ignorance and that education represents effective 
redress.   
Discovering ways to motivate individuals to behave in ways other than they would naturally has long been a 
panacea close to the heart of employers, and has been a central topic of inquiry within organisational 
psychology and industrial sociology since foundation work in the early 20th century. 
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Box 7 
 
Mental models and cognitive strategies 
The concept of a mental model relates to how human beings make sense of their world, with 
respect to relevant entities and how they interact.  Particularly when faced with complexity, human 
beings are prone to conceptualise features of their world using simpler rules of thumb, based upon 
what they believe to be the most salient elements. 
It is important to keep in mind that even where knowledge is substantially complete, human beings 
are prone to adopt non-systematic strategies for conceptualising (heuristics) their world and the 
phenomena that arise within it, particularly when faced with complexity and / or time penalties, i.e. 
we tend to have hypotheses about how our world works, and appear pre-programmed to be 
receptive to patterns / solutions that (we believe) we are familiar with.   
Most of the time our recourse to heuristic rules of thumb serves us well (they are essential 
characteristic of how we process information).  However, they can also be a source of fallibility, 
particularly where influential groups share a common, but flawed or inappropriate mental model and 
apply a common heuristic(s). For example, managerial understanding in the case of the Nimrod 
disaster. (further examples are apparent in the Columbia, Thorp, Davis Besse, Hatfield and the 
Heathrow incidents discussed in Part 1). 
Recourse to heuristics is not a trait that can be removed or unlearned, rather it is more appropriate 
to institutionally take account of the fact that human beings are prone to applying rules of thumb 
based on what they consider to be ‘the most important variables’ when faced with complexity – or 
where time or resources are short. 
Discovering what people believe about how elements of their world operate (mental models) 
including the mental short-cuts (heuristic rules of thumb) they may use to allow them to 
conceptualise and mentally manipulate what they believe to be salient variables can be illuminating. 
It can thus be useful to test assumptions over how employees make sense of their world and how 
this impacts on their decision making and behaviour in regard to any arising safety implications. 
 
18.1.2 Direct and indirect approaches to behaviour change 
A key distinction between interventions are those aimed directly at individuals, that in essence attempt to 
modify behaviour through altering personal orientation to an otherwise unchanged world, and those that seek 
to change behaviour through alterations to the context (e.g. structure, job design, systems of reward, climate 
culture) in which individuals operate (figure 4). 
In large degree reflecting the regulatory emphasis, in the UK, the dominant tradition within the workplace 
safety domain has been to focus on finding ways to address situational influences on behaviour (e.g. 
machinery guarding / interlocks; permit to work systems; an emphasis on workplace climate to influence 
cultural norms).  This reflects the theoretical premise that changes to the environment in which people operate 
will nudge desired behaviour / sponsor positive behaviour change.  It is also characterisable as an extension 
of the traditional engineering model of risk control to behavioural elements. 
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Figure 4: Direct and indirect pathways to behaviour change 
 
This contrasts with non-workplace perspectives on behaviour change (e.g. public health and environment 
greening behaviour agendas) where the dominant emphasis has been on the individual as the focus for 
change, through finding ways to influence personal disposition in relation to risk; under most circumstances, 
reflecting the desire to motivate greater caution.  
Note: Direct v indirect approaches - The underpinning theories of change are not just different, they 
are in tension with each other due to different assumptions over the basis for human behaviour, 
accident causation and responsibility for safety (see Annex C). 
 
Recent years have witnessed a rise in the rate of individual focused approaches being applied in work 
organisations, e.g. mentoring senior managers; safety mindfulness training and stress management courses.  
While these can play a role, the pervading evidence is that where applied, in the absence of complementary 
action to address situational influences, impacts on behaviour tend to range from modest to weak (for a more 
detailed discussion see Annex D). 
Deliberations over whether an individual or a situational focus is the more appropriate for a given behaviour 
change agenda can usefully be informed through consideration of the prevailing level of safety culture maturity 
and the related concept of hierarchy of (risk) control, i.e. a  rule of thumb, applicable under a wide range of 
circumstances, would be to defer attention to individual elements until situational influences have been 
addressed.   
A third perspective, that goes some way towards integrating situational and individual traditions has emerged 
over the last decade.  Although primarily writing for a social policy audience, the concept of ‘choice 
architecture’, as articulated by Thaler and Sunstein in their influential text Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009), 
exhibits notable synergy with the concept or workplace climate.  While more accurately described as a 
reinterpretation of established findings, rather than new science per se, these authors highlight how features 
within the physical, technical and social environment interact with recognised predispositions, biases and 
fallibilities that all human beings are prone to exhibit (see examples in Box 8).   
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Box 8 
Examples of commonly encountered decision biases 
 
• Under most circumstances people are averse to loss; but if faced with a certain loss are 
prone to become risk seeking in selecting a long odds option, e.g. the decision at 
Windscale to insert fire hoses to cool the reactor core despite the possibility of an 
explosion. 
 
• Faced with a choice between a tried and tested solution and a new solution, people tend 
to select the familiar option - even where the presenting evidence that it will prove 
effective may be slight. 
 
• When faced with a problem people are prone to explore hunches, rather than adopt a 
systematic approach, particularly where there is a belief that the issue has been 
encountered previously.  Routinely this strategy is effective, but can lead to important 
issues being overlooked / under considered – to produce failure. 
 
• The tendency to over-interpret a handful of cases of a common type as evidence of 
trend. 
 
• The tendency to focus on frequencies of events of a common type, rather than rates. 
 
• The presence of social norms and group processes engendering conformity effects. 
 
• A preference for immediate reward rather than gains in a more distant future.     
 
• A disposition to choose a certain (possibly) smaller reward in the near future rather than 
the promise larger, but less certain, reward in the future. 
 
• Aversion to guaranteed loss (e.g. stopping production due to safety shortfalls) – relative 
to a cognitively more distant low probability of failure. 
 
 
 
A central premise (and one that is at risk of over-promising within Thaler and Sunstein’s account), is that the 
secret to socially engineering behaviour change lies in finding ways to configure the environment and options 
within it in ways that take account of known human decision making strategies and fallibilities, such that the 
desired behaviour becomes the natural default. 
Thaler and Sunstein (and other authors aligned with this perspective) almost certainly overplay the ease with 
which positive environments (choice architectures) can be engineered, and are at risk of underplaying the 
extent to which extant, possibly more pervasive nudges might motivate counter behaviour.  Nonetheless, their 
integration of cognitive insights with situational influences under the banner of decision architecture benefits 
from strong intuitive appeal as a means of characterising the interaction between cognitive and situational 
influences on behaviour. 
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The balance of evidence is that effect sizes (magnitude of impact) for interventions and initiatives that focus 
on changing individual orientation alone, within an otherwise unaltered, possibly hostile, socio-technical 
environment, are likely to be smaller than a more embracing approach which extends to modification of the 
world in which employees operate. 
18.2 NOT JUST ‘WHAT’ AND ‘HOW’ - BUT ‘HOW MUCH’? 
A challenge common to any change agenda is identifying / developing suitable measures of impact.  To be 
convincing, these need to be specific and mappable onto tangible, objective outcomes that arise directly from 
the intervention activity, i.e. in contrast to a reliance on highly chance related lag data, the focus should be on 
lead indicators of a type that produce a directly comparable (1:1) relationship between inputs and outputs. 
It is important to keep in mind that theory of change considerations extend beyond selecting an appropriate 
psychology model of influence, to include evidence relating to the magnitude of change, for a defined input 
type and / or resource allocation.  The latter is critical where the amount of change required relates to a defined 
quantifiable goal, e.g. a 5% year-on–year reduction in lost-time accidents, as this proportion requires the 
calculation (estimate - based on published evidence) of the number of individuals who would need to 
participate in order to be confident that the required number of individuals would change their behaviour as a 
result of the intervention (see Box 9). 
 
Box 9 
Magnitude of change considerations 
Use of published behavioural science evidence on relative impact is important when choosing an 
intervention.  
For example, realisation of KPI’s of a 5% rise in rates of near-miss reporting, or a 10% increase in 
employee involvement in risk assessment, requires consideration of published evidence on 
foreseeable metrics of impact associated with a given intervention type/design. 
For an organisation of 1000 employees this means a need to change the behaviour of 50 individuals, 
in the case of near miss reporting, and 100 individuals would need to become more involved in risk 
assessment.  
Let us assume that from our review of published evidence on ‘what works’, we identify two possible 
interventions.  The near miss reporting intervention has been shown to be effective in changing the 
behaviour of ~4% of employee exposed to it.  Similarly, the increased engagement in risk assessment 
has also been shown to change the behaviour of ~4% of employees.    
This is important, because it allows us to calculate for the respective rates of change how many 
employees would need to be exposed to the respective interventions to achieve the respective targets 
of changing the behaviour of 50 and 100 individuals 
This means that 650 individuals would need to exposed to the near-miss reporting intervention in 
order to be confident that 50 will change their behaviour in the desired way and, given that there are 
only 1,000 employees in the organisation, (an unattainable) 1300 to the risk assessment intervention. 
Performing this type of calculation can inform decisions over whether an intervention idea should be 
pursed or abandoned.  For the above examples, our choice of near-miss intervention presents as 
potentially viable, whereas the involvement in risk assessment intervention indicates that either an 
alternative technique that can be predicted to deliver higher rates of impact should be sought, or the 
improvement target should be revised. 
Notice – when considering evidence on what works in intervention selection, it is essential that to go 
beyond what can work to take account of evidence on metrics of predicted impact, i.e. how much? 
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18.3 SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTION DESIGN – REQUIRES MORE THAN SILVER-
BULLETS 
It is important to keep in mind that Interventions can fail due to: 
• Conceptual deficiencies - ill-conceived / inappropriate theory of change (Section 5.1.2 and Annex C, 
D & E). 
• Propagation deficiencies - the scale of activity was insufficient to generate the metrics of change 
required to achieve defined goals, such as key performance objectives (see Box 9). 
 
However, as highlighted in section 21, they can also fail, or be significantly blunted, by counter influences, 
e.g.: 
• incident or near-miss reporting inhibited due to an underlying culture of blame; 
• logistical barriers, e.g. insufficient capacity within the safety function for timely response to hazard 
reports;   
• compliance with rules undermined by shortage of resources;  
• line managers preoccupied realising more pressing objectives, and  
• cultural components, such as micro-political rivalries, competing agendas and more.   
 
For the above, and similar, reasons it is important to consider the logic of how an intervention will operate, i.e. 
what are the structures, mechanisms, processes and relationships that need to be in place to support its 
delivery? (For modelled examples see Part 3.) 
Note: By analogy, in intervention design terms it is perhaps useful to think that the theory of change 
relates to the quest for a silver bullet(s) (informed by published evidence on what works); and the 
intervention logic. as the mechanism for firing the bullet  
 
18.4 INTERVENTION LOGIC MODELLING 
In addition to grappling with the science underpinning theories of change, intervention designers need to 
consider how they will deliver their change initiatives, i.e. logistically, what elements need to be in place in 
order to deliver the intervention.   
Potentially relevant elements include (but are not necessarily limited to): 
• resources; 
• defining staff roles and responsibilities, and 
• recognising and mitigating barriers (e.g. structural, logistical, relational / tribal, counter motivating 
influences). 
 
Routinely, this involves discovering ways to influence not just the behaviour of target group(s) that the 
behaviour change intervention is aimed at, but also the behaviour of those responsible for facilitating the 
intervention (potentially extending to staff who might constitute an obstacle to the roll-out), e.g. health and 
safety professionals, line managers, and supervisors (see Box 10 and Part 3). 
Note: Compared with theory of change elements, to date, the social science evidence base has 
made a very modest contribution to the related science of delivery and making it happen. 
 
Reflecting the central feature of a mature safety culture, effective delivery design requires an inward facing, 
self-critical, evidence informed perspective, in which the principles of risk assessment (the risk of intervention 
failure) are applied, i.e. focused on what could go wrong, rather than a best-case scenario. 
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Box 10 
Systems dynamics modelling of intervention logic 
A key strength of the system dynamics modelling technique detailed in Part 3 rests with its potential 
for: 
• virtual trialling of alternative intervention designs - to inform options appraisal decisions; 
• offering the facility for intervention architects to hone their chosen design, through testing the 
logic of envisaged pathways to change, including detecting unforeseen barriers, perverse 
motivations and other unwanted effects that might threaten the realisation of intervention 
objectives. 
 
Effective intervention tends to be a cyclical and iterative activity, rather than a linear process.  Therefore, 
careful thought should be given to designing-in feedback loops (qualitative and / or quantitative) to test that 
assumptions about how change will occur present as valid (i.e. theory of change - also see Part 3) and that 
defined intermediate delivery objectives, (e.g. how much change by when) are being met.  Where issues that 
threaten the success of the intervention are detected, the intervention may need to be revised and refocused; 
possibly even, abandoned (see Box 11).   
Many, if not most, interventions exhibit weakness in this area. They tend to be under-managed, and under 
evidenced with respect to the achievement of intermediate objectives.  Leaving evaluation to the end of the 
process (which may be months or years after its inception) risks failing to become aware that it is not having 
the desired effect until it is too late to redress the situation.  It is important to avoid discovering, at the end of 
your 12-month intervention that it stopped being effective in month two because, for example, line managers 
would not release their staff to take part.  Such eventualities are not only wasteful of resources, with potential 
negative implications for the safety of individuals and integrity of systems, but can also inflict reputational 
damage upon safety professionals and the safety function.  
For this reason, it is important to devise and map a set of sufficient (qualitative and quantitative) measures 
that provide feedback on progress, related to a set of defined KPIs. 
Thus, an evidence informed approach to intervention purposely gathers data referenced to a set of defined 
intermediate delivery objectives / milestones.  
Doing this is important to provide early-warning in the event that interventions that fail to germinate, drift off 
course, get overtaken by events, or otherwise flounder etc., such that they absorb resources to no useful 
purpose (see Box 12). 
 
Box 11 
 
Performance managed interventions (also see Part 3) 
 
Most health and safety interventions are under-evidenced, particularly in the area of feedback on 
roll-out / delivery effectiveness. 
 
As with incident data, a reliance upon headline impacts (e.g. rates of behaviour change) alone 
constitutes a high risk strategy, if the architects are unsighted regarding precursors to failure.   
 
Designing feedback loops, e.g. qualitative evidence from participating stakeholders, with the 
capacity to support early recognition of barriers and other problems increases the opportunity to 
take ameliorative action. 
 
Effective intervention is more commonly an iterative cyclical process than a linear process 
. 
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Potential points of failure in the roll-out/delivery process are multiple, not least because almost all large scale 
interventions bring with them the need for some degree of organisational change, e.g. new procedures, new 
responsibilities, changes in relationships with others, the cessation of established (possibly highly culturally 
valued) working practices, and similar. 
 
Box 12 
Common reasons why interventions fail 
The range of reasons why workplace health and safety interventions can fail is extensive, but 
includes: 
• insufficient resource, 
• structural barriers, 
• (lack of) cultural readiness for change, possibly extending to active managerial / 
employee resistance, 
• fundamental flaws in understanding of systems / the organisation of work, 
• insufficient understanding of social relationships and 
• incomplete models of exposure to harm 
(Whysall et al, 2006, Nazaruk, 2010) 
 
Note: Organisational change - it is prudent to assume that attempts at significant organisational 
change are likely to be subject to inertia, possibly extending to overt resistance from affected staff, 
at least in the initial period following attempts at their introduction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The intervention cycle 
 
Effective performance managed interventions routinely involve the gathering of a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative evidence to capture progress towards defined milestones, with active use of this feedback to 
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refocus or reconfigure the intervention where necessary (refer to figure 5). Thus, evaluation should to be an 
integral component of the delivery cycle, rather than a summative adjunct to the process.   
Note: Notice that the intervention cycle depicted in figure 5 commences with consideration of the 
required magnitude of the change objectives, i.e. how many individuals does the intervention need 
to make contact with AND critically, based on published evidence, what proportion of this 
denominator can we predict will make lasting changes to their behaviour as a result – see Box 9. 
 
The relative paucity of published evidence and guidance on successful intervention roll-out means that 
organisations are, to a significant degree, left to find their own way and learn their own lessons.  Arguably, 
this increases the need for effective delivery monitoring.  However, common experience is that most 
organisations exhibit significant weakness in this area.  All too often, the approach to intervention is 
characterisable as one of ‘hit and hope’, rather than evidence informed. 
Attempting to conduct an intervention, in the absence of a well-configured plan for monitoring delivery 
performance and progress towards defined objectives, not only risks interventions stalling, drifting off course, 
or even having counterproductive results, it leaves their architects (typically human resources and 
occupational health and safety professionals) vulnerable to detractors, to the extent that this may threaten 
future resource allocations. 
Where possible, monitoring objectives should be defined in terms of outcomes - typically, frequency of a given 
behaviour, or other behaviour-related (antecedent), i.e. auditable end-points - that map onto the planned 
pathway to delivering risk reduction measures. For example, borrowing from the HSE's management standard 
for workplace stress (https://www.hse.gov.uk/stress/standards/), the delivery pathway might relate to the 
proportion of employees who have completed the baseline stress audit questionnaire; the proportion of line 
managers who have engaged with staff over the causes of job-stress; the proportion of departments that have 
implemented job-design changes; their impact on staff job-stress ratings, etc.  Similarly, with respect to 
initiatives designed to increase rates of employee involvement in reviewing risk assessments - the proportion 
of work units that have recruited employee representatives; the number of assessment reviews that employee 
representatives have been involved in, the nature of any changes to working practices as a result, etc.- while 
remaining mindful of the scope for eliciting spurious reporting.  
As alluded to in the preceding paragraph, it is important to keep in mind that options for measurement extend 
beyond rates of behaviour change in the target group itself; other stakeholders typically play a role along the 
path to achieving change.  Monitoring change in these permissioning actors/agencies can provide valuable 
feedback on intervention progress, ideally referenced to defined time-bounded milestones. 
Conceptually, intervention performance monitoring measures are lead indicators, insofar as they relate to 
precursors to failure and provide feedback on success in achieving time bounded milestones.  However, they 
do not need to be exclusively quantitative.  Qualitative evidence can be particularly useful in this area, e.g. 
interviews, focus groups and workshops involving key delivery stakeholders. These can provide essential 
feedback, particularly with regard to identifying barriers and how they night be redressed.  While monitoring 
evidence is a key part of the intervention delivery process, it is important that it is proportionate, and that sight 
is not lost of its primary purpose - to provide learning that enhances intervention resilience. 
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19 CONCLUSIONS TO PART 2 
 
 
An evidence-based, prevention orientated approach to managing behavioural, cultural and socio-technical 
elements in complex systems has strong intuitive appeal as a more informed strategic approach to workplace 
risk management, with potential operational and business benefits.  However, the challenge of realising the 
added-value for occupation safety and health professionals and their employers is significant and 
multidimensional.   
The core challenge relates to maximising learning from past and current performance and using the derived 
intelligence to design effective initiatives and interventions, with the potential to redress identified weaknesses 
and, thereby, enhance resilience. 
This means the adoption of good practice in gathering and interpreting the data captured from lag and lead 
indicators, i.e. the capacity to identify trends and root causes in incident data within the host organisation; 
learning from relevant events in other organisations, complemented by a suite of lead indicator indices, e.g. 
workforce safety climate surveys and behaviour-related audits. Having defined an agenda for change, this 
also means having the capacity to review published findings on ‘what works’, and apply these insights to the 
design and delivery of effective interventions. 
 
When attempting to engage with issues of safety climate / culture that embody socio-technical elements where 
humans interact with engineered systems, human factors, and broader behavioural and social science insights 
are of central relevance. 
 
The challenge, with respect to behaviour change intervention design and delivery for organisations and safety 
professionals, is twofold.  On the one hand, it requires the capacity to adopt a critical perspective to navigating 
through what might be unfamiliar academic and practitioner publication accounts of 'what works'.  On the other 
is the need to grapple with the logistics of successful intervention design and delivery; a topic on which 
relativity little has been written. 
  
For safety professionals, the challenge extends beyond mastery of relevant technical elements. It is 
compounded by the need to convince others of, firstly, the need for intervention and, secondly, of the relative 
merits of alternative intervention options.  Aside from technical shortfalls, many workplace interventions fail, 
simply because their protagonists are unsuccessful in gaining sufficient support at a senior level.  The effective 
use of data and evidence embodies the potential to strengthen the case for support. 
Failure in this area can constitute a source of significant frustration but, more insidiously, can lead to the safety 
function retreating to narrower, less fundamental safety agendas, with the associated risk of trivialisation and 
marginalising of the health and safety function.  It is important that safety and risk-management professionals 
possess sufficient competence in evidence gathering, analysis synthesis and intervention design to convince 
others of the value of their contribution.   
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PART 3 
SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODELLING 
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20 INTRODUCTION TO PART 3 
 
Part 1 outlined the results of a study of twelve important events within a variety of process safety industries 
and identified the common organisational and cultural lessons that emerged.  This concluded with the 
articulation of an extensive set of ‘organisational expectations’ which form good practice and, if met, might 
reduce the risk of significant unwanted events.  
Part 2 looked in more detail at the underlying aspects of organisational learning and the design of associated 
direct and indirect behavioural change interventions.  Many interventions fail because their proponents are 
unable to gather sufficient evidence and successfully articulate the reasons why they believe that they will 
indeed result in improvement.  Crucially, the design of such interventions requires a holistic perspective and 
engaging with emerging psychosocial and behavioural issues.  A lack of capability to do so can result in the 
attraction towards simple, piecemeal, technocratic or superficial quick fixes.  
Part 3 argues that the problematic situation is compounded by the way in which process safety successes 
and failures are modelled.  It outlines the case for alternative approaches that better facilitate the identification 
of the underlying issues mentioned in the previous chapters at a systemic level.  Specifically, it suggests   
causal loop diagrams (CLDs) as a participatory tool that can be used to identify issues and crucially to design 
and explore interventions in a way that seeks to explicitly understand the interacting issues relating to the 
failure to meet organisational expectations.  The final sections outline the theory of CLDs, how they can be 
useful in this context and how they can be created by those working in process safety.  Case study applications 
are described, and the pros and cons evaluated.   
One key strength of CLDs is their ability to make implicit assumptions about causal processes visible in such 
a way as they can be easily critiqued and improved.  The models presented here are intended to give an 
insight into the process of creating CLDs and their potential uses.  As such the reader is invited to reflect upon 
the pathways of cause and effect they represent and consider how they might improve them.   
Reflecting on practice in light of the previously identified ‘expectations’ in Part 1 may naturally lead to the need 
for change within an organisation. This change exists in the context of complex, interactive processes and 
behavioural factors.  An approach is required that avoids ‘quick fixes’, and which allows for systemic corrective 
actions and meaningful performance indicators to be developed.  Through the following sections, Part 3 
demonstrates CLDs as a more effective way of implementing change than traditional approaches.   
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21 HOW WE MODEL ORGANISATIONAL AND PROCESS SAFETY 
FAILURES 
 
 
Models and tools for analysing the causality of events have developed considerably over the last fifty years. 
The theoretical developments can be summarised by separating the approaches into three distinct groups: 
sequential, epidemiological and systemic (Erik Hollnagel and Goteman 2004; Qureshi 2007).  
The earliest simple, sequential models conceived of events as occurring through linear, sequential chains of 
cause-and-effect, often focusing on discrete effects, technical and human failures, and direct chronological 
influences. Examples include fault tree analysis and failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA).  These 
approaches tend to work well for simple, mechanical systems.  They may be described as ‘systematic’ in the 
sense that they are methodical, but they aren’t ‘systemic’ in the sense required by systems theory as they do 
not attempt to model complex interactions that may exist within a system. A HAZOP is systematic.  It rigorously 
decomposes a complex system into its component parts/nodes in order to study them in detail.  However, it 
can overlook interactions between nodes.  Deviating from design intent within a specific node may, for 
example, be tolerable, but this might have severe consequences for other dependent nodes. Such 
propagation through the system is often overlooked (Baybutt, 2015).   
Epidemiological models looked more closely at the role of human behaviour, likening the causality of these 
failures to the spread of a disease. They place a greater focus on latent errors, removed in time and space 
from the final event. These latent errors can create a situation where the system is prone to failure. A tipping 
point or trigger event pushes the system over the edge.  Normal accident theory (Perrow 1984), Swiss-cheese 
model (Reason 1997) and man-made disasters theory (B. A. Turner 1978; B. Turner and Pidgeon 1997) 
conform to this type.  In most cases the application of these theories still takes a linear, sequential, event-
driven view of causality.  
The final, contemporary group are grounded in systemic theory and control. They attempt to combine the 
human, technical and organisational factors focusing more on the interactions of the system, the functions it 
performs and variations in its behaviour, rather than discrete events.  Models developed from this view are 
less widely used in practice. They include acci-mapping (Rasmussen, 1997), functional resonance accident 
model (Hollnagel and Goteman, 2004, Hollnagel et al., 2008) and the systems theoretic accident model and 
process (Leveson et al., 2002, Leveson et al., 2003a, Leveson et al., 2003b, Leveson, 2004).   
The way in which process safety failure events are conceptualised - whether formalised in failure investigation 
and risk management techniques or tacit in the heads of those within the organisation - shape the conclusions 
about the underlying causes of such unwanted events.  A discrete, linear model of process failures will uncover 
discrete causes and lead to discrete, isolated fixes.  This has been identified in practice as the phenomena of 
what-you-look-for-is-what-you-find and what-you-find-is-what-you-fix (Erik Hollnagel 2008; Lundberg, 
Rollenhagen, and Hollnagel 2009).   
The approach used to proactively or reactively conceptualise and manage the risk of adverse events 
shapes the sorts of interventions and actions taken.  
 
21.1 WHY DO WE NEED DIFFERENT APPROACHES? 
 
The dominant sequential and epidemiological approaches (henceforth referred to as the ‘current’ methods), 
while powerful in some contexts and undeniably useful, have several known shortcomings. This section 
summarises these and argues for the complementary use of more systemic approaches.  
The current methods are reductionist (Rasmussen 1997).  Decomposing complex issues and systems into 
separate elements or a sequence of events, errors, malfunctions or failures in isolated components can lead 
to a view of significant unwanted events that exist at the system level as somehow being simple, easily 
remedied problems. The simplification can aid the initial understanding of the facts of the event, but these 
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isolated facts do not necessarily reflect the complexity of the causes in the real world.  Human factors, for 
example, should not be treated as separate from the reliability of physical components; instead a model is 
required that looks at the interactions of these elements. Decomposition can result in losing the understanding 
of the global behaviour of the system (Le Coze, 2005). It has been postulated that safety and risk are emergent 
properties at the system level (Woods and Cook, 2002; Dekker, 2006). The concept of a component being 
safe or reliable, especially a human being, has little meaning out of the specific context within which it sits or 
is being discussed. A component may be safe in isolation or in a certain system, but unsafe in another 
(Leveson, 2004) therefore it must be considered in terms of its interactions and purpose.  
The current methods are based on sequential chains of causality, ignoring feedback (Leveson, 2004). 
The use of sequential chains is a specific type of reductionist decomposition. It still plays an important role in 
organising data, but as with the reduction to components, it produces a simplistic view of causality, inefficient 
for modern complex systems (Hollnagel, 2002; Hollnagel and Goteman, 2004) that overlooks the theoretical 
advances, particularly in the complexity of human error (Reason, 1997, Reason, 1990). Leveson (2011) 
summarised some of the ways in which event chains could be problematic: 
• They do not cover non-linear interactions distant in time and space.  
• They do not cover situations where no component explicitly failed. 
• They do not go far enough in time to capture slow migrations or drift.  
• They do not adequately cope with human decision making and associated mistakes. 
 
Sequential, event-chain based models are also challenging because they force the idea of an initiating root 
cause. The assignment of the root cause is often arbitrary as the stopping rules are subjective and it is always 
possible to find some deeper cause (Kletz, 1994, Leveson, 2004). The frame of reference or paradigm of 
those conducting the investigation can influence the identification of a root cause, with a tendency to stop 
when information becomes harder to find, when a familiar cause is identified, or when a cause with a known 
cure is found (Rasmussen et al., 1990). If the system drifts for structural reasons towards vulnerability and the 
boundary of safe operation, then the identification of a root cause may not solve the problem (Rasmussen, 
1997, p190). 
This influence of sequential chains has been called ‘root cause seduction’ (Carroll, 1995, Carroll, 1998). It 
makes the organisational learning process less effective by encouraging limited isolated fixes.  
Sequential models are said to encourage ‘individual blame logic’ (Catino, 2008) countering the 
documented benefits of ‘just’ or ‘blame free’ operation as highlighted in safety culture expectation 9 (SC9) in 
Part 1 (Section 5).   
The sequential reductionism of the currently used tools fail to model or even acknowledge the role of 
feedback despite it being something particularly important in complex industrial processes and organisational 
systems (Dien et al. (2004, p151).  In the nine-steps for moving forward from error (Woods and Cook, 2002) 
it was suggested that it was possible to ‘tame complexity through new forms of feedback’, but this relies on 
understanding the feedback in the underlying structure of the system.  
Current methods do not address complexity and coupling (Hollnagel, 2008).  Figure shows an 
assessment by Hollnagel (2008) of the current tools in the context of a revised version of Perrow’s (1984) 
complexity/coupling matrix.  The revised model, Figure 6a, renames the horizontal axis from complexity to 
manageability.  Figure 6b then summarises the assessment of the tools and the types of systems they were 
designed for. Root cause analysis (RCA) and the human performance enhancement system, the accident 
evolution and barrier function (AEB) are identified as designed and suitable for loosely coupled, manageable 
systems in the bottom, left quadrant. The ‘Swiss cheese’ model is to the upper left quadrant, suitable for mildly 
coupled and manageable systems such as marine transport and railways.  
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Figure 6a and 6b - Hollnagel's Distribution of Accident Models  (Hollnagel, 2008) 
In the upper right quadrant, suited to the complexity and coupling of nuclear power plants, are the newer 
tools of cognitive reliability error analysis method (CREAM), functional resonance analysis method (FRAM) 
and systems-theoretic accident model and processes (STAMP). 
The current methods are non-contextual and focus on the local level (Reiman and Oedewald, 2007).  
They do not take into account wider factors, such as shifting values (Leveson, 2004). Similarly, the changing 
political and economic landscape can create a culture that rewards short term financial goals (Svedung and 
Rasmussen, 2002) which filters down to the operational level, influencing the drift towards vulnerability. 
Efforts to improve system safety based on models of local features are often negated by people adapting in 
unexpected ways (Rasmussen, 1997) as a result of ‘more distant’ influences.   
The current methods only produce prescriptive reactions (Sterman, 2001, p11).  That is to say they 
tend to result in the creation of new procedures or ways of working that are mandated to prevent the exact 
same event/issue from recurring. This is not always enough when dealing with complex systems (Doytchev 
and Hibberd, 2009).  Prescriptive solutions make the system more rigid and constrain variability. While this 
can solve some problems, the ability to adapt can also solve others. The new paradigm encourages the 
development of systems that can adapt to unforeseen events within the given boundaries. Achieving this 
requires approaches that illuminate the underlying structures in the system.  
The reason for these prescriptive actions stems from the current tools not going far enough to expose or 
explain the reasons for the observed behaviours (ESReDA Accident Investigation Working Group, 2009). 
Senge (1990) suggests that there are multiple levels of explanation in a system, all correct in their own way 
(see figure 7). Importantly though, each level of the hierarchy is a product of the level below.  Patterns of 
behaviour result in the occurrence of discrete events (both desirable and undesirable), but these patterns of 
behaviour are in turn formed by the systemic structures.  These structures could take the form of physical or 
digital process systems, or in an organisational sense they could be formally documented procedures, rules, 
guidelines or standards.  These are intended to produce patterns of behaviour in people in order to produce 
certain outcomes or events.  Focussing purely at the level of events (in isolation or in combination) means 
ignoring the longer-term patterns of behaviour that have created them.  If the patterns of behaviour are 
overlooked it could lead to a conclusion that the events are unpredictable and therefore each simply needs to 
be reacted to once it has happened. Focussing on the patterns of behaviour which produce these events 
leads to the identification of trends, resulting in more understanding responsive approaches and the potential 
to identify leading indicators for a system drifting to a state of increased risk. Hence focussing on this level 
facilitates an approach based more on the anticipation of unwanted events.  Most approaches exist at these 
two levels without giving due attention to what generated those patterns of behaviour in the first place.  
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Figure 7 - Events emerge from behaviours that emerge from systemic structures (Senge, 1990 p52) 
To summarise, there is a tendency to see things as a set of discrete events, a world-view reinforced by tools 
based on linear, reductionist models of cause and effect.  This can lead to a reactive approach to problems 
that results in continual fire-fighting.  These discrete events are just snapshots of a continuum of dynamic 
change forming patterns of behaviour over time.  Understanding these patterns and trends allows a more 
anticipatory approach, planning for likely changes.  But these patterns of behaviour are themselves produced 
by systemic structures.  By understanding these generative structures, it is possible to design interventions 
that fundamentally alter them, and therefore change the patterns of behaviours and probability of unwanted 
discrete events.   
 
Common tools and methods reinforce a way of thinking that makes it hard to analyse the role played 
by underlying systemic structures.  CLDs provide a means to address some of these shortfalls in a 
way that is relatively easy to learn and apply.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Events
(Reactive)
Patterns of Behaviour
(Anticipatory)
Systemic Structures
(Generative)
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22 CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAMS 
 
22.1 WHAT ARE CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAMS? 
CLDs provide a useful way of exposing, capturing and discussing the underlying complex structures of 
causality, facilitating the development of ways to change them or work with them to improve the safety and 
resilience of the system.  They can be created in a similar interdisciplinary team-based way to conducting a 
HAZOP.  They are different, in the sense that they are systemic, but are fundamentally complementary to one 
another’s strengths and weaknesses as discussed in section 21.1.  
CLDs have their origins in a modelling approach called system dynamics, created by Jay Forrester at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the late 1950s (Forrester 1958, 1961). CLDs are visual 
representations of the influence between the variables involved in a particular system or problem situation.   
Variables that influence one another are linked with arrows, labelled to indicate the nature of the relationship.  
In the language of CLDs there are just two different types of arrow.   
Figure 8 shows two variables, A and B, along with the first type of arrow.  The arrow indicates that A has some 
influence over B.  The ‘+’ label on the arrow signifies that a change in variable A will cause a similar change 
in variable B.  That means if variable A increases it will cause an increase in variable B. Similarly, if variable 
A decreases it will cause a decrease in variable B.   
The relationship need not be linear. A small decrease in A may cause a large decrease in B. In fact, this type 
of diagram does not indicate the quantitative nature of the relationship.  In Figure 8 there is no arrow from B 
to A which suggests a change in B has no influence over the value of A. 
The type of relationship from A to B shown in Figure 8 is referred to as a positive relationship, but it is important 
to note that the ‘+’ does not mean variable B will always increase. It can go up or down depending on how A 
changes. It doesn’t mean ‘positive’ in the sense that it is ‘good’ either.  The relationship may be undesirable 
or produce unwanted outcomes.  
 
Figure 8 - Positive Causal Relationship 
Figure  shows a simple example of this type of relationship. As the amount of sunshine increases it causes  
ice cream sales to increase.  If the amount of sunshine decreased, it would cause ice cream sales to decrease.  
 
Figure 9 - Example of a Positive Causal Relationship 
In Figure  the variables A and B are linked by an arrow from A to B labelled with a ‘-‘ sign.  This indicates 
that an increase in variable A would cause a decrease in variable B.  Similarly, were variable A to decrease 
it would cause variable B to increase.  Again, the diagram does not tell us about the scale of the change 
caused and it is important to remember that both A and B can go up and down. The ‘-‘ symbol does not 
mean B always decreases, it just means B changes in the opposite or inverse direction to any change in A.  
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Figure 10 - Inverse Causal Relationship 
Figure  shows a simple example of this type of relationship. As traffic congestion increases it causes a 
decrease in air quality.   
 
Figure 11 - Example of an inverse causal relationship 
Multiple variables can be connected using these two types of causal connection to produce complex networks 
of influence.  Crucially they can form feedback loops. 
Figure  is based on an example by John Sterman (2000). It shows a CLD comprised of three variables: the 
quantity of eggs, the population of chickens and the number of road crossings. There are three positive causal 
connections and one inverse causal connection.  The combination of these three variables and four 
connections produces two feedback loops.   
On the left-hand side, labelled with an R, is a reinforcing feedback loop.   
An increase in eggs causes an increase in chickens and an increase in chickens causes an increase in eggs, 
reinforcing the initial change.  
This loop could also be read in the opposite direction whereby a decrease in chickens would cause a decrease 
in eggs that would in turn reinforce the initial decrease in chickens.  All things being equal, if some external 
force caused one of these variables to change then the change would be reinforced.  
If one variable begins to decline the variables would decline to zero, if one variable were to increase, they 
would both increase exponentially (though of course in reality other factors would have an effect).  
The combination of causal connections on the right-hand side causes a balancing feedback loop (labelled 
with a B).   
The diagram shows that an increase in chickens causes an increase in road crossings, this in turn causes a 
decrease in chickens.  Hence the initiating change in the chicken population is counteracted or balanced.  
 
Figure 12 - Reinforcing and balancing feedback loops 
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There is one more important thing to know about CLDs.  The time between a cause and the resulting effect 
can be very important.  As such, it is useful to indicate on the diagrams where a delay is thought to exist.  
Normally, this is done by drawing two lines cutting across the arrow linking the variables.   
For example, to make it clear that an increase in the number of chickens does not immediately result in an 
increase in the number of eggs, it takes a little while for the effect to occur, the two lines perpendicular to the 
arrow from chickens to eggs is added as shown in Figure .  Similarly, there is a delay between a change in 
the number of eggs and the change in the number of chickens it causes.  
 
 
Figure 13 - Delays between cause and effect 
Delays can be very important.  Imagine trying to get a shower to the correct temperature when there is a delay 
between the changing the dial (the cause) and the water arriving at a different temperature (the 
effect).  Increase the temperature dial, and if nothing happens immediately increase it some more... soon the 
water is too hot! Decrease the temperature dial quickly to compensate...soon the water is too cold!  Even in a 
simple situation delays between cause and effect can cause oscillation around the desired outcome.  
It is easy to overlook feedback loops or underestimate the effects they can have. There is a tendency to 
construct a clean narrative chain where a single cause produces a single effect like a row of dominos.  Reality 
is often messier.   
Complex behaviours can emerge from the interaction of a small number of variables.  Consider, for example 
the structure of a double pendulum, comprised of a weight at the end of a jointed armature.  The structure 
itself is simple, but the trajectory traced by the weight can be complex and seemingly unpredictable.   
Feedback loops are all around us in natural systems and man-made ones. Explicitly identifying them 
can have many benefits. 
 
22.2 How are causal loop diagrams useful? 
 
While they do not provide a solution on their own, CLDs present several advantages that complement the 
previously mentioned challenges of traditional approaches.  
CLDs illuminate underlying causal feedback structures. While common approaches largely focus on 
linear chains of cause and effect, CLDs are explicitly concerned with the formation of feedback loops between 
variables.   
CLDs can be constructed collaboratively. While this is also true of many traditional tools it is nonetheless 
an important feature of CLDs.  In a truly complex system, it is unlikely that any single actor or group will have 
a full and comprehensive understanding of the system in question, and even less likely they will individually 
have insight into all of the available data.  Hence approaches such as HAZOPs are designed to be undertaken 
by diverse groups with multiple viewpoints. There is a large community of practice developing co-production, 
participatory methods for constructing CLDs, albeit beyond the domain of process safety. 
CLDs visually represent otherwise tacit assumptions about causality. Again, while not necessarily 
different from some of the existing approaches, it is important to recognise that CLDs are constructed and 
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explored graphically using just two different types of arrow. Whether built as a group or developed in isolation 
by an individual and then shared with a group, they facilitate discussion and debate about the nature of 
causality within a system.  This helps to address some criticism that current approaches are not conducive to 
effective organisational learning.  Traditional methods can lead to conclusions about what needs to change, 
but are not always useful in communicating to others why those changes are necessary. CLDs provide so-
called ‘white box modelling’ where the internal logic leading to the conclusions is clear.  
CLDs can be quantified and simulated. Though this can be difficult and resource intensive, it is possible to 
use CLDs to run simulations of a system of interest.  This can lead to the identification of feedback related 
effects that are otherwise difficult for humans to recognise.  It also allows for potential intervention strategies 
to be tested before implementation in the real world.  
CLDs allow for the identification of common systemic issues.  Part 1 outlined the strikingly similar 
precursors and underlying factors that contributed to the events studied.  As they seemingly reoccur time and 
time again in different industries each of these common factors, such as lack of contractor oversight or the 
development of an operation fragmented into silos, could be considered as a form of safety archetype - in 
other words, a typical factor in the causation of unwanted events.  Similar archetypal entities have been shown 
to exist at lower levels of the hierarchy shown in Figure 7 in the form of frequently occurring generative 
systemic structures.  These ‘systems archetypes’ are common structures, formed of feedback loops, that have 
been found to exist in many contexts as an underlying cause of failure.  Despite their frequent occurrence, 
these systemic structures go largely overlooked.   
These five features are key to CLD’s ability to facilitate and promote the design of more effective interventions, 
corrective actions and other changes, as well as the identification of meaningful performance indicators.   
The Fifth Discipline (Peter. M Senge, 1990) identifies several such system archetypes, for example the ‘fixes 
that fail’ archetype. Imagine our system of interest is facing a problem that can be measured quantitatively 
and is seen to vary up and down.  Hence, we can treat the ‘amount’ of the problem faced as a variable in a 
CLD. A suggested fix to that problem also exists, and similarly it can be treated as a variable in a CLD.  The 
more the problem occurs (or the worse it gets), the more its corresponding fix is used, as represented by the 
positive arrow in Figure 14.  The fix causes the problem to reduce as represented by the negative arrow in 
Figure 14.  This arrow also means that if the amount of fix is reduced the problem increases. Thus, a simple 
balancing loop is established.  
 
Figure 14 - A problem and a fix balancing loop 
However, sometimes - and perhaps not immediately - the fix being implemented can cause unintended 
consequences.  This might be unimportant, but it might create a whole new problem, or it could even cause 
the very problem we are trying to be fix to increase/get worse. 
If it is the latter, then a reinforcing feedback loop is created as shown in Figure .  This works to counteract the 
attempt to fix the problem.  If the unintended consequences are severe it might even make the problem worse 
than before any fix was attempted.  Hence, we have a fix that has failed. This can occur when we treat a 
chaotic or complex situation as if cause and effect only exists as a simple chain of events without feedback.  
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In such situations it might be necessary to modify the fix so that it doesn’t produce the un intended 
consequences, implement something new to reduce the impact of the unintended consequences, or maybe 
try an entirely different fix.  
 
Figure 15 -The ‘fixes that fail’ archetype 
Figure 16 shows an example of this archetype in practice. A company experiencing an unproductive workforce 
tries to fix the problem by increasing aspirational targets as an incentive. This works in the short term but 
trying to hit the targets has the unintended consequences of increasing sickness and stress within the 
workforce, ultimately decreasing productivity.   An aggressive focus on targets may be at the expense of other 
important matters (as discussed in previous chapters and expanded upon in a subsequent section) and by 
following this the model could be expanded though the addition of variables.  This archetypal structure is 
deliberately kept simple in order to highlight a particular key mechanism.  
 
Figure 16 - An example of the ‘Fixes that Fail’ System Archetype 
Employing CLDs to consider process safety facilitates the identification of such generic problematic structures 
of causality.  Senge identified eight of these generative archetypes, using CLDs, in the context of 
organisational learning (P. M. Senge, 1994): 
1. Limits to growth. 
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2. Shifting the burden. 
3. Eroding goals. 
4. Escalation. 
5. Success to the successful. 
6. Tragedy of the commons. 
7. Fixes that fail. 
8. Growth and under investment.  
Senge’s concept of archetypes has been extended to look at organisational safety archetypes (Marais, Saleh, 
and Leveson 2006).  These archetypes fall into two categories: challenges of maintaining safety and, side 
effects and symptomatic responses: 
Challenges of maintaining safety: 
• Stagnant safety practices in the face of technological advances; 
• Decreasing safety consciousness; 
• Eroding safety goals, and 
• Complacency. 
 
Side effects and symptomatic responses: 
• Unintended side-effects of safety fixes; 
• Fixing symptoms rather than root causes, and 
• The vicious cycle of bureaucracy. 
Additional archetypal structures have been identified from the analysis of events described in Part 1, some of 
which are explored in the subsequent sections of this chapter. These generic structures offer a way to 
understand common structures that produce vulnerability and unwanted events, and a means to communicate 
this through the organisational learning process. The following sections looks at the way in which these models 
can be built using investigation teams, as is the case with the current tools.  
Finally, once identified, CLDs provide a means to design and test corrective actions to remove or 
counteract their outcomes.    
CLDs provide a means to collaboratively identify, construct, communicate and remedy potentially 
archetypal underlying structures of feedback that result in emergent unwanted events or conditions.  
 
22.3 HOW ARE CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAMS CREATED? 
 
This section provides a process through which CLDs can be constructed.  There are essentially two ways in 
which a CLD can be created: 
1. by an individual/team with expertise in the modelling approach based on written documents (including 
transcribed interviews), and 
2. co-created with those involved in the situation of interest with facilitation by an individual or team with 
expertise in the modelling approach – known as group model building (GMB). 
These two approaches could be applied to historic situations, ongoing investigations or as routine processes.  
In all cases the general process is similar as extensively outlined in texts such as Business dynamics 
(Sterman, 2000) and Strategic modelling and business dynamics (Morecroft, 2007) among others.  The 
generic process will be outlined via the following examples.  
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22.3.1 Method #1 - Constructing CLDs from historical texts 
We can begin to construct a model by analysing existing documents. For example, the paragraph below is 
from the earlier ‘reporting and learning’ section in section 10 of this report:  
‘There should then be sufficient competent resource to ensure that the learning which emerges 
is distilled and communicated in an intelligible, prioritised and relevant way to those where it will 
be of value. If this is not achieved there is a danger that because material is not directly relevant, 
'overload' of information may occur and recipients may not recognise and act on findings which 
are relevant to their activities.’ 
A chain of cause and effect can be inferred from this text, but the first step requires the identification of suitable 
variables that will form the building blocks of our model.  ‘Competent resources to distil learning’ is a 
quantifiable variable pertaining to the organisation in question.  Some interpretation is required as to how best 
to name this variable as there needs to be an indication of what specific resources are being discussed. The 
sentence also states there is a point at which it is sufficient and by implication, a value at which these resources 
are insufficient.  This variable has a causal influence on the ‘relevance of learning material’.   This variable 
could implicitly include intelligibility of learning material, prioritisation of learning material, communication of 
learning material, or these could be included as separate variables in their own right.  If we were to represent 
this relationship using the syntax of a CLD it would look like Figure 17.  A blue arrow with a ‘+’ symbol at the 
head shows how an increase in Competent resources to distil learning causes an increase in the relevance 
of learning material.  This Figure equally shows that were the competent resources to distil learning to 
decrease, it would cause the relevance of learning material to also decrease.  
 
Figure 17 - Competent resources and learning material fragment 
The next sentence starts with ‘if this is not achieved’ implying a further causal relationship.  The next variable 
might be ‘overload of Information’ and from the sentence we can construct a causal relationship with the 
‘relevance of learning material’ using the CLD syntax (Figure 18).  The red arrow with a ‘-‘ sign at the head 
attempts to show that as the ‘relevance of learning material’ increases it causes the ‘overload of 
information’ to decrease.  Again, this could equally be read to represent the scenario where a decrease in 
the ‘relevance of learning material’ causes an increase in the ‘overload of information’.  
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Figure 18 - Relevance of learning material and overload of information fragment 
At this point it might be of value for those involved in the system under discussion to reflect on whether the 
model sufficiently captures the underlying system of causality or whether additional variables are required to 
clarify.  There is a lot implied in the red arrow at present, and while this helps to keep the model simple, it 
might benefit from additional variables to explicitly show what is thought to be occurring.  Alternatively, while 
‘relevance of learning material’ emerges neatly from the text it might help the clarity of the model to flip the 
variable on its head and call it ‘quantity of irrelevant learning material’.  The model would then look as 
shown in Figure 19, with the arrows flipped to match the variable change.  This arguably becomes more 
intuitive while maintaining the essence of the extracted quote.  
 
Figure 19 - Alternative variable naming 
There is one final clause in the above paragraph relating to recognising and acting on the findings.  For the 
sake of this example the variable name will be kept aligned with the original text, though as above some 
interpretation might result in a more intuitive model.  The variable ‘ability to recognise need to enact change’ 
is added to the model and the model builder reflects on how this is causally influenced by an ‘overload of 
information’. This gives rise to the third arrow shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20 - Ability to enact change fragment 
The visual layout of the model is starting to imply a feedback loop, but this is somewhat artificial. With the 
information available on the extracted paragraph these variables could have just as easily be set out in a 
straight line. There is nothing in the text to suggest the ‘ability to recognise and need to enact change’ has 
any influence on the amount of ‘competent resources to distil learning’.  It might take the addition of many 
more variables before any feedback loops begin to emerge.  Though, of course, this could equally prompt a 
dialogue around whether or not there is a causal influence that would close this loop. Over time, would a 
reduction in an organisation's collective ability to recognise the need to enact change have any impact on its 
competent resources available to appropriately distil learning material? 
22.3.2 Method #2 Group Model Building (GMB) 
Historically, system dynamics models and CLDs have been applied in a consultant/client dynamic (Forrester, 
2007) where a specialist consultant in system dynamics/CLDs would be employed by a client organisation to 
construct the model on their behalf.  This can hinder successful intervention design as those not involved in 
constructing the models may not believe or trust them (Lane, 1992). Partially in response to this there has 
been increasing focus over the past 20 years on GMB, or in other words involving everyone directly in the 
modelling process rather than relying on an external specialist.  
GMB has emerged as a methodology for not only gathering data from people, but capturing their experience 
and subjective interpretations of the causality present in the system (Vennix et al., 1992, Vennix, 1995, Vennix, 
1999). It allows for the integration of a wider selection of stakeholders with different backgrounds and 
perspectives. Groups are more likely to question one another, and although there is a risk of ‘group think’ (see 
Part 1), GMB is more likely to be wider reaching than modelling performed by an individual. GMB also makes 
the participants discuss their otherwise implicit assumptions regarding causality (Vennix, 1999), and it has 
been shown that groups are better at filtering out false information compared to individuals (Shaw, 1932 cited 
in, Richardson et al., 1989).  
Several different approaches to GMB have been developed within the field of systems dynamics, ranging in 
formality. Some advocate presenting a group with a prebuilt model and allowing them to discuss and refine it; 
others recommend collaboratively constructing models step-by-step (Richardson et al., 1989).  
The first stage in the process, eliciting information, can be achieved using documented sources or 
knowledgeable people (who may be members of the model building group). This stage can cause problems 
for groups, who have a tendency to elicit less information than individuals (Richardson et al., 1989). A hybrid 
solution is therefore preferable whereby individuals are encouraged to work independently at times in this 
stage before feeding back to the group. This is referred to in GMB literature as an example of ‘divergent 
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thinking’ (Andersen and Richardson, 1997 p5). This is followed by a convergent thinking process in which the 
group collectively analyse the output of the divergent tasks to discuss assumptions, filter false information and 
group common suggestions. 
A review of published GMB experiences found most implementations of this approach involved groups with 5 
– 12 participants spending between 12 and 25 hours (Rouwette et al., 2002). There was also considerable 
variation over the size of the models (from 6 variables to over 1000 variables) and no consensus as to an 
optimum size. 
According to the experience of Richardson et al. (1992), there are five key roles required for effective GMB: 
1. The facilitator – elicits knowledge, constructs model; 
2. The content coach – analyses the model, draws out assumptions, clarifies;  
3. The process coach – manages the dynamics of the group; 
4. The recorder – makes notes to expose the thought processes of the group, and 
5. The gatekeeper – organises and manages the model building project. 
The roles do not necessarily need to be conducted by five separate people. The facilitator needs to be a 
chairperson promoting the sharing of alternative views as well as a specialist in system dynamics/CLD 
construction. Arguably they should be more concerned with the process than the content (Vennix, 1999). As 
a result, they will often be the person controlling the software or drawing the models.  
 
 
22.4 HOW CAN CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAMS BE USED FOR PROCESS SAFETY? 
 
This section outlines three example case studies of CLDs based on the previous sections.  The first uses a 
combination of historical documents and GMB.   The following case studies highlight some of the advantages 
of the CLD tool such as their ability to make visual and explicit otherwise tacit assumptions about causality, 
the collaborative processes through which they are created and their focus on the feedback loops formed 
between causal factors.   They will also illustrate some causal structures that potentially underpin the common 
issues underlying process safety events described in the previous sections.  
The application of CLDs is by no means limited to the approaches or issues described in these case studies. 
The case studies look at elements of oversight and scrutiny, incentives and indicators and, contractors and 
supply chain management.  Other themes which may benefit from such an approach include initiative 
overload, over complexity and bureaucracy, management of major organisational change, staffing reductions 
in vital support functions, and insidious decline in capability. 
22.4.1 Case Study #1 – Safety culture and oversight  
Part 1 introduced important issues around the themes of safety culture, oversight and scrutiny, the business 
environment and communications that had seemingly contributed to many diverse events.  This case study 
outlines the use of CLDs in the context of both understanding a specific event and the complexity and value 
of the emergent expectations reported earlier. The model described here is one of several constructed by 8 
people in a one-day workshop. Six of those present had no prior experience with CLDs, two performed the 
role of facilitator and content coach.  
The process began with the participants, having read the historical reports into the event, identifying the 
variables they believed to be influential in the degradation of safety at the facility in question and therefore the 
evolution of the incident.   
Participants were instructed to not limit their suggestions to variables they knew were measured by the 
industry, or even those they knew how to theoretically measure.  Participants were encouraged to work in a 
‘divergent mode’, thinking as broadly and creatively as possible, noting as many potential variables as they 
could on post-it notes.  These were then discussed collectively and developed into a refined set.   
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Table 12 gives an indication of this process by showing some of the original variables in the left-hand column 
and the final variables used after discussion in the middle column. The right-hand column provides some 
additional information.  This selection of variables helped to define the initial boundary of the analysis.   
Table 12 Original participant suggestions 
 
Original participant 
suggestions  
Modified  Notes 
Workforce (i.e. size of, number 
of) 
Workforce 
The quantifiable total number of people 
employed by the organisation in 
question.  
Resources (people) 
Sufficient resources (people and 
budget) 
Operator knowledge 
SQEPs 
The quantifiable subset of the workforce 
who are ‘suitably qualified and 
experienced’ (SQEP) for the task under 
investigation.  
Right people 
Experienced staff 
Capability (skills/knowledge) 
Competence – training of 
operators 
Process change control 
Compliance 
It is important to notice that ‘procedural 
adherence’ was grouped as an initial 
suggestion under the heading of 
‘compliance’ This is important because 
‘adherence to procedures as written’ 
was used as a variable in one of the 
models.  
Procedural adherence 
Reviewing operational 
procedures 
Qualification checks 
Conformance to procedures 
Safety case procedures 
compliance 
Safety information 
Safety culture 
‘Safety’, ‘safety information’ and ‘safe 
operation’ are not strictly encapsulated 
by the term ‘safety culture’ though they 
may be a product of it or contributor to 
it. It was felt that the degree of ‘safety 
culture’ was an important measurable 
stock and therefore quantitatively at 
least was a more tangible term than 
‘safe operation’ etc.  
Safety culture 
Safety 
Safe operation 
 
Following discussions between the workshop participants a set of ‘policy variables’ were identified. These are 
variables which affect the system of interest, but which arise from outside its control. For example, the 
business environment, and the relevant industry regulator were all perceived to control variables that would 
impact upon the system of interest.  For example:  
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• Frequency of orders – The number of times in a given period that the organisation in question was 
contracted to produce a product. 
• Commercial pressure – The impact of competitors on the organisation in question which in this 
instance was quantified on a dimensionless scale from 0 to 100. 
• Regulatory oversight - This was conceived as the number of visits or inspections to the production 
facility owned by the organisation in question in a given period.  This could be an external or internal 
regulatory function. Indeed, in the event in question, both played a role, but each has different 
requirements which may or may not be important.  
The first two of the variables above in particular highlight that, despite being discussed here as illustrative of 
issues relating to oversight and scrutiny, these were far from the only or even the most significant factors in 
the actual causation of the event in question.  
Additional variables emerged during the modelling process. Three separate models were constructed, though 
they shared a common set of variables.  When combined they produced the rather complex model shown in 
Figure 21.   
Figure 21 - A caveat: Despite the initial sense of confusion the following image might produce, it is in fact 
possible to extract key elements from this which the subsequent sections attempt to articulate.  The reader 
need not dwell on this model or attempt to understand it at this stage, it is presented for completeness. To not 
present this model would be to imply an artificial degree of neatness which only arises at a later stage in the 
process. It is important to acknowledge that any extracted or simplified diagram is still in reality part of a much 
more complex whole. Simplifying before understanding the full extent of the complexity is to be avoided, hence 
the inclusion here.  
 
Figure 21 - Complete model from group model building workshop 
 
This collective model was refined and used as the basis to extract a series of simpler models showing 
selections of feedback processes that were thought to be influential in the development of the event.   One 
such extracted model aims to capture the following issue: The regulator (which in principle could be a 
regulatory function internal to the operating company or an external government regulator) held a 
perception of the safety of the process system that may have been significantly influenced by the 
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number of event reports coming from the organisation. Both parties’ assumptions and mental models 
may not match the reality, as fewer event reports did not necessarily mean increased safety. The 
process, as those in the workshop felt the organisation in question and the regulatory function perceived it to 
be, is shown in Figure .  In this Figure the arrows are numbered as this provides an opportunity to explore in 
more detail how to read or interpret a CLD.  
 
 
Figure 22 - Simplified 'mental model' CLD 
The model features two feedback loops: a reinforcing loop at the top labelled with an image of a snowball 
rolling down a hill, and a balancing loop at the bottom labelled with an image of balanced scales/see-saw.  A 
model like this can be ‘read’ in several different ways. An initial narrative can be formed by selecting a variable 
and tracing the consequences through the model.  It does not matter which variable is chosen or how it is 
changed, the model is capable of representing any situation.   
In Figure 22, numbers have been added to each arrow to help illustrate a potential narrative.  It begins by 
seeing what would happen if ‘safety culture’ within the organisation were to change.  If it were to decrease, 
the model suggests through arrow (1) that it would cause the level of ‘questioning attitude’ within the 
organisation to also decrease.  The model does not tell us the scale with which it would decrease (deteriorate).  
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This decrease in ‘questioning attitude’ may cause the ‘quality of procedures’ to decrease, presumably as 
a result of poor-quality procedures no longer being as frequently questioned and improved.  The model does 
not tell us the time frame over which this change may happen.  This connection between safety culture, 
questioning attitude and the quality of procedures relates to SC13 in Part 1, Section 5.  
As the ‘quality of procedures’ decreases, arrow (3) suggests this would result in ‘compliance’ decreasing 
(linked to SC16).   
Arrow (4) is the first inverse causal relationship encountered.  As ‘compliance’ decreases it would cause the 
number of ‘unauthorised changes’ to increase (alongside other potential issues such as such as 
inappropriate operational waivers, SMS2 (Section 8), or other causal non-compliance factors).  This is 
arguably tautological, and it would certainly be possible to simplify the model by including ‘compliance’ or 
‘unauthorised changes’.  However, the group involved in constructing this model decided to include both to 
maintain clarity within the model.   
Arrow (5) is the first causal link to explicitly include a delay, indicated by the two lines through the arrow.  This 
suggests that as the number of ‘unauthorised changes’ increases, it causes the ‘normalisation of 
unauthorised changes’ to increase over a longer time frame than the other changes in the model.  In other 
words, the more unauthorised changes that occur, the more the workforce considers such activity as a normal 
part of operations.  As this increases it would cause ‘complacency’ to also increase (arrow 6) which would in 
turn cause the level of ‘safety culture’ to decrease (arrow 7). 
Hence a reinforcing loop is formed whereby any decrease in safety culture results in a series of consequences 
that ultimately causes safety culture to decrease even further.  Were safety culture to increase (improve) it 
would similarly reinforce this change, setting into action a series of changes through the feedback loop that 
would cause safety culture to further increase.  
At this point it is worth briefly returning to the idea of a delay mark and what this may illustrate about the pros 
and cons of CLDs.  Firstly, it is perfectly reasonable to make the case for delays on other arrows. Procedures 
can take a long time to change, so the influence of a questioning attitude on this may well be worthy of a delay 
mark.  This highlights something often presented as a strength of such models.  Figure 22 represents the 
output and beliefs of a particular group of people. Their assumptions and thoughts are explicitly visualised in 
the CLD facilitating such critiques as the placement of arrows and delay marks.  Secondly, as a draw-back of 
the approach, the standard syntax of CLDs only allows for a delay or no delay to be indicated, there is no 
simple way of visually depicting a variable delay or delays of different lengths in the same model.  
In describing the model above, the narrative began by imaging an initial change in safety culture but this need 
not be the initiating change.  Some external factor not shown in Figure 22 could result in the quality of 
procedures improving, and the effects of this could be traced through the model as above.  Or some external 
factor could cause complacency to increase and so on.   
Starting again at ‘safety culture’ we can trace the effects of the second feedback loop.  If it were to decrease 
then the results would propagate through arrows (1) to (4) as above resulting in the number of ‘unauthorised 
changes’ increasing.  Arrow (8) implies that this rise in ‘unauthorised changes’ would cause an increase in 
the number of ‘reportable events’ as an unauthorised change is, in this regulatory set-up, reportable to the 
regulator.  Naturally this would in turn result in an increase in the number of ‘reported events’ (arrow 9).  As 
the regulator received more of these event reports it would cause ‘regulatory oversight’ to increase as shown 
by arrow (10).  Again, this could be conceived as internal or external regulatory scrutiny, though each would 
have different reporting requirements and different legal consequences.  Arrow (11) then suggests that this 
scrutiny from the regulator may in turn cause the ‘management commitment to safety’ within the facility to 
increase.  The increased ‘management commitment to safety’ would act to drive down ‘complacency’ 
which would in turn cause ‘safety culture’ to improve (see L12 in section 4.1).  Thus, this outer feedback loop 
counteracts the initial change.  It is a balancing loop.  It depicts the mechanism by which the regulator puts 
right declining standards within the organisations they oversee.   
Figure shows the situation as it was perceived to exist by the regulator and the company being regulated.  It 
was their shared mental model (see Box 7) and a situation from which they may well have drawn comfort.  
Should standards slip there was believed to be a process through which it would be put right.  
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However, the reality is closer to Figure  with an additional variable, the ‘fraction of events reported’.  As 
unauthorised changes and innovations to the approved processes become normalised, the fraction of events 
that get reported goes down.  This sets up a second reinforcing loop.  As presented, the models do not provide 
any insight into which of the two competing feedback loops will be most influential.  It might be that the 
balancing loop is still capable of alerting the regulator to the declining safety.  Alternatively, the second 
feedback loop could mean that the regulator is not alerted and the management themselves essentially 
become complacent based on an erroneous belief that the regulator would have intervened had standards 
slipped too far.  There may be a feeling that the initial risk-laden non-compliance decision has ‘paid off’ without 
the potential negative consequences occurring and a sense of ‘getting away with it’ as it has gone unnoticed.  
With this, production can become an increasingly high priority to the detriment of process safety.  
   
 
Figure 23a and 23b - Mental model versus reality  
This reflects issues postulated within the ‘incubation period’ of man-made disasters (Turner and Pidgeon, 
1997, p73) and provides a structural account of how the system (especially the relationship with the regulator) 
allowed or encouraged these changes. This also has similarities to the ‘erosion of safety’ archetype (Marais 
et al., 2006), the drift in safety consciousness identified in the Columbia accident (Dulac et al., 2005, Leveson 
et al., 2006), and even (in structure but not in meaning) the ‘flirting with disaster’ model identified from Salge 
and Milling’s (2006) Chernobyl investigation.  
This simple model also helps contextualise some of the expectations outlined in Part 1. For example, section 
13.2.1 discusses the importance of ‘auditing and more holistic scrutiny’ rather than just relying on passive 
reporting methods: 
‘A further important role is to challenge the view that confidence in continued good performance 
is justified by past success. Thus those carrying out O&S should remain alert to evidence of  
'organisational drift' and should ensure that business and corporate leaders are helped to 
maintain awareness of the 'reality' of how operations are being carried out and the associated 
organisation and culture. This should be made apparent even when there may be real or 
perceived pressure to conform to the accepted view. 
For some events studied, it was found that organisations had become insular and did not properly 
consider industry good practice and the findings from previous relevant events. This can indicate 
a weak safety culture. Those carrying out O&S should thus have the competence to identify and 
respond to deficiencies in safety culture and to ensure that learning opportunities are being 
taken.’ 
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22.4.2 Case Study #2 – Incentives and indicators 
The previous two Parts described the need for a combination of lagging and leading indicators, noting 
strengths and weaknesses.  Data around significant events can, for example, be based on data sets too small 
to show any meaningful statistical trends.  Data concerning smaller scale events or near-misses might be 
more plentiful, but is also more susceptible to reporting bias and perceptions over the apportion of blame (and 
may also have no causal relationship to the occurrence of significant events). 
Method 1 was used to create the CLD shown in Figure 24.  The model features 11 variables forming 7 
feedback loops.  The key variable, shown on the right-hand-side, is the ‘risk of unwanted events’.  Naturally, 
the desire is to minimise this variable.  The model depicts a scenario where two financial incentives are used 
to help achieve this. These are highlighted in black boxes.  At the top right is a variable representing a 
‘financial reward for achieving good performance in period’.  In other words, this is something of economic 
worth (e.g. end of year bonus, a prize, raffle entry, charity donation, etc.) awarded if the organisation does not 
experience any (or below a threshold) unwanted events in the given period of data collection (e.g. financial 
year, calendar year, month, operating period, etc.).     
The total amount given would, in this instance be influenced by the number of ‘logged non-compliance 
events’ in the same period.  These represent a lagging indicator as it is only possible to gather this data once 
an event has occurred.  An increase in the ‘logged non-compliance events’ causes the ‘financial reward 
for achieving good performance in period’ to decrease.  So, in this model it is a sliding scale. The fewer 
events recorded in a period, the higher the reward.  It is of course important to acknowledge that the bonus is 
only based on reported events, not the actual number of events (which may or may not be different).  As set 
out in this model, those administering the bonus, and presumably those in charge of the system, do not have 
sufficient oversight to know the true number of events.  They rely entirely on what is reported to them.  Rewards 
such as these need to be carefully formulated (see 4.2.5). 
The intended effect of this bonus is shown by reinforcing loop 2. The offer of a bonus causes ‘safe 
behaviours’ to increase which in turn causes the ‘risk of unwanted events’ to decrease and therefore the 
‘logged non-compliance events’ to also decrease.  There is a question over whether such a crude bonus 
will have this affect on ‘safe behaviours’ (hence the dashed line) and whether it will sufficiently counter any 
‘disincentives’.  
Linked to this is a potential unintended side-effect illustrated by balancing loop B1.  An increase in the 
baseline ‘financial reward for achieving good performance in period’ would cause a decrease in the 
‘incentive to report events’.  If an event occurs and it is reported then the associated bonus for avoiding 
such events will be reduced.   
Expectation SC5 in Section 5 stated: ‘Where possible, measurable criteria including proactive (leading) 
indicators should be in place to assess safety culture performance. These should be carefully formulated to 
reduce any unintended 'knock on' effects and to minimise misuse to meet targets. Where initiatives are taken 
to improve safety culture, these should be prioritised and coordinated to avoid initiative overload.’ 
To counter B1, a second financial incentive is introduced for more proactive engagement, i.e. a ‘financial 
reward for logging events or concerns’ shown on the left of the Figure.  Balancing loop B1 is therefore 
counteracted through reinforcing loop R1.  The ‘financial reward for logging events or concerns’ 
increases the ‘incentive to report events’ which in turn causes the ‘logged non-compliance events’ to 
increase should they occur.  The two incentives would have to be carefully calibrated to achieve this.   
‘Financial reward for logging events or concerns’ also incentivises ‘risk register entries’ (a form of leading 
indicator).  Through reinforcing loop R3, the more concerns raised the larger the financial reward.  The logic 
behind this presumably being that it gives those with an oversight role richer information about the state of the 
system.  This provides a challenge in calibrating the reward to counter balancing loop B1.  An increase in ‘risk 
register entries’ would cause an increase in ‘meaningful corrective actions’ which in turn reduces the ‘risk 
of unwanted events’.  This forms balancing loop B2, reducing risk through better information but again 
producing a counter point to the incentive as the safer the system the fewer events that will be logged.  Again, 
this could be carefully calibrated with the other financial reward mechanism.   
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There are two more potential side-effects captured in this model.  Balancing loop B3 highlights a situation 
where the amount of data raised in the risk register as a result of the incentive becomes too much for the 
available resources to meaningfully handle.  The ‘ability to address each entry’ decreases as the number 
of entries rise.  Balancing loop B4 depicts a situation whereby an increase in the financial incentive causes 
the ‘quality of risk register entries’ to decline. This can create a form of data ‘noise’ making it hard to 
distinguish or resource meaningful action.  
This model highlights some of the benefits and uses of CLDs.  As indicated in case study #1, the CLD has 
made some tacit assumptions about these causal processes visible in such a way as they can be easily 
critiqued and improved.  It may very well be the case that someone reading this model would profoundly 
disagree with a causal connection or feedback mechanism depicted.  The model makes it easy to identify 
such influences which may otherwise remain hidden from discussion. This also shows the benefit it can 
have on communicating the reasons for corrective action.  Any changes to the system to address the side-
effects shown could be justified with reference to the model. The model could be used to explain the need 
for change and the reason behind specific interventions. 
 
  
Figure 24 - Incentives and influences 
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22.4.3 Case Study #3 – Contractor and supply chain management 
Part 1 outlined common causal factors relating to contractor and supply chain management (section 12).  It 
highlighted the need for leadership of all parties to understand their obligations and align, where possible, 
client and contractor goals.  The relationship between the parties should be structured in such a way as to 
avoid disincentives to meet those obligations.  This could include the threat of financial penalties deterring 
parties from raising safety concerns in a timely manner.  The client must maintain oversight, particularly to 
change processes, and sufficient capability as ‘intelligent customer’.  Clear communication channels and 
regular review points are recommended.  
A small workshop was convened in order to explore these issues, and the interactions between them, in more 
detail.  Three safety specialists from the rail and nuclear industries were taken through GMB exercise over 
the course of a few hours.  As with the previous examples the initial output was complex and required some 
additional analysis to identify pertinent feedback mechanisms.  For completeness the full model is presented 
in Figure , followed by an explanation of its creation and the post-analysis simplified conclusions.  
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Figure 25 - Complete contractor and supply chain management CLD 
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As in case studies #1 and #2, participants began by identifying pertinent variables through a divergent process 
(essentially brainstorming on post-it notes) before combining, refining and converging on the final set of 21 
used in the model above.  A series of structured discussions were then held around the relationships between 
those variables.  These discussions revealed fragments of cause and effect that when combined were able to 
form the complete model.  
In order to provide insight into this process for the purpose of this report these discussions and the elements 
of the model that arose from them are summarised in (Table 13).  The ‘description’ column paraphrases the 
statement made by one of the workshop participants, while the adjacent ‘model representation’ column shows 
how this statement is interpreted using the language and syntax of CLDs.  
Table 13 – Model case study #3 creation 
 Description Model representation 
1 Because of the client’s commercial 
risks and pressures, they issue a 
request for tenders with 
unrealistically short timescales. 
 
 
2 Potential contractors do not 
challenge the timescales because 
they desire to win the contract. 
 
 
3 This can cause both parties to 
accept a project timescale with 
limited achievability.  
 
4 Upfront contract discussions and 
arrangements such as competence 
requirements, safety case/risk 
assessment and management of 
change requirements, reporting 
routes and project interfaces and 
progress reviews/oversight are not 
properly considered to minimise 
time as a result of short project 
timescales.   
5 Design and safety case concerns 
arise during the project (in a 
narrative sense these can be 
considered to be initially due to 
factors outside the current model). 
When identified, these lead to 
concern within the contractor’s 
project team. 
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6 The contractor minimises these 
(with or without the approval of the 
client) and deals with them either 
through an approved process 
which will add to project delays, or 
alternatively on an ad hoc basis in 
order to avoid or minimise delays. 
 
7 Whether or not the contractor 
seeks approval from the client is 
also affected by the initial 
consideration of communication 
requirements and the achievability 
of the accepted project timescale.  
 
8 The consideration of 
communication requirements and 
propensity towards ad-hoc, 
unplanned and unapproved 
modifications can impact the 
client’s knowledge of safety issues 
they should be aware of.  Their 
knowledge of these issues affects 
their ability to fulfil the role of 
‘intelligent customer’ which can 
ultimately lead to changes in the 
relationship and trust between 
them and the regulator.  
 
9 The realisation of the key staff that 
short cuts/non-conservative 
decision making is being approved 
is likely to lead to a further 
deterioration in safety culture, 
reinforced by a view that 
management condones this. 
 
10 If the safety 'fixes' do not lead to 
delays or more serious impacts 
during the contract lifetime, there 
may still be longer term 
implications for the client. 
 
 
From the preliminary model in Figure 24 it is possible to identify two key leverage points which have 
significant impacts on the dynamics of the system and the observed behaviours, and could therefore be used 
to inform corrective actions.   
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Firstly, the ‘achievability of the accepted timescales’ can be controlled at the inception of the project, and 
if a timescale with low achievability is accepted, it can set in motion a series of behaviours that could ultimately 
have negative impacts.  A mechanism to ensure the timescale is achievable and realistic would reduce the 
probability of the subsequent actions and emergent behaviours.  
Secondly, the management system needs to ensure that communication requirements are adequate and 
understood along with the mechanisms for approving changes/deviations from the original plan. This 
reinforces the importance of several elements discussed previously, and shows that if the specified 
requirements are in place, they should provide suitable leverage points which can be used to monitor and 
then reduce potential vulnerabilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FINAL DRAFT PRE-PRINT 
136 
 
23 CONCLUSIONS TO PART 3 
 
Part 3 explored the ways in which process and other safety-related events are commonly understood through 
sequential and epidemiological models and methods.  While powerful for capturing and structuring knowledge, 
they are not without their limitations.  Principally they reduce causation to sequences of discrete events, 
overlooking the powerful effects that feedback can have to speed up or resist change.  New ‘systems-theoretic’ 
models have been developed that provide ways to address some of these issues by looking at more complex 
representations of the relationships between causal factors.  CLDs were highlighted as providing the basis for 
one such method.  
The three case studies illustrated some of the processes for creating CLDs while also representing some of 
the common underlying structures of causality that contribute to the themes and failure to meet expectations 
described in the previous Parts.  
CLDs are not without their own challenges.  One common criticism is that, in not shying away from complexity, 
the initial models can be daunting and require some degree of sense-making and refinement.  US Supreme 
Court Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.  (1841-1935) once said ‘The only simplicity for which I would give a 
straw is that which is on the other side of the complex – not that which never has divined it’ (Holmes-Pollock 
letters: The correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Sir Frederick Pollock, 1874-1932, 2nd ed., 1961, p. 
109).  There is a danger that simple explanations are sought before the complexity has been fully described 
and analysed.  CLDs provide a potential way to explore this complexity.  
CLDs also present several strengths in addition to balancing issues relating to traditional tools.  The approach 
provides a means for constructing hypothetical structural models of the complex underlying mechanisms of 
causality. The CLDs produced can illuminate the underlying assumptions of the event investigators in terms 
of causes and effects by way of the visual nature.  CLDs can facilitate an understanding of the complex 
interactions within the system and facilitate the development of corrective actions more informed by the 
interactions within the system, allowing for the structures of causality within the real world to be modified and 
avoiding the seduction of addressing single, isolated root causes.  There is a need to incorporate behavioural 
issues and ensure the right things are being measured so as to avoid perverse behaviours.  CLDs provide a 
means to achieve this.  CLDs can lead to the identification of common mechanisms (archetypes) which 
frequently influence unwanted behaviours, which can then be proactively addressed.  They can be used to 
benchmark and learn from others who have encountered similar causal mechanisms.  While not discussed 
here, it is also possible to prepare the models for simulation allowing for a greater understanding of the 
dynamics of the system and the ability to explore alternative scenarios and test potential corrective actions. 
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24 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
24.1 CONCLUSIONS  
The prevention of major events in many industries relies upon the effectiveness of an overall system based 
on engineered protection, effective SMSs and required human behaviours, and the interaction between these. 
Recognising vulnerabilities can be challenging because problems which can arise in this complex, interactive 
environment may not be easy to identify. This Report has outlined the scope for developing new 'tools' and 
thinking which it is believed offers advances in addressing this problem and thus reducing the risk of major 
events. 
The analysis of major incidents reported in Part 1 revealed a high degree of common causality, that could be 
characterised in terms of 10 themes.  The interpretation of these themes, referenced to established human 
factors / safety management insights, enabled the generation of a set of expectations of good practice for 
mitigating the vulnerabilities identified in the major incident analysis.  A potentially useful contribution of the 
report is, therefore, considered to be offering the facility for organisations to benchmark their current status 
against 'good practice guidelines' as defined by the set of expectations.     
The authors believe that the set of expectations could potentially be distilled into a set of probing questions to 
produce a tool for formal assessment of the extent to which  operational 'reality' reflects expectations of good 
practice, i.e. an 'audit tool' that would complement existing approaches for identifying deficiencies in 
engineering and management systems.  
The expectations and associated discussion might also provide a basis to strengthen the understanding of 
decision makers in these sometimes neglected areas and could be further developed to provide a framework 
which would enable these important event precursors to be identified more effectively in event investigations.  
Recognising vulnerabilities and what needs to change to mitigate them is key to informing decision-making 
over what, where, and how to intervene.  In attempting to address the organisational and cultural issues 
identified, it is essential that human factors and broader behavioural and social science insights are 
understood and addressed. This requires an evidence-based approach to their management, as discussed in 
Part 2. 
With respect to intervention, three fundamental issues are addressed in the report. The first relates to the 
measurement of safety performance and, in particular, the relative merits of alternative sources of data and 
evidence. The second to the relative merits of alternative techniques for priority elicitation, and lastly, the 
challenge of designing effective behaviour change interventions. 
The latter requires the capacity to apply a critical perspective to the social science evidence on 'what works' 
(theory of change) and translating this into deliverable activity in a given organisation. Notable challenges 
surround the fact that the subject matter tends to be unfamiliar to many engineers and managers, compounded 
by the fact that guidance on the science of successful intervention delivery remains limited, i.e. relatively little 
has been written on how to apply insights on behaviour change in the workplace.   
Arising risks relate to: the selection of inappropriate / sub-optimal types of intervention floundering due to 
delivery failures, or worse, interventions that engender perverse motivations that degrade rather than enhance 
safety performance.  There is a significant need for guidance for employers in this area, and for tools that 
support the intervention selection/design process.   
The CLM technique described in Part 3 shows promise in this respect, as a means of testing proposed 
interventions at the design stage. 
Part 3 outlines some of the limitations of traditional sequential and epidemiological models and methods used 
in incident analysis. It outlines the case for alternative approaches for detecting vulnerabilities of the type 
identified in Parts 1 and 2. There is scope for causal loop modelling (CLM) in: forensic incident analysis; 
resilience testing of extant systems, and in proof testing the logic of proposed interventions at the design 
stage. The utility of this technique as a potentially valuable participatory 'tool' is illustrated in three case studies 
identified by the discussion in Part 1.   
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Causal loop diagrams (CLDs) provide a means for constructing structural models of the complex underlying 
mechanisms of causality and can illuminate the assumptions involved and enable the development of 
corrective actions more informed by the interactions within the system. The output can also inform decisions 
over the selection of safety performance indicators. Reflecting alignment with modelling techniques advanced 
by others, e.g.  Leveson, Hollnagel and Rasmussen, their principal strength is considered to be the capacity 
to increase the transparency of interactions between variables in complex systems. 
The potential of CLDs is reflected in the recommendations in 24.2. In particular, there is proposed follow-on 
work to further familiarise potential users with the use of the technique by providing further examples based 
on both key identified expectations and taking account some of the behavioural learning identified in Part 2.    
24.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
24.2.1 Research 
• Extend the 'library' of events studied to verify and potentially enhance insights into organisational and 
cultural precursors and to further refine the developed risk management expectations.  
• Based upon foundation work described in this report, develop an event (incident and near-hit) 
investigation framework for senior managers and safety professionals, that complements established 
approaches by helping organisations detect the contribution of incubating organisational and cultural 
precursors to event causation.  
• Develop 'penetrating' questions to facilitate the investigation of the extent to which expectations are 
being met in practice and thus to produce an assessment tool for use by employers and safety 
professionals to assess the resilience of (i) established systems (ii) proposed changes to systems. 
• Develop behaviour–change intervention selection and design guidance, for employers and safety 
professionals; potentially extending to the development of an expert-system incorporating the novel 
feature of causal-loop modelling, with a view to, ultimately, producing a tool for organisations. 
• Further develop and refine the CLM technique to provide illumination in three areas:  
(i) incident investigation; 
(ii) testing the resilience of established systems, and 
(iii) prototyping planned interventions. 
24.2.2 Knowledge transfer 
• Develop training (courses/workshops) for senior managers and safety professionals in detecting and 
addressing system vulnerabilities, including learning from incidents, testing the resilience of established 
systems and evidence-based approaches to intervention design. 
• Produce a more succinct abridged version of this report aimed at senior managers and leaders. This 
could be augmented by specific training/mentoring sessions, tailored to the needs and interests of 
leaders and their organisations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FINAL DRAFT PRE-PRINT 
139 
 
ANNEX A 
HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANISATIONS 
The concept of HROs, widely attributed to Perrow (1984), has been said to characterise businesses that 
successfully manage and sustain their resilience to failure despite operating in complex, hazardous conditions, 
where the consequences of errors could be profound or catastrophic.  While a defining characteristic is held 
to be that HROs exhibit ‘nearly accident free performance’ (LaPorte, 1996), this is not to suggest that they are 
vulnerability-free, rather the claim is that they demonstrate prowess in maintaining hazard control and 
detecting and reacting to vulnerabilities, to mitigate their potential.    
‘…people who had examined these organisations [HRO’s] were struck by their unique structural 
features. We saw something else: These organisations also think and act differently’ (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2001). 
Features relating to HRO practices have been divided into two categories: those relevant to the anticipation 
of failure, and those relevant to the containment of hard-to-avoid failures (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2015).  These 
mindful organisations are said to anticipate failure through corporate adoption and cultural internalisation of 
the overlapping principles of preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, and sensitivity to operations. 
Preoccupation with failure: This involves regular reflective 'self'-critical testing of the reliability and 
resilience of established safety systems - to actively probe for weaknesses and degradation, as well as 
effectively monitoring changeable and emergent contingencies that may give rise to new hazards, i.e. the 
capacity to detect early warning signs of the potential for failure.  Practices that can provide the desired degree 
of insight include the following (also see Part 1): 
• Avoiding the temptation to assume that the absence incidents means that safety is being effectively 
managed; 
• Responding to near miss events with the same degree of vigour as actual failures; 
• Removing barriers to incident reporting and offering multiple reporting routes for employees. 
• Pro-actively seeking-out ‘bad news’; 
• Regularly asking ‘what might go wrong’ questions, at all levels within the organisation, and 
• Considering and addressing the scope for undesirable knock-on effects arising from systems and 
interventions.  Regular constructive conversations with managers and employees about incidents, 
errors and associated learning. 
Reluctance to simplify: An example of this is that while aggregating data and information can be useful 
for identifying trends across an organisation, a disadvantage is that this can have the effect of masking local 
issues. Practices that help organisations and management to keep in tune with operational reality include 
the following: 
• Collecting and analysing qualitative, as well as quantitative data; 
• Basing insight and decisions upon multiple complementary data sources; 
• Using active listening skills to understand the nuances of others’ perspectives; 
• Eliciting and being prepared to meaningfully engage with all stakeholders; 
• Ensuring transparency of the decision-making process so that subordinate staff and other 
stakeholders can understand and recognise the underpinning logic’ and 
• Giving a meaningful voice to dissenters as well as champions. 
 
Note:  With respect to analytical capacity – the presence of a healthy degree of slack and redundancy 
(rather than paring to a minimum), to provide a pool of resources is viewed as advantageous to enhance 
resilience. ‘Organisational slack in terms of time and human resources [and capacities] is important for 
organisations coping with the challenges of the 21st century.’ (Lawson & Samson, 2001).   
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Sensitivity to operations: This involves the recognition of the need for architects of safety systems, rules 
/ procedures and change management to be cognisant of operational conditions and practices. Relevant 
features include the following: 
• Regular director/management shop-floor walkarounds; 
• Approachable leadership; 
• Regular formal and informal safety conversations with staff, and 
• Regular review of operating procedures, safety rules, and risk assessments. 
Commitment to resilience: the organisation’s capacity to adjust its functioning prior to, during and following 
a failure, in order to contain its consequences is important in this context.  Relevant practices include the 
following: 
• Training staff to possess conceptual systems-based skills, as well as specialist skills; 
• Periodically exposing staff to work and experiences outside their specialism; 
• The capacity to learn during the incident, as well as after, and 
• Avoiding overdoing lean-management to the point where it may compromise capacity and options 
when emergencies do arise. 
 
‘The signature of an HRO is not that it is error-free, but that errors don’t disable it’ (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001). 
Deference to expertise: Responding to unanticipated failures requires fluid decision making structures that 
do not assume that relevant expertise is proportionate to rank.  Relevant practices that enable this can 
include the following: 
• Having an up-to-date competency map profiling internal capabilities and knowledge that can rapidly 
mobilized in the event of an emergency, and 
• Operational staff input into rules, procedures and risk assessments.  
Note: Critics see value in deference to expertise (whether professional / technical or front-line insight) but 
point to the micro-political and hierarchical challenges of making it happen. 
Reflections on the HRO concept 
Essentially, Weick’s model reflects an idealised organisation, i.e. it is probably most appropriately regarded 
as aspirational. 
Weick offers a potentially useful check-list against which an organisation might assess its status relative to 
any array of what are claimed to represent HRO characteristics.  However, the reality that complex 
organisations are routinely in a constant state of structural flux and socio-technical evolution suggests the 
conclusion that these are principles rather than a defined end point.  For example, as Hopkins (2007) 
concludes, attempts at determining achievement of HRO status in any material / quantifiable sense would 
constitute an over-interpretation of Weick's model. 
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ANNEX B 
SAFETY CUTURE MATURITY 
A notable feature of most, if not all, workplace accidents is that constituent components have routinely 
occurred previously.  Rarely are each of the component elements that lead to an incident new or unique 
events.  It is only when they achieve the necessary alignment that an accident or near-miss occurs.  This is a 
common feature of relatively minor, routine accidents involving individuals as well as major disasters. Effective 
risk management relates to corporate resilience over the capacity to detect and block (or mitigate) pathways 
to failure.    
Organisational learning, specifically the capacity to gain insight into how effectively hazards and risks are 
being controlled, is key to producing resilience to failure.  Critically, this requires the capacity to gather 
evidence that goes beyond accident and ill-health statistics and to develop a suite of measures that relate to 
how effectively the organisation is managing recognised precursors that can lead to failure. 
In many organisations, claims of a plateauing of improvement in safety performance, arising from engineered 
safety solutions, has sponsored an increased focus on decision making, behavioural and cultural elements - 
in particular aspects relating to reducing human-error and volitional risk-taking.  The post-war tradition in the 
UK, and most of western Europe, has been to focus on situational drivers of employee behaviour, rather than 
individual differences e.g. personality traits.  While some may argue that this owes much to the convenient 
alignment between the (UK) safety regulator emphasis on employer responsibilities and the systems focus 
within the human factors paradigm, the capacity for situational influences to transcend dispositional influences 
on employee safety behaviour is widely evidenced.  
The recognition that human beings do not operate in isolation, and that social conformity influences, and 
shared ‘world views’, can have a pervasive influence on how individuals behave, is central to the concept of 
safety culture.  However, employees’ behaviour in relation to risk is, transparently, not merely the product of 
normative effects attributable to peer influence.   
The work environment can embody an array of other, potentially more pervasive, behaviour and performance 
shaping features. Some of these are structural, e.g. the demarcation of departmental responsibilities and 
accounting units. Others relate to how work is organised; the design features of machinery and equipment; 
systems of reward, as well as 'softer' elements such as management priorities and style.  These and 
associated features are perhaps best characterised as relating to organisational safety climate.  They are 
scene setting variables - ‘the choice architecture’, which intersects with and impacts on workplace safety 
culture.   
‘Safety culture’ is not a noun, it is an adjective, i.e. a safety culture is not something that organisations possess 
or lack.  All organisations have a safety culture (which may well extend to plural sub-cultures), such that they 
occupy a position on the continuum between positive and negative.  The notion of safety culture maturity 
relates to attempts to characterise where an organisation is on this continuum, referenced to contemporary 
perspectives on good practice (e.g. Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH), 2015). 
Note:  Conceptually safety culture maturity reflects the broader, established principle of a hierarchy of risk 
control.   A central tenet is that selected interventions need to be of good fit with the prevailing level of cultural 
maturity. 
The capacity to characterise and take account of the level of safety culture maturity is important when 
developing safety improvement plans.   In particular, it is critical to proceed at an appropriate pace and to 
progress in incremental steps that build on firm foundations that reflect the hierarchy of control, e.g. a focus 
on behavioural elements, where fundamental aspects relating to levels of management commitment, 
resources, or engineered control measures are found wanting.  For these reasons, characterising an 
organisation’s safety culture maturity is widely held to represent a cornerstone in the change process towards 
reduced risk taking. 
Where interventions are of poor fit with the prevailing level of maturity, their impact is likely to be blunted to 
the point where they represent a poor return on investment.   
FINAL DRAFT PRE-PRINT 
142 
 
A range of indicators of safety culture maturity have been advanced.  While embodying detailed differences, 
all share the perspective that an organisation (or sub-division of an organisation) can be assessed with 
reference to a continuum.  The capacity to do this is important, both as a benchmark against which to assess 
change over time and, most pertinently, because it informs decisions over the types of intervention that are of 
best fit with prevailing workplace norms, values, attitudes and practices.  At a fundamental level, assessment 
signposts what needs to change to progress to higher levels of maturity. 
The assessment of safety culture maturity is potentially complicated by the scope for an organisation to exhibit 
multiple cultures, i.e. it is rare to find a large complex organisation that can reasonably be characterised as 
possessing a single homogeneous culture.  For example, different sub-cultures may be present both between 
and within sites, reflecting differences in management / supervisory style, local norms / historical precedents, 
systems of work, industrial relations and more.  Determining the extent of homogeneity / variability is an 
important issue, as it informs thinking over the relative merits of universal (whole organisation) or local 
bespoke (segmented) solutions. 
A number of models of safety culture maturity have been produced.  In the UK the HSE endorsed the Keil 
Centre model.  This was intentionally designed to mesh with the key regulatory risk management guidance: 
Managing for health and safety (HSG65), Reducing error and influencing behaviour (HSG48), and the 
foundation Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) publication Organising for 
safety (HSC, 1993).  Table A.1 provides a staged sequential series of vignettes that reflects an elaboration of 
the HSE-Keil Centre model, developed by Weyman and Lunt (unpublished), that takes the form of a set of 
heuristics designed to characterise different levels of cultural maturity.     
With a view to enhancing transparency through supplementary elaboration of the HSE-Keil Centre model, 
Weyman and Lunt (2016) developed the version depicted in table A.1.  Each facet of maturity is referenced 
to a linear five-point rating, each anchor being represented by a vignette designed to characterise current 
practice within the organisation / function being assessed.  No empirical basis for the scaled vignettes is 
claimed, they are simply offered as what the author’s hope readers will view as a logical, but by no means 
definitive extension of the original, reflecting equivalent principles aimed at providing employers with a more 
tangible means of assessing their organisation’s level of maturity.   
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Table A.1 - Suggested elaboration of HSE safety culture maturity criteria 
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Cultural maturity 
(Keil Centre) 
Behavioural 
antecedents 
Cultural level 
Emerging 
 
Managing 
 
Involving 
 
Cooperating 
 
Continuous 
improvement 
 
Board management 
commitment / visibility 
(inclusive of 
leadership)  
Is safety seen as 
important for 
business, moral 
and/or legal reasons?  
Do senior 
management have a 
reactive or proactive 
approach?  
How do senior 
management 
demonstrate 
commitment? 
How responsive is 
management to 
health and safety 
(H&S) issues?  
To what extent do 
senior management 
walk the talk?  
Board champion?  
Flexible 
leadership/resonant 
leadership  
Visibility in meetings  
Safety is not seen or 
managed as a key 
business risk.  
No discussion of H&S 
at board meetings. 
No board member 
with H&S 
responsibility. 
No public 
commitment to H&S 
improvement. 
Non systematic 
approach - H&S 
priorities primarily 
reactive to incidents 
 
Safety is managed as 
a business risk in so 
far as avoiding legal 
costs.  
Limited discussion of 
H&S at board 
meetings 
A board member with 
H&S responsibility 
identified. 
A public commitment 
to H&S improvement 
has been made. 
H&S priorities are 
primarily compliance 
driven. 
Command and 
control leadership 
style. 
 
Safety is managing a 
business risk in terms 
of avoiding legal 
costs and protecting 
reputation. 
H&S is an agenda 
item at all board 
meetings. 
A board member with 
H&S responsibility 
plays an active visible 
role in promoting 
H&S. 
Corporate 
commitment to H&S 
improvement has 
been widely 
publicised. 
H&S prioritisation is 
driven by lagging 
indicators.  
Visionary leadership 
style used.  
H&S is managed as a 
legal, business and 
moral risk.  
H&S is the first item 
on the agenda item at 
all Board meetings. 
A board member with 
H&S responsibility 
provides active visible 
leadership in 
promoting H&S. 
Corporate 
commitment to H&S 
improvement and 
improvement goals / 
KPIs has been widely 
publicised. 
Recognition of the 
limitation of trail data 
for setting H&S 
priorities. 
Receptive to new  
ideas and innovative 
techniques in H&S / 
risk management. 
H&S is managed from 
the perspective that it 
brings business 
opportunity (i.e. that 
the workforce is an 
asset) and as part of 
a portfolio of broader 
risks (e.g. inclusive of 
quality, security etc.).   
H&S is the first 
agenda item at board 
meetings 
A board member with 
H&S responsibility 
provides active visible 
leadership in in H&S. 
Corporate 
commitment to H&S 
improvement and 
improvement goals / 
KPIs has been widely 
publicised. 
Receptive to new  
ideas and innovative 
techniques in H&S / 
risk management.  
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Visionary and 
participatory 
leadership.  
Recognises the 
benefits of drawing 
upon KPI and related 
evidence to inform 
strategic thinking over 
H&S priorities.  
Flexible leadership 
approach. 
Site leadership  
 
Tailoring board 
requirements to site 
needs? 
Level of visible 
proactive leadership 
on safety. 
 
No visible 
involvement in safety 
activity. 
No representation of 
site views to the 
board. Board views 
delivered as H&S 
command and 
control. 
Little insight into 
workforce 
motivations. 
 
Modest - infrequent 
visible involvement in 
safety activity e.g. 
attendance at safety 
meetings. 
Sporadic/ad hoc 
representation of site 
views to the board 
and of board views to 
site. 
Evidence of being 
responsive to H&S 
risks / issues raised, 
but inconsistent. 
Some appreciation of 
workforce 
motivations. 
 
Recognition of H&S 
leadership role.  
Regular visible 
involvement in safety 
activity e.g. 
attendance at safety 
meetings. 
Reliable advocates of 
site perspective to the 
board, and of board 
requirements to the 
site. 
Evidence of 
responding to H&S 
risks / issues raised, 
in a consistent and 
timely fashion. 
Effective insight into 
workforce 
motivations. 
Regular visible 
involvement in safety 
activity e.g. 
attendance at safety 
meetings. 
Evidence of active 
leadership role in 
H&S, e.g. public 
workforce 
engagement; pro-
active contribution to 
development of safety 
improvements; active 
engagement with and 
participation in H&S 
initiatives / 
interventions.  
Able to tailor board 
requirements to site 
needs.  
Recognition of H&S 
leadership role. 
Evidence of 
responding to H&S 
risks / issues in a 
Regular visible 
involvement in safety 
activity e.g. 
attendance at safety 
meetings. 
Evidence of active 
leadership role in 
H&S, e.g. public 
workforce 
engagement; pro-
active contribution to 
development of safety 
improvements; active 
engagement with and 
participation in H&S 
initiatives / 
interventions. 
Recognition of H&S 
leadership role.  
Receptive to new  
ideas and innovative 
techniques in H&S / 
risk management. 
Evidence of 
responding to H&S 
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consistent and timely 
fashion. 
Recognises the 
importance of a 
receptive and fair 
management style. 
Good insight into 
workforce motivations 
- and taking account 
of this e.g. in setting / 
managing 
performance 
objectives. 
risks / issues in a 
consistent and timely 
fashion.  
Adopts a receptive 
and fair management 
style. 
Good insight into 
workforce motivations 
- and taking account 
of this e.g. in setting / 
performance 
objectives. 
Has an effective site -
specific set of lead 
indicators in place; 
monitors the 
performance and 
actively uses the 
output maintain / 
enhance risk control. 
Communication 
 
Two or one way,? 
Clear/Easy to 
comprehend? 
Regular/repeated? 
Timely?  
Multi-channel, multi-
media? 
Reporting options. 
Feedback 
mechanisms. 
Dedicated formal 
systems for 
communicating safety 
information with staff. 
No point-of-work 
safety briefings / tool-
box talks. 
No staff suggestion 
scheme. 
No formal system for 
eliciting staff views – 
There is an intention 
to introduce a 
dedicated formal 
system for 
communicating safety 
information with staff. 
There is an intention 
to introduce a point-
of-work safety 
briefings / tool-box 
talks. 
There is an intention 
to introduce a staff 
Dedicated formal 
systems for 
communicating safety 
information with staff 
are in place. 
Communication is 
managed so that it is 
timely and repeated.  
Point-of-work safety 
briefings / tool-box 
talks are in place. 
Dedicated formal 
systems for 
communicating safety 
information with staff 
are in place. 
Communication is 
managed so that it is 
timely and repeated. 
Multiple channels are 
used.  
Point-of-work safety 
briefings / tool-box 
Dedicated formal 
systems for 
communicating safety 
information with staff 
are in place and used 
regularly. 
Communication is 
managed so that it is 
timely, repeated and 
updated. Multiple 
channels are used.  
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 e.g. staff survey; 
safety climate survey.  
The above – re-
contractors / tenants. 
 
H&S suggestion 
scheme. 
There is an intention 
to introduce a formal 
system for eliciting 
staff views – e.g. staff 
survey; safety climate 
survey.  
The above – re-
contractors / tenants 
 
A staff H&S 
suggestion scheme is 
in place. 
Formal systems / 
structures for eliciting 
staff views – e.g. staff 
survey; safety climate 
survey are in place.  
The above – re-
contractors / tenants. 
Attempts are made to 
make the 
communication 
engaging (e.g. 
tailored, interactive).  
talks are conducted 
regularly. 
Staff H&S suggestion 
scheme is in place - 
with evidence of use 
by staff. 
Systems are in place 
to inform staff of H&S 
issues raised / 
reported; feedback on 
arising management 
action relating to 
accidents, near miss 
and confidential 
reports. 
Managers provide  
feedback on staff 
suggestions.  
Formal systems / 
structures for eliciting 
staff views – e.g. staff 
survey; safety climate 
survey have been 
formally adopted as a 
recurrent feature. 
The above – re-
contractors / tenants. 
Point-of-work safety 
briefings are 
conducted regularly. 
Staff H&S suggestion 
scheme is in place - 
with evidence of use 
by staff - producing 
high quality material 
that can be used by 
senior management 
decision making over 
risk control.  
Systems to inform 
staff of H&S issues 
raised / reported; 
feedback on arising 
action relating to 
accidents, near miss 
and confidential 
reports - the are KPI's 
associated with 
response times. 
Managers provide 
feedback on staff 
suggestions. 
Response time is a 
KPI. 
Formal systems / 
structures for eliciting 
staff views – e.g. staff 
survey; safety climate 
surveys have been 
formally adopted as a 
recurrent feature.  
The output from such 
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is used at a senior 
level to inform 
decision making over 
performance and 
priorities for 
intervention. 
A safety committee 
system is in place, 
with employee 
representation at 
senior management 
policy meetings.  
Involvement of staff 
representatives in 
devising safe systems 
of work = custom and 
practice. 
Staff representatives 
have a formal role in 
incident investigations 
and make an active 
and meaningful 
contribution. 
Safety 
representatives play 
an active role in the 
design and roll-out of 
safety improvement 
initiatives and 
interventions. 
Training & 
competence: 
Clear definition of 
competencies and 
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certification exist for 
all job roles. 
All new staff undergo 
induction training.  
Refresher training is 
provided for all job 
roles - to defined 
time-lines. 
Employee safety 
representatives 
receive advanced 
H&S training, e.g. 
incident investigation. 
A diverse range of 
regular interactive 
face-to-face and 
online training is 
offered, 
encompassing H&S, 
technical and 'soft' 
skill that includes 
contractors includes 
relevant supply chain 
personnel.  
Safety record is the 
principal criterion in 
the contractor 
selection process. 
The above – re-
contractors / tenants / 
supply chain. 
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Productivity vs. safety 
 
Productivity first, 
safety first, or both? 
Context dependent 
(e.g. safety first 
following accident)? 
Mixed messages over 
priorities? 
Productivity is always 
prioritised over safety. 
Safety does not 
feature in operational 
decision making.    
Production frequently 
takes priority over 
safety.                
Safety rarely features 
in operational 
decision making.  
Production 
sometimes takes 
priority over safety.  
Safety features in 
operational decision 
making - sometimes. 
Production and safety 
have equal priority.  
Safety routinely 
considered in 
operational decision 
making. 
 
Safety always 
prioritised over 
productivity during 
decision making.  
Safety is seamlessly 
embedded into 
operational decision 
making.  
Safety resources  
 
Appropriate? 
Usable? 
Maintained? 
Available? 
Accessible? 
Instruction on use? 
Sufficient? 
Widespread reports 
of equipment 
shortages. 
Widespread reports 
of safety system 
failure. 
Widespread reports 
of staff shortages. 
There are some 
reports of equipment 
shortages. 
There are some 
reports of safety 
system failure. 
There are some 
reports of staff 
shortages. 
Reports of equipment 
shortages – and 
evidence of delay in 
their resolution. 
Reports of safety 
system failure are 
apparent – and 
evidence of delay in 
their resolution. 
Reports of staff 
shortages. 
Available resources  
inappropriate, or in 
poor condition.   
Reports of equipment 
shortages are 
infrequent – and there 
is evidence of timely 
resolution. 
Reports of safety 
system failure are 
infrequent – and there 
is evidence of timely 
resolution. 
Reports of staff 
shortages are 
infrequent – and there 
is evidence of timely 
resolution.  
Resources are 
appropriate but not 
necessarily easy to 
access.  
Reports of equipment 
shortages are rare – 
and there are KPIs for 
timely resolution. 
Reports of safety 
system failure are 
rare – and there are 
KPIs for timely 
resolution. 
Reports of staff 
shortages are rare – 
and there are KPIs for 
timely resolution.  
Resources are 
appropriate and 
accessible.  
Participation//involve
ment (inclusive of 
industrial relations)  
 
Told, sold, consulted, 
feedback on use, 
delegated? 
No safety committee 
system. 
No staff 
representative 
involvement in 
There is an intention 
to introduce a safety 
committee system. 
There is an intention 
to introduce a formal 
A safety committee 
system is in place. 
There is a formal 
system for involving 
staff representatives 
A safety committee 
system is in place, 
with employee 
representation at 
senior management  
meetings where 
Safety committee 
system is in place, 
with employee 
representatives at 
senior management 
meetings where 
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Inclusiveness (e.g. of 
supply chain, 
tenants)? 
Staff representation.  
 
devising risk 
assessment / job 
planning / safe 
systems of work. 
• The above – re-
contractors / tenants. 
 
 
staff representative 
involvement in 
devising risk 
assessment / job 
planning / safe 
systems of work. 
The above – re-
contractors / tenants.  
Explanations are 
provided on a 
'because we have to’ 
basis.  
in devising risk 
assessment / job 
planning / safe 
systems of work. 
Staff representatives 
have a formal role in 
incident 
investigations. 
The above – re-
contractors / tenants.  
Explanations / 
directives are justified 
(a 'why') is provided.  
safety policy 
decisions are 
discussed. 
Involvement of staff 
representatives in 
devising risk 
assessment / job 
planning / safe 
systems of work 
represents custom 
and practice. 
Staff representatives 
have a formal role in 
incident 
investigations. 
Staff consulted prior 
to introduction of 
changes.  
safety policy 
decisions are made. 
Involvement of staff 
representatives in 
devising risk 
assessment / job 
planning / safe 
systems of work =  
custom and practice. 
Staff representatives 
have a formal role in 
incident investigations 
and make an active 
and meaningful 
contribution. 
Safety 
representatives play 
an active role in the 
design and roll-out of 
safety improvement 
initiatives and 
interventions. 
Decisions delegated 
to staff where 
appropriate. 
Training and 
competence 
(inclusive of 
contractors)  
 
Relevant competency 
requirements defined 
for all jobs?  
Inductions/training 
occur before people 
start job for first time? 
No clear definition of 
competencies and 
certification by job 
role. 
No induction training. 
No refresher training. 
Clear definition of 
competencies and 
certification exist for 
some, e.g. safety 
critical, job roles. 
All new staff undergo 
induction training. 
Clear definition of 
competencies and 
certification exist for 
all job roles. 
All new staff undergo 
induction training.  
Clear definition of 
competencies and 
certification exist for 
all job roles. 
All new staff undergo 
induction training.  
Refresher training is 
provided for all job 
Clear definition of 
competencies and 
certification exist for 
all job roles. 
All new staff undergo 
induction training.  
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Relevant and 
sufficient? 
Competent/credible 
providers? 
Transferable? 
Technical and soft 
skills?  
Inclusion of 
contractors? 
Contractor vetting?  
 
No provision for 
monitoring the above 
regarding contractors. 
Safety record is not 
considered in the 
contractor selection 
process. 
 
 
Refresher training is 
provided for some, 
e.g. safety critical, but 
not all job roles. 
There are systems for 
monitoring the above 
regarding contractors, 
e.g. safety critical, but 
not all job roles. 
Safety record is a 
criterion in the 
contractor selection 
process. 
Refresher training is 
provided for most job 
roles. 
A competent / 
credible training 
provider is used. 
Employee safety 
representatives 
receive dedicated 
H&S training paid for 
by the employer. 
There are systems for 
monitoring the above 
regarding contractors 
for all job roles. 
Safety record is an 
important criterion in 
the contractor 
selection process. 
roles - referenced to 
defined timelines. 
A competent / 
credible training 
provider is used. 
Employee safety reps 
receive advanced 
H&S training, e.g. 
incident investigation, 
paid for by the 
employer - with good 
levels of take-up. 
A diverse range of 
regular interactive 
face-to-face and 
online training is 
offered that includes 
contractors / relevant 
supply chain 
personnel.  
Measures are taken 
to ensure 
transferability to the 
workplace.  
There are systems for 
monitoring the above 
regarding contractors. 
Safety record is a 
primary criterion in 
contractor selection.  
Refresher training is 
provided - to defined 
timelines. 
A competent, credible 
training provider is 
used.  
Employee safety 
representatives 
receive advanced 
H&S training, e.g. 
incident investigation. 
A diverse range of 
regular interactive 
face-to-face and 
online training is 
offered, 
encompassing H&S, 
technical and 'soft' 
skills that includes 
contractors, and 
relevant supply chain 
personnel.  
Measures are taken 
to ensure 
transferability to the 
workplace.  
Safety record is the 
principal criterion in 
the contractor 
selection process. 
The above – re-
contractors / tenants / 
supply chain. 
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The workforce is 
empowered and 
judged competent to 
exercise their own 
discretion in dealing 
with novel or unusual 
situations. 
Systems (HSG65) 
Policy  
 
Inclusive of worker 
involvement? 
State the overall 
current risk 
management context 
of the business 
(comprehensively)? 
Consultation during 
development? 
Reflect H&S 
commitment 
While a policy is 
present, there is no 
evidence of workforce 
consultation in its 
development. 
 
 
Policy underwent 
some workforce 
consultation in its 
development but its 
wording and content 
does not provide any 
sense that worker 
involvement is 
valued. 
Developed with input 
from the workforce, 
the policy conveys 
the importance of 
worker involvement. 
 
The H&S policy is 
clearly linked to other 
policies related 
human resource (HR) 
/ occupational health 
(OH) polices such as 
bullying, 
rehabilitation, 
negotiation and OH 
access.  
 
The H&S policy is 
fully integrated with 
HR/OH, security, 
quality (i.e. in style, 
consideration of their 
interactions). 
Safety management 
system 
 
Consider future risks, 
the unknown? 
Responsiveness to 
changes (HRO)?  
Workforce inclusion 
and extent of 
consideration (i.e. 
logistic interfaces 
sub-industries, 
suppliers, tenants? 
Emergency planning?  
No formal system of 
risk assessment. 
No risk register. 
No safety 
improvement plan / 
KPIs. 
No emergency plan. 
No recognised SMS, 
e.g. ISO 45001 in 
place. 
A formal system of 
risk assessment is 
present. 
Consideration has 
been given to the 
introduction of a risk 
register. 
Consideration has 
been given to the 
introduction of an 
A formal system of 
risk assessment is 
present with a defined 
time-line for review. 
Employee 
representatives are 
involved in 
developing some risk 
assessments / 
method statements / 
job planning and 
reviews. 
A formal system of 
risk assessment is 
present with a defined 
time-line for review. 
Employee 
representatives are 
involved in 
developing most risk 
assessments / 
method statements / 
job planning and 
reviews. 
A formal system of 
risk assessment is 
present with a defined 
time-line for review. 
Employee 
representatives are 
involved in 
developing all risk 
assessments / 
method statements / 
job planning and 
reviews. 
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Balance between 
process and safety 
process. 
Consideration of 
impact upon the 
supply chain. 
 
Unresponsive to H&S 
risks / issues raised. 
 
 
improvement plan 
and KPIs.  
Consideration has 
been given to the 
introduction of 
emergency plan. 
Consideration has 
been given to the 
introduction of a 
recognised SMS e.g. 
ISO 45001. 
Evidence of being 
responsive to H&S 
risks / issues raised, 
but inconsistent. 
A system for point-of-
work / ad-hoc risk 
assessment is in 
place. 
Evidence of 
responding to H&S 
risks / issues raised, 
in a consistent and 
timely fashion. 
Risk management 
covers conventional 
and process safety 
but systematic 
consideration of 
emerging risks is not 
undertaken. 
Propensity to focus 
on conventional 
rather than process 
safety. 
A system for point-of-
work / ad-hoc risk 
assessment is in 
place - and there is 
evidence of its use by 
line managers / 
supervisors. 
A risk register has 
been introduced.  
A H&S improvement 
plan plus KPIs is in 
place – with KPIs for 
lag and lead 
indicators. 
An emergency plan is 
in place - with 
periodic testing. 
Evidence of 
responding to H&S 
risks / issues in a 
consistent and timely 
fashion. 
Risk management 
covers conventional 
and process safety. 
Systematic 
consideration of 
emerging risks is 
undertaken. 
A system for point-of-
work / ad-hoc risk 
assessment is in 
place - with evidence 
of routine use by line 
managers / 
supervisors. 
A risk register has 
been introduced - 
based on evidence 
derived from lead and 
lag indicators and 
expert judgement. 
A H&S improvement 
plan plus KPIs is in 
place – with KPIs for 
lag and lead 
indicators. 
An emergency plan is 
in place - with 
simulation exercises 
referenced to a 
defined time frame. 
A recognised SMS 
e.g. ISO 45001 is in 
place and fully 
functioning. 
H&S implications and 
impacts of supply 
chain elements are 
addressed. 
Evidence of 
responding to H&S 
risks / issues in a 
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consistent and timely 
fashion.  
Risk management 
covers conventional 
and process safety. 
Systematic 
consideration of 
emerging risks is 
undertaken. 
Hierarchy of controls 
 
Hierarchy of controls 
appropriately applied. 
 
Unreasonable 
reliance on personal 
protection and 
behavioural elements. 
Engineered control 
solutions are under-
applied. 
A heavy reliance on 
personal protection 
and behavioural 
elements. 
Evidence of 
introducing 
engineered control 
solutions. 
Evidence of effective 
engineered control 
solutions.  
Reliance on personal 
protection and 
behavioural elements 
limited to controlling 
residual risk. 
Evidence of 
widespread 
introduction of 
effective engineered 
control solutions.  
Reliance on personal 
protection and 
behavioural elements 
limited to the control 
of residual risk. 
Evidence of 
widespread 
introduction of 
effective engineered 
control solutions.  
Reliance on personal 
protection and 
behavioural elements 
limited to the control 
of residual risk. 
Integration/performan
ce management 
 
What are the formal 
incentives that drive 
behaviour - 
productivity at 
expense of safety?  
Extent of integration 
with other 
management 
systems. 
H&S always seen as 
an addition to normal 
activity. 
 
H&S usually seen as 
an adjunct to normal 
activity. 
 
Safety viewed as an 
integral component of 
normal activity e.g. 
job-planning. 
H&S included in 
performance 
management.  
Safety treated as an 
integral component of 
normal activity e.g. 
job-planning. 
H&S objectives set 
within performance 
appraisals. 
Safety treated as an 
integral component of 
normal activity e.g. 
job-planning. 
Career progression 
contingent on H&S 
performance/attitude. 
Job 
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Physical working 
conditions and job 
design 
 
Managed to mitigate 
impact of heat, 
weather, lighting, 
fatigue upon 
attention?  
Due consideration of 
person, environment 
fit? 
Comfortable?  
Little / negligible 
attempt to monitor the 
impact of working 
conditions (physical 
or psychosocial) upon 
situational 
awareness, inclusive 
of stress. 
Attempts are made to 
regulate the impact of 
working conditions 
upon situational 
awareness for 
physical but not 
psychosocial risks. 
Physical and 
occasionally 
psychosocial aspects 
of working conditions 
are managed to 
optimise situational 
awareness. 
Physical and 
psychosocial aspects 
of working conditions 
are systematically 
managed to optimise 
situational 
awareness. 
Sufficient flexibility is 
built into resource 
allocation to permit 
their rapid 
realignment in line 
with changing 
conditions, demands 
and job requirements 
in keeping with HRO 
principles. 
Rules and procedures  
 
Understood? 
Relevant? 
Reviewed?  
Enforcement. 
 
Little/no active 
enforcement. 
Do not reflect custom 
and practice. 
A high proportion are 
impracticable / 
unworkable. 
No clearly defined 
sanctions for 
infringement. 
No formal system for 
review. 
Review only occurs in 
reaction to incidents. 
No employee 
representative 
involvement in 
drafting. 
 
A significant 
proportion of custom 
and practice reflects 
deviations from rules 
and procedures. 
A significant 
proportion of rules 
and procedures are 
not practicable or 
workable. 
Clearly defined 
sanctions for 
infringement. 
Evidence of active 
enforcement – 
inconsistent. 
Some employee 
representative 
involvement in 
drafting. 
A small proportion of 
custom and practice 
reflects deviations 
from rules and 
procedures. 
The majority of rules 
and procedures have 
been reviewed to 
enhance practicability 
and workability.  
Employees 
demonstrate an 
awareness of clearly 
defined sanctions for 
infringement.  
Evidence of active 
consistent 
enforcement. 
Employee 
representatives 
actively involved in 
drafting / reviewing. 
Deviations from rules 
and procedures are 
rarely encountered. 
A formal system for 
periodic review (with 
defined time scales) 
has been introduced.   
Employees 
demonstrate an 
awareness of clearly 
defined sanctions for 
infringement.  
Evidence of active 
consistent 
enforcement that 
employees perceive 
to be just and fair. 
Employee 
representatives 
actively involved in 
drafting / reviewing. 
Analysis of incidents 
has been integrated 
Deviations from rules 
and procedures are 
very rarely 
encountered. 
A formal system for 
periodic review (with 
defined time scales) 
has been introduced 
with KPIs.   
Employees 
demonstrate an 
awareness of and 
buy-in to clearly 
defined sanctions for 
infringement.  
Evidence of active 
consistent 
enforcement that 
employees perceive 
to be just and fair. 
Employee 
representatives 
actively and 
meaningfully  
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There is an intention 
to introduce a formal 
system for review.  
Reaction to incidents 
dominates the 
approach to review. 
A formal system for 
periodic review has 
been introduced. 
Analysis of incidents 
integrated into the 
review process. 
into the review 
process. 
The scope for 
elimination / 
substitution to avoid 
reliance on 
compliance is actively 
explored / adopted. 
involved in drafting / 
reviewing. 
Analysis of incidents 
and employee 
suggestions has been 
integrated into the 
review process. 
The scope for 
elimination / 
substitution to avoid 
reliance on 
compliance is actively 
explored / adopted 
and examples of such 
solutions can be 
identified. 
Supervision 
 
Bottleneck?  
Supported? 
People management 
skills?  
Role model. 
Receptive to being 
challenged. 
 
Primary emphasis on 
productivity. 
No, or under-defined 
safety responsibilities. 
Little, or no effective 
policing of 
compliance with 
safety rules. 
 
Primary emphasis on 
productivity. 
H&S responsibilities 
defined – but relate to 
a general obligation – 
i.e. non-specific. 
Limited / selective 
policing of 
compliance with 
safety rules. 
Low ownership of 
personal 
responsibility for 
H&S. 
Potential for 
productivity and 
safety tensions 
recognised and taken 
account of. 
H&S responsibilities 
specific, clearly and 
unambiguously 
defined. 
A strong emphasis on 
consistent policing of 
compliance with 
safety rules. 
Show interest in H&S 
initiatives and 
interventions. 
Potential for 
productivity and 
safety tensions 
recognised and taken 
account of. 
H&S responsibilities 
specific, clearly and 
unambiguously 
defined - and 
accepted. 
A strong emphasis on 
consistent policing of 
compliance with 
safety rules. 
Confident in raising 
H&S issues with 
senior managers. 
Potential for 
productivity and 
safety tensions 
recognised and taken 
account of. 
H&S responsibilities 
specific, clearly and 
unambiguously 
defined - and 
accepted. 
A strong emphasis on 
consistent policing of 
compliance with 
safety rules. 
Confident and pro-
active in raising H&S 
issues with senior 
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Little or no support in 
managing competing 
demands. 
Some support for 
managing complex 
demands. 
Willingness to 
participate in H&S 
initiatives and 
interventions. 
Receptive to the 
introduction of new 
ways of working on 
H&S grounds. 
Reliably supported to 
manage complex 
demands. 
managers formally 
and informally. 
Receptive to new 
ideas and innovative 
techniques in H&S / 
risk management. 
Willingness to take a 
lead role in H&S 
initiatives and 
interventions. 
Spontaneously 
contributes to 
identifying new ways 
of working on H&S 
grounds. 
Reliably supported to 
manage complex 
demands. 
Team working / peer 
influence/support 
 
Challenging occurs? 
Positive or negative 
peer influence/team 
norms? 
Team dialogue on 
safety?  
Supportive (no 
bullying)?  
Buddy system, ‘fresh 
pairs of eyes’. 
 
Risk taking is a widely 
encountered feature 
of custom and 
practice. 
Very little enthusiasm 
for working with 
managers to improve 
H&S. 
Negligible ownership 
of personal 
responsibility for 
H&S.  
Individuals do not 
necessarily 
Risk taking remains a 
significant feature of 
custom and practice.  
Little enthusiasm for 
working with 
managers to improve 
H&S. 
Low ownership of 
personal 
responsibility for 
H&S. 
Risk taking remains 
custom and practice 
in a limited range of 
areas / activities. 
Significant % of 
employees willing to 
work with managers 
to improve H&S. 
Low rates of 
engagement with 
H&S improvement 
interventions. 
Risk taking is not the 
norm and is rarely 
encountered. 
Some active positive 
social policing of H&S 
behaviour of peers. 
Most are willing to 
work with managers 
to improve H&S. 
The majority of staff 
recognise their 
personal 
Risk taking is not the 
norm and is rarely 
encountered. 
Significant active 
positive social 
policing of H&S 
behaviour of peers. 
Almost all are willing 
to work with 
managers to improve 
H&S. 
Almost all staff 
recognise their 
personal 
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appreciate/understan
d whether conditions 
are unsafe.  
 
H&S interventions 
viewed with 
scepticism / cynicism.  
  
Individuals confident 
to STOP when they 
feel unsafe.  
responsibility for 
H&S. 
Evidence of use of 
H&S suggestion and 
near-miss reporting 
systems. 
Fair rates of 
engagement with 
H&S improvement 
interventions. 
Individuals always 
STOP working 
whenever they feel 
unsafe. 
 
responsibility for 
H&S. 
Evidence of use of 
H&S suggestion and 
near-miss reporting 
systems. 
Receptive to new  
ideas and innovative 
techniques in H&S / 
risk management. 
High rates of 
engagement with 
H&S improvement 
intervention. 
Individuals always 
STOP working 
whenever they feel 
unsafe. Learning from 
this is systematically 
collected.  
Individual / human factors 
 Approach 
 
Process / impact 
evaluation. 
Intervention logic. 
Appropriateness 
within the hierarchy of 
controls. 
Fidelity checks.  
Inclusion of supply 
chain.  
 Does not reflect 
hierarchy of control - 
e.g. focus on 
behavioural elements 
in the presence of 
notable infrastructure 
/ safety systems / 
systems of work 
weaknesses.  
Significant scope for 
enhancement of   
General approach 
reflects principles of 
hierarchy of control – 
but significant scope 
remains for 
engineered solutions. 
Choice of topics for 
intervention reactive 
to events / based on 
lag indicators / 
regulators priorities. 
Evidence of 
widespread 
introduction of 
effective engineered 
control solutions. 
Choice of topics for 
intervention reactive 
to events / based on 
lag indicators plus 
lead indicators e.g. 
safety climate; 
Scope for further 
enhancement of  
infrastructure / safety 
systems / systems of 
work, e.g. via 
engineered controls is 
limited. 
Choice of topics for 
intervention reactive 
to events / based on 
lag indicators plus 
Approach reflects 
hierarchy of control. 
Scope for further 
enhancement of  
infrastructure / safety 
systems / systems of 
work, e.g. via 
engineered controls is 
very limited. 
Choice of topics for 
intervention informed 
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 infrastructure / safety 
systems / systems of 
work. 
Choice of topics for 
intervention is 
random / ad-hoc, 
rather than informed 
by contextual 
evidence. 
Theory of change for 
behavioural focused 
interventions is 
absent / weak / 
restricted scope e.g. 
individuals only - no 
context / 
inappropriate. 
Evidence relating to 
impact not recorded 
/absent and no 
baseline. 
No intervention logic 
monitoring / process 
management 
evidence gathered – 
‘hit and hope’. 
Theory of change for 
behavioural-focused 
interventions is 
absent / weak. 
Evidence relating to 
impact not recorded 
/absent and no 
baseline. 
No intervention logic 
monitoring / process 
management 
evidence gathered’– 
‘hit and hope’. 
 
behavioural audit 
data, etc. 
Linkage between lead 
and / or lag indicators 
and intervention 
choices weak / 
confused / absent. 
Choice of behavioural 
focused interventions 
reflects ‘what works’ 
guidance. 
Baseline data 
gathered but 
evidence relating to 
impact is absent / 
weak. 
No intervention logic 
monitoring / process 
management 
evidence gathered – 
‘hit and hope’. 
Appropriate lead KPIs 
and measurement 
tools that map onto 
intervention activity 
identified. 
lead indicators e.g. 
safety climate; 
behavioural audit 
data, etc. 
Effective linkage 
between lead / lag 
and supporting 
evidence e.g. 
employee 
engagement and 
indicators and 
intervention choices. 
Effective integration 
of contextual data 
evidence on ‘what 
works’ to inform 
intervention topics 
and design. 
Baseline data 
gathered with 
appropriate evidence 
relating to impact 
gathered. 
Process management 
principles / evidence 
used to monitor 
progress towards 
objectives and 
soundness of 
intervention logic.  
Appropriate lead KPIs 
and measurement 
tools that map onto 
intervention activity 
by contextual 
evidence - lead and 
lag indicators; climate 
assessment / staff 
attitude survey / 
employee 
engagement activity 
etc. 
Theory of change for 
interventions reflects 
guidance on what 
works. 
The scope of 
intervention activity 
addresses situational 
and well as individual 
determinants. 
Evidence relating to 
impact is recorded 
referenced to reliable 
quantifiable 
benchmark measures 
– with KPIs. 
Process management 
principles / evidence 
is used to monitor 
progress towards 
objectives and 
soundness of 
intervention logic - 
referenced to suitable 
KPIs, e.g. rates of 
behaviour change. 
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identified and 
operationalised.   
Appropriate lead KPIs 
and measurement 
tools that map onto 
intervention activity 
identified and 
operationalised.  
Checks are made to 
ensure the 
intervention is 
implemented as 
intended. 
Supply chain are 
included. 
Content / behaviour 
Change techniques / 
intervention logic: 
Coverage individual 
behavioural drivers 
(based on capability, 
opportunity, 
motivation and 
behaviour model 
(COM-B)) (motivation, 
intention to 
behaviour, and 
maintenance of 
behaviour change).  
(Note: capability 
already addressed by 
training / 
competency).   
 
Extent to which 
motivator strategies 
covers automatic and 
reflective decision 
making. 
Extent to which the 
approach encourages 
translation of 
motivation into 
behaviour. 
Extent to which the 
approach covers 
sustained behaviour 
change / 
maintenance 
strategies. 
 
One-off awareness 
raising activities are 
considered sufficient 
for securing interest 
in safety. 
No attempt is made to 
appeal to personal 
motivations (the 
'what's in it for me’).  
No attempt to target 
messages.  
No attempt is made to 
consider the 
transferability of any 
learning to the 
workplace. 
Behavioural 
observation 
techniques 
prematurely used 
Attempts are made to 
appeal to personal 
motivations (e.g. by 
creating cognitive 
dissonance, 
encouraging cost-
benefit appraisals).  
Motivation strategies 
may encourage some 
reflection but do not 
target automatic 
decision making (by 
raising situational 
awareness). 
Assumption prevails 
that motivation is 
enough for securing 
behaviour change. 
No attempt is made to 
consider the 
Attempts are made to 
appeal to personal 
motivations (e.g. by 
creating cognitive 
dissonance, 
encourage 
implications of risk 
taking on family/work 
mates etc.). 
Strategies may 
encourage some 
reflection but do not 
target automatic 
decision making (by 
raising situational 
awareness). 
Inclusion of 
techniques that helps 
translate motivation 
into action (e.g. by 
demonstrating that 
Attempts are made to 
appeal to personal 
motivations (e.g. by 
creating cognitive 
dissonance, 
encourage 
implications of risk 
taking on family / 
work mates etc.). 
Strategies may 
encourage some 
reflection but do not 
target automatic 
decision making (by 
raising situational 
awareness). 
Inclusion of 
techniques that helps 
translate motivation 
into action (e.g. by 
demonstrating that 
Attempts are made to 
appeal to personal 
motivations (e.g. by 
creating cognitive 
dissonance, 
encourage 
implications of risk 
taking on family / 
work mates etc.). 
Strategies may 
encourage some 
reflection but do not 
target automatic 
decision making (by 
raising situational 
awareness). 
Inclusion of 
techniques that helps 
translate motivation 
into action (e.g. by 
demonstrating that 
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(before consideration 
of whether the job 
context is sufficiently 
ready).  
 
transferability of any 
learning to the 
workplace. 
Behavioural 
observation 
techniques 
prematurely used 
(before consideration 
of whether the job 
context is sufficiently 
ready).  
controls work to 
counter response 
efficacy, by action 
planning, contingency 
planning, goal 
setting).  
Behavioural 
observation 
techniques 
prematurely used 
(before consideration 
of whether the job 
context is sufficiently 
ready). 
controls work to 
counter response 
efficacy, by action 
planning, contingency 
planning, goal 
setting).  
Inclusion of 
techniques with the 
potential to tackle 
automatic decision 
making (nudge, 
mindful safety).  
Behavioural 
observation 
techniques 
prematurely used 
(before consideration 
of whether the job 
context is sufficiently 
ready). 
controls work to 
counter response 
efficacy, by action 
planning, contingency 
planning, goal 
setting).  
Inclusion of 
techniques with the 
potential to tackle 
automatic decision 
making (nudges, 
mindful safety).  
Context suitable for 
behavioural 
observation-based 
techniques.  
A suite of techniques 
are used for 
maintaining change 
(e.g. behavioural 
observation, trouble 
shooting workshops, 
refreshing messages, 
appropriate reward 
and recognition).  
Knowledge 
management 
techniques used to 
elicit useful 
knowledge from new 
recruits, assure 
business continuity 
etc.).  
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Delivery/Plan/Do check Act 
Assessment (leading 
and lagging indicators 
covered by 
organisational 
learning)  
 
Suite of lead and lag 
indicators. 
Representativeness / 
generalisability. 
Reporting/ Under-
reporting. 
Quality / reliability / 
validity / sensitivity / 
responsiveness. 
Basis on a model. 
Scope for plotting 
covariance (e.g. with 
productivity data).  
Controls / ability to 
eliminate alternative 
explanations / 
counterfactual / 
biases.  
Scope for process 
evaluation 
(understanding of 
why the interventions 
work).  
     
Monitoring check 
(active) 
Active: routine 
inspections, health 
surveillance.  
No proactive 
monitoring 
undertaken. 
Intention to introduce 
proactive monitoring. 
 
Proactive monitoring 
undertaken. 
 
Proactive monitoring 
undertaken. 
Attend to low level 
signals.  
Proactive monitoring 
undertaken. 
Attend to low level 
signals.  
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‘Bad news’ actively 
sought. 
Monitoring check 
(reactive) 
(Inclusive of shared 
responsibility) 
 
Reactive: incident 
Investigation. 
Are accidents / 
incidents / near 
misses always 
reported?  
Are investigations 
done by multi-
functional teams 
including operators 
where appropriate?  
Do investigations 
identify underlying 
causes and system 
failures not only 
immediate causes?  
Do investigations look 
for root causes 
(performance 
influencing factors)?  
Quality of 
investigations 
controlled through 
management 
arrangements e.g. 
training, guidance 
and quality 
insurance?  
Accidents are an 
accepted feature.  
No discernible 
interest in identifying 
root causes. 
Managers / 
investigators focus 
almost exclusively on 
behavioural elements. 
Primary orientation 
around accountability 
and blame. 
 
 
Accidents are seen 
as preventable. 
Some interest in 
identifying root 
causes for fatal / 
major accidents. 
Managers believe the 
majority are caused 
by rule breaking / 
employee ignorance / 
wilfulness. 
Primary orientation 
around accountability 
and blame. 
People learn about 
the incidents mainly 
via ‘the grapevine’.  
 
Accidents are seen 
as preventable. 
Active attempts to 
identify root causes 
for fatal / major 
accidents / near 
misses. 
There are in-house 
staff trained in basic 
incident investigation 
skills.  
Stakeholders 
recognise the need to 
consider elements 
beyond immediate 
causes and 
behavioural 
components. 
The perspective 
accountability and 
blame extends 
beyond the 
‘perpetrator’ / injured 
person.  
Learning is formally  
shared with some of 
the organisation. 
 
Accidents are seen 
as preventable. 
Active attempts to 
identify root causes 
for fatal / major 
accidents / near 
misses. 
There are in-house 
staff trained in 
advanced incident 
investigation skills / 
external specialists 
engaged for high 
profile / consequence 
incidents.  
Stakeholders see 
value in looking 
beyond immediate 
causes and 
behavioural 
components. 
The significant focus 
is on learning and 
future prevention, 
rather than 
determining 
responsibility. 
The perspective on 
responsibility / 
accountability 
extends beyond the 
Accidents are seen 
as preventable. 
Active attempts to 
identify root causes 
for fatal / major 
accidents / near 
misses. 
There are in-house 
staff trained in 
advanced incident 
investigation skills / 
external specialists 
engaged for high 
profile / consequence 
incidents.  
Checks are built in to 
ensure impartial 
accident investigation 
and reporting.  
Stakeholders see 
value in looking 
beyond immediate 
causes and 
behavioural 
components. 
The primary focus is 
on learning and future 
prevention, rather 
than determining 
responsibility. 
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‘perpetrator’ / injured 
person. 
Learning is 
systematically shared 
across the 
organisation.  
The perspective on 
responsibility / 
accountability 
extends beyond the 
‘perpetrator’ / injured 
person. 
Learning is 
systematically shared 
across the 
organisation and 
throughout the supply 
chain. 
Near misses  
(Inclusive of trust and 
shared 
Responsibility)  
 
 
Reactive: near 
misses.  
Reporting systems. 
Confidentiality. 
Trust. 
No system for near 
miss recording. 
No system for 
confidential reporting.  
Employee trust is low. 
The above – re-
contractors / tenants.  
 
There is an intention 
to introduce a system 
for near miss 
reporting. 
There is an intention 
to introduce a system 
for confidential 
reporting.  
Employee trust in 
engaging with 
managers over H&S 
issues is low. 
The above – re-
contractors / tenants.  
A system for near 
miss reporting is in 
place. 
A system for 
confidential reporting 
is in place. 
Employees exhibit 
significant trust and 
willingness to engage 
with managers on 
H&S issues. 
The above – re-
contractors / tenants.  
 
System for near miss 
reporting in place - 
and high quality data 
is gathered, 
appropriately 
analysed and used to 
inform decision 
making on risk 
control. 
System for 
confidential reporting 
in place - is used by 
employees, and 
produces useful, 
actionable evidence. 
Employees exhibit 
high trust and 
willingness to engage 
with H&S issues. 
The above – re-
contractors / tenants.  
A system for near 
miss reporting is in 
place - and high 
quality data is 
gathered and is 
actively used to 
inform decision 
making on risk control 
at a senior level.  
Confidential reporting 
system in place and 
produces useful, 
evidence that is acted 
upon to enhance risk 
control. 
Employees exhibit 
high trust and actively 
engage with 
managers on H&S 
issues. 
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The above – re-
contractors / tenants. 
Act: organisational 
learning  
(Inclusive of 
assessment and 
review)  
 
Internal. 
External / 
benchmarking. 
Proactive / reactive. 
Reliable 
dissemination of 
learning.  
 
No systematic 
attempt to identify 
patterns in incident 
data. 
No formal root cause 
analysis of incidents. 
No lead indicators. 
 
Some steps have 
been taken to identify 
patterns in incident 
data. 
Root cause analysis 
has been applied to a 
small number of 
headline incidents. 
Some consideration 
has been given to 
identifying a suite of 
lead indicators. 
There is senior 
stakeholder 
recognition of the 
limitations of lag 
indicators and added 
value of lead 
indicators.  
Significant steps have 
been taken to identify 
patterns and trends in 
incident data.  
The product of the 
above is fed back to 
senior management. 
Root cause analysis 
has been applied to a 
significant proportion 
of headline incidents. 
A suite of lead 
indicators has been 
identified. 
Quantifiable 
benchmarks have 
been established for 
a defined suite of 
complementary 
lagging and leading 
indicators. 
 
Significant steps 
taken to identify 
patterns and trends in 
incident data - 
including the use 
qualitative methods.  
Root cause analysis 
applied to all major 
and fatal accidents. 
A suite of lead 
indicators has been 
identified.  
Quantifiable 
benchmarks 
established for lag 
and lead indicators - 
with effective reliable 
measures of 
performance towards 
defined goals.  
The product of the 
above has been fed 
back to senior 
management - in a 
form that can be used 
to inform the decision 
making process, e.g. 
setting priorities for 
intervention and 
improvement.  
Comprehensive 
approach to identify 
patterns and trends in 
incident data, 
including the use of 
qualitative data.  
Root cause analysis 
is applied to all fatal 
and major accidents. 
A suite of lead 
indicators has been 
identified - with 
appropriate defined 
KPIs.  
Quantifiable 
benchmarks 
established for lag 
and lead indicators - 
with reliable 
measures of 
performance towards 
defined goals.  
The product of the 
above has been fed 
back to senior 
management - with 
evidence of having 
impacted on the 
decision making 
process, e.g. setting 
priorities for 
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Senior stakeholders 
see value in and use 
output from lead 
indicator data as 
indicators of safety 
management 
performance / 
progress towards 
improvement.  
Output from lead and 
lag indicators is used 
by safety 
professionals to 
identify priorities for 
intervention.  
Learning is 
systematically shared 
across the 
organisation.  
intervention and 
improvement.  
Senior stakeholders 
place value in and 
use output from lead 
and lag indicator data 
as indicators of safety 
management 
performance / 
progress towards 
objectives and use 
the output to inform 
decision making over 
priorities for 
improvement. 
Output from lead and 
lag indicators is used 
to identity the focus 
for intervention (topic 
/ location / function / 
personnel 
demographic) and 
options over nature of 
intervention.   
The organisation 
proactively engages 
with other 
organisations to 
share learning (e.g. 
via industry 
platforms).  
Quality of evidence 
 
Internal. 
External / benchmarking. 
3. Three or more biases can be ruled out: selection, 
attrition, performance and detection; or theme 
saturation. 
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Proactive / reactive. 
Reliable dissemination of learning. 
2. No more than two biases can be ruled out. Partial 
theme saturation.  
1. Highly biased: No more than one bias can be ruled 
out or no theme saturation. 
N/A (E.g. management information). 
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ANNEX C 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF INFLUENTIAL BEHAVIOUR 
CHANGE PERSPECTIVES 
This annex provides a description of key features, historical background, underpinning assumptions and 
recognised strength / weaknesses of some of the most widely applied behaviour change perspectives and 
techniques in the UK:  
• behavioural / behaviour-based safety; 
• workplace safety culture / climate; 
• choice architecture (nudging), and 
• (health) psychology social-cognition models. 
 
A high proportion of workplace safety and risk interventions are most appropriately characterised as 
atheoretical; the safety culture / climate tradition being a notable case in point, i.e. they reflect a pragmatic 
perspective, informed by established scientific insights, but lack a definitive theoretical basis.  This is in 
marked contrast to other behaviour change domains, many of which tend to be dominated by theory-based 
models that lend themselves to formal testing (see Dolan, 2012). 
 A great deal has been written on these topics, and there is insufficient scope within this document to provide 
a detailed review of influential contemporary behaviour change models (see Darnton, 2008). The following 
account aims to offer a summary of some of the key considerations and a commentary on recognised 
strengths and weakness of the more commonly encountered perspectives.  
 
C.1 BEHAVIOURAL SAFETY 
 
Behavioural safety, behaviour-based safety and behaviours modification (B.Mod)13 are umbrella terms used 
to refer to an array of intervention tools and techniques that, in varying degrees, reflect the principles of 
applied behaviour analysis / behaviour modification.  Rooted in foundation work within psychology, 
principally involving animals, a core assumption is that behaviour can be changed through conditioning and 
reward.  The unit of change is, generally, at a group level, e.g. employees who share a common 
demographic (typically this is geographical e.g. a defined work site). 
They are essentially an auditing activity, the theory of change relating using the output as a benchmark 
against which targets for improvement are set.  Change rests with setting targets for improvement that are 
claimed to be reinforced though the setting of normative goals which are claimed to motivate employees ’ 
goals or other forms of reward, e.g. badges, lottery tickets, charitable donations (see Annex D).   
Although originally conceived, and predominantly used, as a technique for addressing occupational safety 
issues, there is also potential to apply the approach to monitoring human factors elements of systems safety 
 
13 Note: An observation is that a significant proportion of the schemes and techniques that are currently 
marketed under the auspices of behavioural safety and behaviour modification have strayed some 
distance beyond what might reasonably be justified on the basis of the underpinning science. 
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issues in complex environments. Behavioural audit findings can also be used to monitor safety performance 
in order to inform managerial thinking over the need / priorities for intervention, and relatedly, as feedback 
on the effectiveness of live interventions (see Section 15). Indeed, there are grounds for concluding that 
there is a stronger case for using behavioural audit output for safety performance monitoring than as an 
adjunct to reward schemes aimed at motivating behaviour change.14 
The prevalence of behaviours needs to be assessed through regular, repeated observation / recording, 
using demonstrably reliable measures (quantifiable check-lists) that are bespoke to the site.  Meeting these 
criteria is important because: 
(i)  the higher the frequency of observations the lower the potential for random error; some sources 
recommend twice or three times per week. 
(ii)  observation criteria need to be clearly defined and tailored to the respective work-site to minimise 
the scope classification error so that the results from one observation can be reliable compared 
with the next. 
(iii)  checks need to be made that observers are using the check list in an equivalent way – minimising 
the number of observers/recorders is desirable. 
More sophisticated approaches tend to focus on the antecedents of behaviour (e.g. equipment left in an 
unsafe condition, evidence of interlock having been defeated, shortages of personnel, etc.) rather than 
behaviour per se, as this broadens the array of elements that can be considered.  It also reduces the 
potential for undesirable observation effects, i.e. personnel altering their behaviour due to becoming aware 
that they are being observed.  For this reason, schemes that are based on the direct observation of a 
sample of individual employees tend to be of questionable utility. 
A focus on antecedents (past behaviour) brings the more fundamental and desirable advantage of 
broadening the perspective on causality beyond the overt behaviour of front-line staff, to deeper issues e.g. 
condition of machinery, hazards within the built environment, insufficient supervision.  
A focus on presenting (visible-overt) behaviour components alone e.g. use of personal protective equipment 
(PPE), compliance with rules, with the implicit undertones of individual accountability and blame, risks a 
superficial perspective.  It is this partial focus that lies at the heart of the significant trades union opposition 
to behavioural safety programmes, that risks sullying the reputation of the behaviour safety / behaviour 
modification as a whole. 
Arguably, the primary value of the technique lies in the safety function / senior manager’s use of the arising 
data to highlight weaknesses that need addressing.  Some schemes use the findings as material to feed 
back to staff in safety briefings, or to stimulate discussion over ameliorative action, whilst others actively 
involve employee representatives in setting targets for improvement. Ultimately, it is important not to lose 
sight of the fact that behavioural audits are nothing more than that, in and of themselves they do nothing to 
influence the behaviour of personnel; it is the use to which the data is put and arising interventions that 
embody the potential for improvement.   
When used in conjunction with rewards, care needs to be exercised to select a system of reward that is 
appropriate to reinforce the behaviour(s) of interest, and which does not engender perverse motivations 
(see Annex D).  There is much debate over the durability of change arising from behavioural safety and 
behaviour modification programmes, particularly after the point at which rewards are removed.  The 
underpinning theory would suggest behaviour will revert to the pre-intervention level. While, there are claims 
 
14 Note: While one-off snap shot audits are sometimes branded as behavioural safety, and these have 
their own utility, they do not reflect the scientific premise (theory of change) that underpins the 
behavioural safety tradition and are most appropriately regarded as a separate enterprise. 
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of sustained change to produce positive shifts in workplace norms, such that they become a feature of an 
enhanced safety culture, robust evidence to substantiate this is sparse. 
 
C.2 SAFETY CULTURE AND CLIMATE 
 
The phrase safety culture is widely attributed to the IAEA analysis of the Chernobyl incident (INSAG4).  
However, the concepts of culture and climate were well established within wider organisational theory and 
research at that point. 
The concepts of climate and culture are perhaps a little vague and opaque.  Academics have spent 
considerable time attempting to distinguish between them, the product of which has arguably been to create 
more ‘heat’ than ‘light’.  Pragmatically, a useful working distinction can be to characterise climate as relating 
to contextual elements within both the sector e.g. prevailing market conditions, regulatory arrangements, 
and historical norms, and, not unrelatedly, structural and technological elements, safety systems, resources 
and operational priorities and similar within a given organisation.  In this definition, climate contrasts with 
culture, this being cast as the shared psychological orientation(s) of managers and employees working 
within the respective climate, e.g. as reflected in leadership style, employee beliefs, attitudes, norms and 
practices. 
The theoretical basis for the safety climate / culture perspectives is quite different from both behavioural 
safety and mainstream psychology motivation models of behaviour change.  The principal differences can 
be summarised as the following: 
• A focus on situational rather than individual (trait and dispositional) influences on employee 
behaviour; 
• The premise that change can (and should) be achieved though changes to situational (social, 
technical and structural) elements that lie beyond the individual, and  
• The premise that the realisation of change is the product of collective, rather than individual action. 
 
Foundation work set out to: 
• Identify a set of universal variables common to all organisations that represent the primary 
influences on safety culture / climate, and 
• Refine the identified headline influences to produce employee survey tools with the capacity to 
benchmark and monitor change over time. 
 
However, beyond the identification of senior management commitment and compliance with rules, findings 
revealed limited commonality across the different studies.  This gives rise to at least two conclusions: 
• findings reflect the different perspectives of the respective researchers / authors i.e. the topics / 
questions they included their surveys were simply different, or 
• different climate and culture variables are relevant in different organisations. 
 
The intervening period has witnessed the emergence of a significant array of climate / culture tools, of 
varying quality.   
Conducting a safety climate survey is not an intervention. Climate surveys are barometers. Their 
contribution rests upon the use of the results, being used to inform thinking over setting priorities for 
improvement.   
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C.2.1 Limitations and potential pitfalls 
The finding that the set of headline influences is prone to vary between sectors and organisations is in 
some tension with the ambitions of purveyors of commercially available tools, as an arising implication is 
that a generic tool may miss important context specific issues.  In recognition of this, some sectors and 
organisations have begun to develop their own sector-specific tools. 
While the output from climate / culture assessment tools is subjective, this does not render it problematic 
in relative terms, e.g. comparing one function or department with another, or evaluating change over time.  
However, it is important to keep in mind that responses to staff surveys (of all types) can be tinged with 
broader satisfaction or dissatisfaction with work and associated relationships.   
Many users under-capitalise on their climate surveys, because they fail to give sufficient consideration at 
the planning stage regarding how they wish to explore differences in profile across their organisation.  
Traditional contrasts of gender, age and ethnicity, for example, may be of relevance, but under many 
circumstances are less useful to know than structural components, e.g. job grade, functional role, 
department / function, work-site.  However, it is also important to keep in mind that too fine a degree of 
granularity (too small a sample) may preclude statistical testing of relationships.  Too detailed a focus also 
risks inhibiting respondents, due to the fear of being identified (e.g. how many part-time, female supervisors 
might there be at site x, in department y, of age z?). 
Climate and culture survey tools provide an indication of the status (relative positivity / negativity) for each 
of the constituent scales.  However, they offer no indication of their relative importance. Other techniques 
need to be applied to determine this (see part 3).   
 
C.3 CHOICE ARCHITECTURE PERSPECTIVES (NUDGES) 
 
All human beings are prone to exhibit an array of systematic biases in their decision making, e.g. unrealistic 
optimism (overestimation of personal ability / skill relative to others); aversion to loss (particularly where 
this relates to highly valued objectives in the near future), and selecting long-odds options when faced with 
an otherwise certain loss.  They are also prone to over-applying mental short cuts (heuristic rules of thumb), 
based on past success and / or as a reaction to complexity.     
A key insight is that the manner in which options are presented can render the likelihood of individuals (and 
groups) exhibiting (non-rational) biases and recourse to heuristics is increased, i.e. situational elements 
interact with cognitive elements. 
Recognition of the interaction between human decision-making traits / frailties and the configuration of 
choices that they face is not new science.  However, the concept of ‘choice architecture’ is, and is intuitively 
useful in highlighting the role of context on human sense-making and decision-making, together with the 
implication that relevant influences are potentially malleable and reconfigurable to produce better, more 
desirable, choices on the part of decision makers - in the current context managers and employees. 
Although influential authors such as Thaler and Sunstein have focused on public policy contexts, and offer 
modest comment on workplace applications, the concepts that they articulate are of no less relevance. 
Critically, the nudge perspective represents a divergence from the traditional education deficit (the 
presumption that undesirable behaviour is the product of ignorance) and (health) psychology behaviour 
change models (increasing worry over personal vulnerability motivates change – see below); but reflects 
alignment with the safety climate / culture and human factors perspectives.  Arguably, what the choice 
architecture perspective potentially brings to the safety and risk management arena is an intuitive means 
of characterising the interaction between features of work (structural, technical and psycho-social) and how 
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these have the potential to interact with cognitive elements (knowledge / sense-making, mental models of 
casualty, etc.). 
Echoing the safety culture / climate perspective, the focus is not on the individual as the unit for change, 
per se, but on finding ways to engineer the context in which individuals operate, that take account of how 
individuals (cognitively) operate.  It is not a rejection of, or necessarily incompatible with, individual 
motivational perspectives (see C.4), rather it is a supplement that lays claim to addressing more 
fundamental influences on decision making. 
Recognition of the role of context as an important driver of behaviour sponsors the conclusion that 
resolution lies in redesign / reconfiguration of the choice environment i.e. its architecture. Work 
organisations and, in particular, their senior managers, play a key role as choice architects.  Examples of 
relevant features of choice architecture include: organisational structure and functional / tribal rivalries; 
systems of reward (and sanction); relative priorities and availability / status of systems and resources; as 
well as cultural elements such as norms; openness; trust and blame. 
 
C.4 (HEALTH) PSYCHOLOGY MODELS OF BEHAVIOUR CHANGE 
 
The discipline of psychology offers an array of theoretical models of behaviour change.  These have been 
widely applied in public policy and workplace contexts, notably in the area of lifestyle-health agendas, e.g. 
with the purpose of motivating healthy diet, physical activity and smoking cessation.  To a lesser degree, 
they have also been applied to motivating self-protective behaviour within the occupational safety domain.   
The list of psychology behaviour change models below is not exhaustive; its purpose is to make the reader 
aware of the headline assumptions and limitations of intervention tools and techniques of this type that they 
may encounter (e.g. when reviewing published findings or when considering marketed tools and techniques 
that claim to be based upon them).  It is perhaps instructive to note that in a review of intervention practice, 
the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) (2007) concluded that, despite claims of being 
rooted in these models, linkages are often rather tenuous, i.e. there is a tendency for their designers to 
over-claim in this respect. 
Value expectancy models - principally the Theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1976); the 
Theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985); the Health belief model (Becker, 1974) and Protection 
motivation theory (Rogers, 1975). These characterise behaviour as a product of individuals weighing up 
the relative costs and benefits (in at least quasi-rational terms).  Interventions in this area most commonly 
take the form of publicity / education / awareness raising programmes designed to make employees feel 
(more) vulnerable, the assumption being that this will motivate greater caution - particularly where the 
magnitude of consequences is high.   
While these models vary in the degree to which situational barriers to the desired behaviour are taken 
account of, at a fundamental level they attempt to change individual orientation to an otherwise unchanged 
world. This is a primary contrast with the nudge, safety climate and human factors perspectives. 
The theory of planned behaviour, for example, has nothing to say about the array of potentially important 
external variables that constrain individual volitional behaviour, e.g. availability of resources, time pressure, 
quality of rules and procedures.    
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Figure 26: Theory of planned behaviour15 
Stages of change models – characterise behaviour change as a linear series of cognitive stages that the 
individual passes through to achieve behaviour change, e.g. smoking cessation, wearing PPE.  
Interventions based on staged models hinge upon findings ways to support individuals as they travel along 
their pathway to change.  The cognitive stages are typically cast as: pre-contemplation – contemplation – 
preparation – action, and sustained change.  The Trans theoretical model (Prochaska and Di Clemente, 
1986) and the Health action process approach (Schwarzer, 2008) are the most widely encountered. 
Weinstein’s (1988) Precaution-adoption process is a functionally equivalent five stage model (becomes 
aware of the hazard – believes in susceptibility of others – acknowledges personal susceptibility – decides 
to take personal precaution – takes precaution).  The stages of change approach benefits from a high 
intuitive appeal, which may go some way towards explaining the frequency of its application.   
Echoing the safety culture maturity concept, success is held to be rooted in matching the approach to 
intervention (with each individual) with the stage that they are currently at (see DeJoy, 2010). 
Both value expectancy and stages of change models assume that people are rational decision-makers 
motivated by utility maximisation (highest value / personal benefit).  However, the evidence on cognitive 
biases (see Box 8, and Annex D) highlights that people are prone to make non-rational decisions.  These 
(health) psychology models also tend to underplay the, often pervasive, role of situational influences on 
behaviour (e.g. systems of work and reward, cultural norms, and habituation effects).  By analogy, consider 
the proportion of New Years’ resolutions that flounder, despite good intentions.   
More fundamentally still, they assume that the individual enjoys sufficient autonomy to be considered the 
master of their own destiny.  In many workplace situations this is not the case, or at least the scope for such 
tends to be constrained to varying degrees, by external events and contingencies. 
To date, neither of these types of change model have received widespread application in the health and 
safety domain, beyond elements relating to motivating lifestyle (health) change.  However, occupational 
safety examples can be encountered, with respect to motivating self-protective behaviour.  Despite claims 
to the contrary, the overwhelming evidence is that the magnitude and durability of impact ranges from 
modest to weak, tending to be further eroded with the passage of time (NICE, 2007). 
 
 
15 Source: http://johnnyholland.org/2011/01/24/the-a-b-c-of-behaviour/intent-behaviour/ 
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Figure 27: The stages of change conceptual model16 
These, and similar models, share a theory of change rooted in the premise that increasing people's 
awareness of risk and attempting to make them feel vulnerable to the negative consequences of undesired 
outcomes will motivate attitude change that will lead to a positive change in behaviour.  Established social 
and cultural norms (observation and imitation of the behaviour of others) are typically characterised as 
barriers to change. 
Primary criticisms of the health behaviour change models surround claims that they: 
• overplay rationality and autonomy (choice); 
• overplay the degree to which attitude change translates to behaviour change; 
• are too focused on individual orientations, underplaying structural barriers to change, and  
• similarly, underplay social and cultural (particularly normative) counter influences.   
 
  
 
16 Source: http://johnnyholland.org/2011/01/24/the-a-b-c-of-behaviour/intent-behaviour/ 
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ANNEX D 
TRAINING AND COMMUNICATION INTERVENTIONS 
Training and communication interventions functionally relate to skills acquisition (expertise), awareness 
raising and plugging knowledge gaps in employee mental models of causality. 
Skills acquisition - at a basal level relates to sufficiency of expertise to perform a defined role.  Under 
most circumstances this is likely to prove sufficient.  However, it can also be important that employees 
possess an effective conceptual appreciation and understanding of their contribution to the wider productive 
process.  This can be acutely important where the consequences of their actions have implications for the 
safety of others and the integrity of systems, as well as the capacity to recognise the implications of 
anomalies that they may encounter, either during the course of their work or incidentally. 
The latter can be important from the perspective of organisational resilience.  For this reason, as highlighted 
by Weick (1991), there may be merit in training that extends beyond basic sufficiency to perform a defined 
role.  In practical terms, job / task appraisal might usefully include consideration of the extent to which there 
may be value in providing operatives with a  more conceptual appreciation of how the system operates and 
threats to its integrity and arising safety implications, i.e. a transformation from what have been 
characterised as ‘programmed’ to ‘concept’ operatives.  The effectiveness and completeness of near-miss 
reporting, for example, in part rests upon the capacity to recognise what constitutes a near miss and its 
implications. 
Characterising individuals / roles as those that can be performed by concept or programmed operators can 
offer a useful distinct characterisation.  Employees' mental models can be important (see Box 7).  The 
concept of a mental model (Craik, 1943) relates to how individuals make sense of their world, specifically 
their conception of which variables are salient in a given context and how they interact.  This includes issues 
relating to how systems operate, including functionality and causality.  Of central interest for psychologists 
and human factors specialists is discovering how employees believe systems they interact with operate in 
order to discover the extent to which these may be incomplete, partial or otherwise inaccurate.  For 
example, when faced with complex systems, understandings will tend to be more impressionistic, with staff 
disposed to fall back on intuitions and heuristic rules of thumb (refer to Annex C). 
Awareness raising - while embodying elements of skill acquisition, awareness raising routinely reflect the 
ambition to motivate some level of change in employee behaviour.  Potential pitfalls surround the tendency 
towards over-optimism on the part of senior managers that raising awareness will be sufficient, in and of 
itself, to motivate a change in employee orientation, particularly where it is assumed that the behaviour in 
question is the product of knowledge deficit.  Awareness raising has a role, but examples of instances 
where volitional risk taking occurs in the presence of substantially complete knowledge are routinely 
encountered in work organisations. 
Mental models - discovering and mapping employees' mental models of how systems function, and the 
related safety implications, is frequently revealing, and represents an important foundation step in the 
process of plugging knowledge gaps.  The mental models approach to training and education in risk relates 
to knowledge transfer, rather than motivational elements, per se.  Rather, it is based on the recognition that 
conceptual deficiencies may lead to even the most highly-motivated and engaged employees missing 
important things, misinterpreting the information they are presented with, or behaving in ways that may 
present to others as non-rational.  A simple example, drawn from the occupational safety domain, is of 
electricians aware of the risk posed by asbestos donning a dust mask in the erroneous belief that this will 
offer sufficient respiratory protection. 
Organisations and their managers are more prone to telling employees what we believe they need to know, 
based on the premise that this is known (by educators), rather than charactering employees’ extant 
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knowledge (and misunderstandings) in the first instance and tailoring communication content to plug 
detected gaps and shortfalls.   
Failure to do this risks redundancy in communication content (telling people things they already know), 
omission of material relating to important gaps and misunderstandings and relatedly, where a one-size fits 
all approach is adopted, leads to lost opportunities to tailor content to the needs to different segments of 
the workforce. 
Intervention logic considerations 
Assuming that the configuration of message content is optimised through good practice in its development, 
e.g. taking account of insights from the mental models perspective and broader insights on effective 
communication (see, for example Covello, 2004), the pathway from message transmission to behaviour 
change is perhaps usefully construed as passing through an array of filters: 
• Penetration - even when well targeted, the communication is unlikely to reach all relevant 
individuals.  Careful planning and an evidence-informed perspective on transmission pathways is 
needed. 
• Dispositional effects - some groups of employees may be (culturally) more receptive than others.   
• Locus of control - there may be differences between groups of employees over their latitude to 
act on the content. 
• Relevance - the message content must be relevant and appropriately focused and of a good fit 
with the physical and social context in which the receiver works. 
 
Where the objective of the communication intervention is to alter individuals' orientation to an otherwise 
unaltered environment (see Annex C), under a wide array of circumstances, rates of sustained behaviour 
change can be predicted to be modest.  The science surrounding foreseeable metrics of impact is far from 
exacting.  For illustrative purposes, Figure 28 offers a heuristic of the potential rate of attrition relating to 
the proportion of individuals who receive the message and that are likely to make sustained changes to 
their behaviour.  In the absence of complementary activity that addresses more fundamental issues, it is 
prudent to assume that, under a wide array of circumstances, this will be low. 
A salient reflective question, therefore, when reconsidering the merits of a communication intervention is: 
‘will the foreseeable proportion of individuals who change their behaviour as a result make a sufficient 
difference to render the intervention worthwhile?’ 
 
. 
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Target group receiving the message 
 
Message raises awareness 
 
Message content contains new & previously 
unknown material 
 
Message engenders more positive beliefs   
 
Message fosters more positive attitudes 
 
Enhanced intention to change behaviour 
 
Initial change in behaviour 
 
Sustained behaviour change 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Communication impacts on behaviour - rate of attrition a heuristic model (Weyman et al 
2012) 
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ANNEX E 
INCENTIVES AND REWARD SCHEMES 
E.1 INTRODUCTION  
Annex E is broken down as following: General principles; desirable, and undesirable features (in Box 13). 
E.2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Incentives are rewards and have been used with the aim of motivating employees and recognising effort 
since the earliest days of industrialisation.  More routinely ascribed to productivity related performance, they 
are now widely applied within the safety domain, where proponents claim major gains in safety 
performance.   
By contrast, detractors cast them in terms of bribery and superficiality, emphasising the propensity for ill-
conceived rewards to engender perverse motivations, e.g. suppression of incident / near-miss reporting; 
inducements to save time by sponsoring safety rule infringement, etc. 
Contemporary HSE guidance stresses the need to reward safe behaviour e.g. procedural compliance, and 
specific safe behaviours, but does not endorse rewarding non-events, e.g. accident free periods, reductions 
in number of lost time accidents (LTAs) etc. that are only weakly linked to individual motivation. 
Much of the evidence relating to claims of positive impacts on safety behaviour emanates from non-peer 
reviewed practitioner publications and on-line sources, rather than peer reviewed accounts. The balance 
of evidence from peer reviewed sources gives rise to the conclusion that impacts tend to be short lived.  
However, there are grounds for concluding that appropriately configured incentives can play a useful role 
as component of a broader programme of activity aimed at raising the profile of the safety agenda. 
For example: 
• encouraging employees (and groups of employees) to follow health and safety procedures; 
• rewarding employees who exhibit outstanding or desired levels of health and safety performance; 
• rewarding employees who actively support / contribute to a creating a positive health and safety 
culture; 
• encouraging participation in safety initiatives, e.g. climate surveys; safety committees, and 
• rewarding measured improvements / goal achievement in (group) safety performance, e.g. based on 
behavioural audit data. 
 
When designing reward schemes, a key consideration relates to the theory of change i.e. the mechanism 
by which the reward is assumed to impact on employee behaviour.  Many schemes encountered are weak 
in this area.  At the most fundamental level, the reward needs to be sufficiently attractive to employees to 
motivate some change in behaviour.   
Financial incentives are perhaps the most intuitive reward, but other forms of effort / performance 
recognition can also be effective. Setting achievable goals for improvement can motivate even in the 
absence of tangible rewards.  Rewards can also relate to third parties, e.g. charity donations.  But in all 
cases at the planning stage, it is wise to find out what is attractive to the target employees in a given context, 
rather than basing this on best guesses.  High value / highly valued rewards are more prone to engendering 
perverse motivations e.g. under-reporting of incidents, than low value rewards.   
Rewards can be ascribed to whole sites, individual managers, management teams, supervisors and groups 
of front-line employees and individual workers.  However, it is important to ensure that rewards further up 
the hierarchy do not engender perverse motivations on the part of managers and supervisors, and that 
rewards relate to good practice and not simply good fortune (see Part 3). 
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E.3 DESIRABLE AND UNDESIRABLE FEATURES 
This section provides a summary of review findings relating to desirable and undesirable features of safety 
reward and incentive schemes (based on Reviews by Weyman [1999] and Marlow [2005h]). 
E.3.1 Desirable 
Individuals - rewards for individuals that are in direct proportion to personal effort work best in 
motivational terms (but may be more challenging to configure).   
Teams - rewards that are ascribed to small teams can bring useful peer-policing gains, but tend to work 
better with cohesive teams with stable membership, i.e. they are unlikely to work well with teams of 
casual labour. 
Lead indicators - a focus on positive (lead), rather than negative components (lag) of safety, counters 
undesirable under-reporting motivations engendered by the latter. Rewards that relate to objective 
change / improvement in reducing risk, e.g. standards of housekeeping in a defined area which a defined 
group of employees has designated responsibility or levels of compliance with PPE rules, for a defined 
(usually less than 10 individuals) work team, and similar.  However, it is important that the assessment 
criteria are viewed by employees as fair and objective.  There is scope for linking this type of scheme to 
antecedent-type behavioural audits. 
 
Standards - rewards that relate to recognition of incremental improvement, or achievement of defined 
standards, are potentially less problematic than league tables (see E.3.2). 
 
Recognition - beyond point of work behavioural components, there is scope to recognise and reward 
employee continuations to the safety agenda through involvement, e.g. in safety committees or topic 
specific working groups, and through contribution to safety suggestion schemes, and similar. 
 
Feedback - the provision of feedback to employees on progress towards defined objectives can be a 
positive feature and have a positive impact on motivation, but is dependent on the direction of travel, i.e. if 
performance is falling this can have a negative impact.  Additionally, the feedback should be at a level of 
specificity that is meaningful to those who receive it.  Broadly speaking the more locally referenced the 
better, i.e. feedback on ‘your’ team, shift, or function, possibly extending to ‘your’ site is likely to have a 
more positive impact than on corporate level data. 
 
Safety and health - reward schemes are more commonly encountered with respect to safety 
performance, but can also be applied to aspects of occupational health, health monitoring and lifestyle 
health elements. 
 
E.3.2 Undesirable 
Large groups - rewards ascribed to large group of loosely coupled employees tend to have limited 
impact on motivating individual employees, i.e. there is a risk of free-rider effects. 
 
Good fortune - rewards, the receipt of which owes more to happenstance than effort are not useful, 
particularly where they do not relate to specific behaviours, e.g. accident free week or month, etc.   
 
Lag indicators - rewards relating to decreases in accident / sickness absence rate, if sufficiently 
attractive, will tend to suppress reporting.  This has implications for employee wellbeing, but also for 
organisational learning and resilience.  Almost all respected sources strongly caution against reward in 
relation to reduced incident rates. 
 
Lotteries - rewards in the form of raffle tickets / lottery tickets and variations on this, even when 
referenced to high value prizes are poor in individual motivational terms.  Receipt of a lottery ticket with a 
slim prospect of winning an electric toaster, or similar, is unlikely to give rise to significant behaviour 
change.  One-off prizes can be appropriate, e.g. relating to ad-hoc activities, but will have a very brief 
FINAL DRAFT PRE-PRINT 
181 
 
effect. 
 
League tables - e.g. relating to achievement of improvement goals (or accident free periods) can 
promote competition, which can enhance motivation.  But competitions of all types involve more losers 
than winners.  If the same individual or groups win all or most of the time, others are prone to quickly lose 
interest.  They can also sponsor disharmony over accusations of unfairness and cheating. 
 
Box-ticking - rewards (and performance indicators) that relate to rates of completion of safety procedural 
components e.g. rates of delivery of tool box talks, completion of point-of-work / ad-hoc risk assessments 
should be carefully considered with respect to their potential to engender self-serving behaviours on the 
part of those responsible for their delivery.  While such targets will likely be met, their contribution to 
safety improvement and resilience is questionable. 
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ANNEX F 
OUTLINES OF EVENTS STUDIED  
This Annex provides very brief descriptions of each of the events investigated and identifies in outline 
some of the key organisational and cultural factors which were present. These accounts do not present 
mitigating factors and the full range of factors involved, and readers are encouraged to read the 
referenced event investigation reports and the summaries contained within them, to obtain a fuller 
account of the events and the causal factors involved. 
F.1 PORT OF RAMSGATE WALKWAY COLLAPSE 
On 14 September 1994, part of a walkway at the Port of Ramsgate in the UK collapsed. Six passengers 
were killed and seven seriously injured. The walkway was in three sections:  
a) from shore to a floating pontoon, which was supported on a portal frame;  
b) across the pontoon, and  
c) from the pontoon to a docked ferry.  
The end of the section from shore to the pontoon failed because of an inadequate weld securing the end 
of a stub axle to the walkway. Investigation by the HSE showed that the design did not provide the support 
and articulation necessary. Estimates of loadings on the stub axles were inadequate and there was a failure 
to consider the effects of fatigue. 
Among the findings of the investigation of the event (HSE, Walkway collapse at Port Ramsgate: A report 
on the investigation) were the following:  
a) The project proceeded with very great haste (no contract papers were completed) and vital information 
was not provided to the designer and was not pursued.  
b) Overall, there was an absence of suitable arrangements for project management and supporting systems 
- including QA, with the client failing to act as an intelligent and competent customer for the work.  
c) In addition to other aspects of unsatisfactory leadership and a generally poor safety culture, warning 
signs of likely failure were not heeded and faults in input data and fabrication not identified. No maintenance 
procedures were requested or made available.  
d) There was a lack of liaison (communication) between client, designer, fabricator and a 'classification 
society' whose primary role it was to certify the structure. There was also a failure to keep records of 
decisions etc. and the role of the classification society was not made clear to the parties involved. 
e) Checks on calculations and assumptions were not satisfactorily carried out (lack of oversight).  
f) A risk assessment was not performed.  
F.2 HEATHROW EXPRESS NATM TUNNEL COLLAPSE DURING CONSTRUCTION 
A serious event occurred in October 1994 when tunnels being constructed under the central terminal area 
at Heathrow Airport collapsed, exposing the workforce and the public to 'grave risk'. Workers were 
evacuated only minutes before the collapse. By great good fortune, nobody was injured, but extensive 
disruption ensued with major consequent costs. A new technique for tunnelling in London clay known as 
the 'new Austrian tunnelling method' (NATM) was being used for the construction. An HSE investigation 
found that the direct causes of the collapse were substandard construction of a section of the tunnel over 
a period of three months, the use of a process called grout jacking which damaged the same length of 
tunnel, together with inadequately associated repairs and the construction of a parallel tunnel in failing 
ground (HSE, Collapse of NATM tunnels at Heathrow Airport.  A report on the investigation by the HSE into 
the collapse of new Austrian tunnelling method (NATM) tunnels at the Central Terminal area of Heathrow 
Airport on 20/21 October 1994). 
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The investigation found that the accident 'had all the hallmarks of an organisational accident'. The following 
inadequacies were among those identified:  
a) failures in 'defensive' systems that did not deal adequately with hazard identification and control of risks;  
b) poor design and planning;  
c) a lack of quality during construction;  
d) a lack of engineering control;  
e) poor safety management;  
f) unsatisfactory communication and reporting processes led to the views of the workforce not being sought 
and heard and,  
g) weaknesses in competence in various roles.  
In addition, HSE pointed to several major lessons that could be learnt from the shortcomings leading to the 
event, including:  
a) the need for the risks of major accidents to be addressed;  
b) the requirement for more rigorous understanding and assessment before adopting new or unfamiliar 
technologies;  
c) the need to take into account organisational and human factors issues when designing management 
systems;  
d) the need to balance production pressures by defensive precautionary systems and,  
e) the importance of high levels of commitment to health and safety and effective communication with the 
workforce.  
F.3 LONGFORD GAS PLANT EXPLOSION 
On 25 September 1998, a major explosion at the Longford gas plant in Australia killed two men, injured 
eight others and cut off Melbourne's gas supply for two weeks. The plant took gas from platforms in the 
Bass Strait, together with hydrocarbons, liquids and water. It removed the water, most of the liquefiable 
components and the small amount of hydrogen sulphide which was present.  Separation occurred through 
a series of heating, cooling and pressure changes.  Occasionally, variations in the mixture coming ashore 
caused disturbances in operating conditions. This accident occurred when a significant variation, coupled 
with a failed automatic valve, led to a major build-up of condensate. As part of the process control, pumps 
shut down automatically, leading to reduced oil flow and operators were unable to restart them. As a result, 
a 14-tonne heat exchanger became extremely cold. Operators then reintroduced warm oil, leading to 
catastrophic brittle fracture, an explosion, and a fire.  
The book by Hopkins provides very valuable insights into the event but since it was not an 'official' report, 
it has not been used as a source for the current study (Hopkins, Lessons from Longford: The Esso gas 
plant explosion). The event was investigated by a Royal Commission (Royal Commission, The Esso 
Longford gas plant accident: Report of the Longford Royal Commission). Many of the conclusions are also 
presented in the State Coroner's Report (State Coroner Victoria, Inquest into the deaths of Peter Brubeck 
Wilson and John Francis Lowery and the fire at Longford gas plant number 1). They concluded that 
organisational and cultural factors were important, including issues relating to:  
a) weaknesses in risk assessment;  
b) a lack of effectiveness of audit and oversight and leadership review of standards;  
c) inadequate levels of competence;  
d) insufficient monitoring and response to information about system status (e.g. tolerance of alarms);  
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e) communication issues, including during shift handover;  
f) the impact of organisational change, with cuts in staff numbers and other changes which included the 
possible effect of moving engineering support staff away from the plant to a separate location some distance 
away;  
g) shortcomings in the SMS and,  
h) poor reporting of process upsets and a failure to learn from previous events. It appears that occupational 
safety performance was good, but the same concentration on process safety was not apparent.  
F.4 TOKAI-MURA CRITICALITY ACCIDENT 
This criticality accident occurred on 30 September 1999, at a Uranium reprocessing plant at Tokaimura in 
Japan. Two operators involved in plant operations were killed by the radiation released by the criticality and 
a third was highly irradiated but survived. Evacuation within a 350 m radius of the plant took place and 
sheltering was required within a 10 km radius. The accident was the first serious nuclear-related accident 
ever experienced in Japan and the consequences to the Japanese nuclear industry (for example in a 
reduction in the trust of the general public), were considerable. The operators were dissolving fuel in 
stainless steel buckets and then by-passing equipment designed to preclude criticality and pouring the 
material into a large mixing vessel through a funnel. The fuel on this occasion was at a much higher fissile 
content than the operators were used to working with, and the 16.6 kg of uranium material became critical, 
resulting in a large release of radiation.  
Findings of IAEA (IAEA, Report on the preliminary fact-finding mission following the accident at the nuclear 
fuel processing facility in Tokaimura, Japan, 26 November 1999) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Safeguards, D of F.C.S, NRC review of the Tokai-mura 
criticality accident) reviews of the event identified significant organisational and cultural precursors. These 
included:  
a) managerial ‘neglect’ of an ‘orphan plant’;  
b) poor risk assessment;  
c) failures to act conservatively in setting and following procedures with poor supervisory control and 
communication with the operators;  
d) shortfalls in training and competence;  
e) deficiencies in internal and regulatory oversight;  
f) a SMS which had been changed without the application of adequate safeguards.  
The 'neglect' of the plant/process requirements appeared to result from the fact that the process being used 
was no longer regarded as a mainstream commercial activity and, since the time that it had been, major 
resource reductions in the company had occurred. It is interesting to note that Tokaimura again had a good 
occupational safety record and took product quality seriously. It appears that this may have again given 
false confidence regarding process safety. 
F.5 HATFIELD RAILWAY ACCIDENT 
On 17 October 2000, an intercity passenger train travelling between London and Leeds derailed near 
Hatfield station, north of London. As a result, four passengers were killed and over seventy were injured, 
including four seriously. The subsequent Office of Rail and Road (ORR) investigation (Office of Rail 
Regulation, Train derailment at Hatfield: A final report by the Independent Investigation Board) found that 
the immediate cause of the derailment was the fracture and subsequent fragmentation of the rail at a curve 
in the line. This was due to the presence of multiple and pre-existing fatigue cracks in the rail.  
The investigation findings included the following:  
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a) The maintenance contractor failed to manage effectively the inspection and maintenance of the rail in 
accordance with industry standards. 
b) The infrastructure controller failed to manage effectively the contractor, and also failed to implement an 
effective rail renewal operation.  
c) The event particularly highlighted issues relating to risk management. It had become increasingly obvious 
that risks were unacceptably high but, perhaps partly because of commercial pressures and as a result of 
major organisational changes, nobody took responsibility and ensured that risks were reduced to 
acceptable levels.  
d) A failure to heed warnings and act in the light of a potentially serious deficiency.  
e) A lack of conservative decision making, reinforced by failures in leadership, competence, communication 
and oversight. 
F.6 DAVIS BESSE PRESSURE VESSEL CORROSION EVENT 
In March 2002, the staff at Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) in the USA discovered a 'football 
sized' cavity in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head during an outage. Only a thin internal liner of 
stainless steel cladding remained at the pressure boundary. This was not designed to withstand the primary 
circuit pressure. They found that several RPV vessel head penetration nozzles had cracked and leakage 
of borated water from one of these was the source of the corrosion of the carbon steel RPV head. The plant 
had remained in operation, and inspection of the plant had been deferred despite a thick boric acid deposit 
having built upon the head. The problem of cracking was a well-known phenomenon and both the regulator 
(the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC) and industry body had recognised that it required licensee 
attention. The subsequent NRC inquiry (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Davis-Besse reactor vessel 
head degradation lessons-learned task force report) into the event concluded that the licensee had failed 
to resolve long-standing leaks, did not implement a boric acid corrosion control programme, and had not 
adequately implemented industry guidance and NRC recommendations. 
The NRC also concluded that the event had occurred because of a wide range of broader issues including:  
a) strained engineering resources and an approach which addressed symptoms rather than causes;  
b) a long-standing acceptance of degraded plant;  
c) a lack of management involvement and questioning attitude, together with a lack of engineering rigour;  
d) a lack of awareness of external experience - and a failure to address the lessons learned from past 
events;  
e) ineffective and untimely corrective actions and an inability to recognise or address a recurring problem;  
f) ineffective self-assessment of safety performance;  
g) weaknesses in response to - and implementation of - employee concerns, and  
h) a lack of compliance with procedures. 
F.7 LOSS OF SHUTTLE COLUMBIA  
The mechanical causes of the Columbia Shuttle disaster are now well known. In brief, during the launch, a 
small piece of insulating foam (about the size of a laptop) and weighing less than a kilogram, came off an 
external tank and collided at about 500 mph with the leading edge of the left-wing of the orbiter. As a result 
of the damage caused, the shuttle overheated and disintegrated on re-entry to the earth's atmosphere, 
whilst travelling at 14,000 mph and at a height of 205,000 feet.  The crew of seven were killed. Some 84,000 
pieces of debris were recovered.  Fortunately, nobody on the ground was injured, but as the debris (hitting 
the ground at 10,000 mph) dropped 70 miles north (over Dallas/Fort Worth), the consequences could have 
been much worse.  
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The independent inquiry into the disaster (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board report) concluded that ‘NASA’s organizational culture had as much to do with this 
accident as the foam did’. Organisational and cultural issues were in some respects similar to those of the 
Challenger disaster in 1986. Among the issues found were the following:  
a) NASA had become ‘reactive, complacent and dominated by unjustified optimism’. For example, requests 
to examine the leading edge in flight were denied. A culture existed which required those raising concerns 
to prove that it was unsafe rather than the reverse.  
b) NASA did not provide effective checks and balances.  
c) Communication was ineffective (with resistance to new information).  
d) NASA did not have an effective independent safety programme, and had not demonstrated the 
characteristics of a learning organisation.  
e) An issue (foam hitting the wing) that had once been seen as a significant safety risk had been 
‘normalised’ over time into a maintenance issue.  
f) External pressures to meet schedules and the impact of organisational changes (such as the greater use 
of contractors and the loss of in-house expertise), had significantly increased prior to the disaster. 
F.8 PAKS NUCLEAR PLANT FUEL CLEANING EVENT 
Paks nuclear power station in Hungary had been experiencing an accumulation of corrosion deposits in the 
primary circuit of its units. Magnetite deposits on fuel cladding had reduced flow through coolant channels, 
thus affecting heat transfer to the coolant and leading to a reduction in output and potential safety 
implications. In October 2002, it was decided to build an ex-core cleaning system on a considerably 
increased scale compared with an earlier test. A very aggressive schedule agreed with the assigned 
contractor sought to have the new system designed, installed and ready for use by March 2003. In 
December 2002, a preliminary design was submitted to the regulator with a request for urgent action, and 
about a month later a license was granted with only one regulatory comment on the safety analysis. After 
one successful cleaning run, on 10 April 2003, fuel assemblies were again transferred to the newly installed 
fuel cleaning tank. At the end of the subsequent cleaning process, the assemblies were left in-situ and the 
tank was not opened within the timescale designated by the assigned procedure. Radiation alarms then 
sounded within the reactor hall and staff were evacuated. It was assumed that a fuel assembly was leaking, 
but several days later, pictures revealed that most of the fuel had suffered significant damage. Analysis 
showed a range of design deficiencies, including an inadequately sized pump; wrong assumptions about 
coolant flows in a flawed thermo-hydraulic analysis for the scaled-up design which was cleaning 'hot' fuel 
straight from the reactor (unlike an earlier small scale test); inadequate instrumentation and, poorly 
communicated and understood arrangements for lifting the tank head. 
An investigation by the IAEA (Report of the expert mission conducted under the IAEA technical co-operation 
project) revealed indicative 'safety management and safety culture weaknesses'. These included the 
following:  
a) The responsibility for operation of the fuel cleaning system was turned over to the contractor, despite the 
fact that safe operation required an interface with - and depended upon - plant systems.  
b) The aggressive schedule for an unproven system led to a safety (risk) assessment which was not 
rigorous and was not subject to conservative decision making.  
c) The operational and emergency procedures were not reviewed and approved by the client, and 
procedures relating to the lifting of the tank head and for positioning fuel assemblies were inadequate.  
d) Problems in implementing procedural requirements were not reported and addressed - indicating a poor 
reporting culture.   
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e) There was no challenge of the design or operation of the fuel cleaning system, even though analysis 
showed that boiling could occur in only nine minutes. 
f) There was poor communication and inadequacies in training, and these reduced the ability of the plant 
to act as a learning organisation. 
 
F.9 TEXAS CITY OIL REFINERY EXPLOSION 
 
This event has been a major source of learning and has been the subject of three comprehensive 
investigations. On 23 March 2005, a distillation column overflowed during the start-up of an isomerisation 
unit. This occurred as a result of known faulty equipment, misleading and inadequate information, 
inadequate communication, poor use of procedures and a lack of competent supervision and oversight 
during the process. Liquid hydrocarbons vented through a blowdown stack into the atmosphere and the 
consequent large flammable vapour cloud was ignited by a nearby vehicle.  This led to a series of 
explosions and fires killing 15 workers and injuring 180. It also led to offsite damage and was also very 
costly, both in direct business terms and in reputational damage.  
 
From the many organisational and cultural issues which were identified as precursors to the accident, the 
Baker Panel (Baker et al, The report of the BP U.S. refineries independent safety review panel) 
emphasised:  
a) the need for improved safety leadership, with process safety as a core value. There was a high turnover 
of refinery managers and sometimes inadequate resources combined with 'initiative overload' within a weak 
management of change system;  
b) failure to provide an integrated and comprehensive SMS;  
c) the need for greater process safety competence;  
d) a requirement for improvements in process safety culture - including greater operating 'discipline' and 
the need to develop a trusting, positive and open environment;  
e) clearer expectations and accountabilities and better support to line management and,  
f) the need for better process safety performance indicators, more effective auditing, and more effective 
board monitoring within a longer-term focus.  
A US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) Study (Chemical Safety Hazards Investigation Board, 2007, 
Investigation report: Refinery explosion and fire) identified similar issues. Key organisational findings 
included:  
a) cost-cutting and failure to invest, together with production pressures and the failure to address the impact 
of organisational change;  
b) lack of a reporting and learning culture;  
c) a failure to respond to deficiencies (e.g. long-standing mechanical integrity and instrumentation 
shortcomings), with a response that was 'too little, too late' with a lack of focus on controlling major hazard 
risks, and  
d) a dysfunctional safety culture with a 'check the box' mentality (even when requirements had not been 
met).  
BP also published an open, very informative and wide-ranging report (Mogford, J, Fatal accident 
investigation report - Isomerization unit explosion final report) which highlighted among other things:  
a) a working environment in which trust and motivation had eroded, with resistance to change;  
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b) poor reporting, hazard identification and upward communication of safety issues with adequate 
'challenge';  
c) significant failures to follow procedures which were not updated and appeared not to be regarded as 
important, together with a lack of awareness of company standards;  
d) a lack of rigour and follow-through in training;  
e) audits which appeared to ignore the history of previous incidents and near-hits;  
f) acceptance of high process safety risks and a general inability to see them;  
g) poor supervision (lack of role models) and handover provision and,  
h) a lack of accountability, unclear roles and responsibilities within a complex, siloed, inward-looking 
organisation. 
BP rightly prided itself on an excellent occupational safety record and this may have, again, provided false 
confidence regarding process safety. 
F.10 LOSS OF CONTAINMENT AT THE THORP SELLAFIELD REPROCESSING 
PLANT 
In April 2005, British Nuclear Group Sellafield (BNGSL) discovered a leak from a pipe that supplied highly 
radioactive liquor to an adjacent cell. Approximately 83,000 litres of liquor had leaked onto the floor of the 
cell. It was estimated that the leak had remained undiscovered for about eight months because leak 
detection equipment was not in working order and there had been a failure to follow operating instructions. 
The most likely cause was fatigue failure from the swinging motion of the suspended tank during an agitation 
process which was part of normal operation. This resulted from 'design inconsistencies' and a modification 
which overlooked the impact on pipework and which was not subject to an adequate risk assessment.  
The HSE carried out an investigation (HSE, Report of the investigation into the leak of dissolver product 
liquor at the thermal oxide reprocessing plant (THORP), Sellafield) leading to 55 recommendations. In 
summary, findings and recommendations that were relevant to this report included:  
a) changes to design had not been risk assessed by competent assessors;  
b) alarms were ignored, non-compliance with procedures were allowed, and there was a failure to keep the 
plant in working order;  
c) there was the lack of a questioning attitude and 'challenge' (failure to regard a leak as credible in a new 
plant which was viewed as being very well-designed);  
d) a deficient associated safety culture - with senior managers not setting an example; 
e) a lack of training of the workforce so that they did not understand key precautions, why relevant 
procedures were necessary, and why related 'workarounds' were unacceptable;  
f) shortcomings in arrangements, roles and responsibilities;  
g) questions about the effectiveness of monitoring, audit, and review and,  
h) a failure to learn from previous events using a structured system which implemented learning and was 
supported by reviews of effectiveness. 
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F.11 BUNCEFIELD FUEL STORAGE EXPLOSION 
A delivery of unleaded petrol was in progress at the Buncefield oil storage depot in Hertfordshire, UK in 
December 2005. The receiving tank (holding six million litres) overflowed and the resulting vapour cloud 
ignited leading to a major explosion. Because it was early on a Sunday morning there were many fewer 
casualties than might have occurred at other times, but although there were no fatalities, forty people were 
injured. The ensuing fire was 'the largest in the UK in peacetime' and 'the devastation was enormous'. 
Because fuel and fire-fighting chemicals flowed from leaking bunds, significant environmental 
contamination occurred. The report into the event concluded that 'the environmental, social and economic 
toll was considerable'. During the filling operation, an automatic tank gauging system 'flat-lined' and could 
not record the tank levels. The control room supervisor was not alerted to the situation. Furthermore, an 
independent high-level switch was inoperable and had been 'sticking' for some time. Thus, automatic 
shutdown did not occur. 
A wide range of organisational and cultural deficiencies were identified by the inquiry into the event (jointly, 
the HSE, the Environment Agency [EA] and the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency [SEPA]) (The 
Buncefield incident, 11 December 2005 - The final report of the major incident investigation board). These 
were judged to reinforce findings from Texas city and Longford. Among the key issues identified were:  
a) a lack of clear and positive process safety leadership with the necessary competence. A joint venture 
corporate structure led to insufficient board involvement in which leaders did not apply effective control, 
with insufficient time and resources made available;  
b) growing working pressures on staff and increasing throughput, together with a lack of clear information 
and inadequate management of change provisions;  
c) management systems which were both deficient and not properly followed; 
d) a culture which did not encourage the detection of signals of failure with a sufficiently quick and effective 
response, together with a lack of a questioning attitude;  
e) lack of a clear understanding of major accident risks (there was again a concentration on occupational 
safety), with risk control processes that were inadequate;  
f) supplier inputs were taken for granted and the client did not act as an intelligent customer; 
g) communication at shift handover was poor and,  
h) auditing on the SMS and its application, and board oversight were not effective.  
F.12 LOSS OF THE NIMROD XV230 AIRCRAFT 
A Royal Air Force (RAF) Nimrod aircraft (XV230) was lost in September 2006 on a mission over Afghanistan 
as a result of a catastrophic fire. It led to the deaths of the fourteen personnel on board. A full investigation 
of the causes of the accident at the accident site had to be curtailed for military reasons, but some limited 
information was obtained. An internal board of inquiry was held followed by an independent in-depth inquiry 
led by Charles Haddon-Cave QC (The Nimrod review - An independent review into the broader issues 
surrounding the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006). This concluded that 
the most likely cause of the loss was an escape of fuel during air-to-air refuelling, with the cross-feed/SCP 
duct acting as the ignition source. The Haddon-Cave report presented a comprehensive discussion of the 
potential physical causes of the loss, together with a detailed analysis of the organisational and cultural 
issues involved. Many similarities to other disasters were noted (e.g. Columbia and Texas City). The title of 
the inquiry report includes the phrase 'A failure of leadership, culture and priorities' and an important quote 
of relevance is 'The importance of investigating and understanding the organisational causes of accidents 
cannot be overstated' (page 459). 
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Of the very large amount of material contained in the Haddon-Cave report of relevance to this document, 
the following points are particularly relevant:  
a) There was 'insufficient leadership' and an 'overview' was not taken. There was also a lack of management 
attention, supervision and oversight.  
b) Major organisational changes, many arising from changes to defence provision, had led to ever-reducing 
resources with increasing demands affecting safety and a failure to prioritise.  
c) The safety culture was deficient with 'can do: will do' becoming 'make do'. The culture was process 
dependent and relied on box-ticking - leading to a safety culture 'which does not work'.  
d) The development of the safety case was very poor ('a lamentable job') and no overall risk assessment 
was carried out.  
e) There were many concerns regarding contractor interfaces (including procurement), failure to act as an 
intelligent customer, and management and communication shortcomings.  
f) The SMS (airworthiness) was of 'byzantine complexity'.  
g) Competence and learning issues were not adequately addressed. 
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ANNEX H 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACCRONYMS 
 
Acronym Definition 
ACSNI Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations 
AEB evolution and barrier function 
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable 
BNGSL British Nuclear Group Sellafield 
CLD causal loop diagram 
CLM causal loop modelling 
COM-B capability, opportunity, motivation and behaviour model 
CREAM cognitive reliability error analysis method 
CSB U.S. Chemical Safety Board 
DBNPS Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station 
EA Environment Agency 
EI Energy Institute 
FMEA failure modes and effects analysis 
FRAM functional resonance analysis method 
GMB group model building 
HAZOP Hazard and operability study 
HMSO Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 
HR Human resource 
HRA human reliability analysis 
HRO High reliability organisation 
HSC Health and Safety Commission 
HSE Health and Safety Executive 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IOSH Institution of Occupational Safety and Health 
ISO International Organization of Standardization 
IT information technology 
KPI key performance indicator 
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Acronym Definition 
LOPA layers of protection analysis 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NATM new Austrian tunnelling method 
NICE National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
OE operational experience system 
OH occupational health 
ONR Office for Nuclear Regulation 
ORR Office of Rail and Road 
PPE personal protective equipment 
PRA probabilistic risk assessment 
QA Quality assurance 
QMS quality management system 
QRA qualitative risk assessment 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RCA root cause analysis 
RIDDOR Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013 
RPV reactor pressure vessel 
SEPA Scottish Environmental Protection Agency 
SMS safety management system 
SQEP suitably qualified and experienced 
STAMP systems-theoretic accident model and processes 
THORP thermal oxide reprocessing plant 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States (of America) 
USA United States of America 
 
